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Abstract
The Theses examines some of the hypotheses advocated by some economists as the 
vital instrument toward economic growth and development. The works of Mckinnon, 
Shaw and the Neo-Structuralists were reviewed in great depth.
Following the postulations of the Mckinnon - Shaw school and the Neo-Structuralists 
models, the role of interest rate in particular in financial deepening and capital 
development became the centre piece of the study. In addition to that, is the demand 
for money, the effects of financial liberalisation and short run growth.
Attempts were made to provide a contrast on the arguments advocated by the 
Mckinnon - Shaw school with those of Taylor et al ie the Neo-Structuralists.
In support of the hypothesis that financial sector of an economy is important in its 
economic development, especially in a repressed economy, a thorough review of the 
Nigerian Financial System, Structure, Growth and Developments were provided in this 
thesis.
The thesis also provides an indepth review of the Nigerian structural adjustment 
programme (SAP) and the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),and the 
World Bank,
The objective of the dissertation, which provides the theme binding the chapters 
together, is a critical analysis of the operation of the structural adjustment programme 
for the financial sector, in the light of the theories of financial reform.
The grouping into chapters provided a detailed overview of the main schools in 
financial development theory and the Nigerian economy.
The thesis also relates to the dynamics of the demand and supply sides of the 
economy, the issues of foreign investment and policies and financial intermediation. 
Anyalezu Nkem Guthlac 
1992.
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Chapter 1
LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE FINANCIAL REPRESSION
The seminal works by Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) both independently marked 
the take-off or trend of empirical research interest into the workings of financially 
repressed economies and the beneficial effects of financial liberalisation.
Chapter 1 deals with the general review of financial repression, while in chapters 2 
to 4 , 1 review the work of Mckinnon, Shaw and the Neo-structuralist. Chapter 5 deals 
with the structural adjustment and the Nigerian financial system. Chapter 6 is a 
consolidation of chapters 1 to 5 and review of "Order of Economic Liberalisation". 
Chapter 6 examines in detail some of the policy prescriptions such as exchange rate 
misalignment, quotas, GATT, and foreign exchange volatility which were all briefly 
mentioned in other chapters. Chapter 1 examines the available empirical evidence on 
the essential relations of what is now termed the financial repression paradigm 
[Dornbusch & Reynoso (1989)].
The Mckinnon - Shaw hypothesis is that a repressed financial system disrupts 
development in several ways ie; the savings channel are underdeveloped and the return 
on savings is negative or unstable and financial intermediaries that collect savings do 
not allocate them efficiently among competing uses. Firms are discouraged from 
investing because poor financial policies reduces the returns to investment or make 
them excessively unstable.
However, liberalisation on the financial sector from interest rate ceilings and other 
restrictions facilitates economic development and growth, because higher interest rates 
lead to increased savings and a more efficient allocation of capital.
The common features in the Mckinnon - Shaw models are illustrated in a diagram 
popularized by Maxwell J. Fry (1979, 1980, 1988, 1989). Saving, S(YX) at income 
level Yj is a function of the real rate of interest, while F denotes financial repression
14
taken to consist of administratively determined nominal bank lending and deposit rates 
which hold the real rate of interest below the equilibrium level and actual 
investment limited to Ix which is equal to the amount of saving receivable at the real 
interest rate (See Figure 1).
Raising the interest rate ceiling from F to F* ie ^  to r2 , raises saving and 
investment. It also rations out low yielding investments which are no longer profitable 
at the higher interest rate r2. The level of income increases in this process and shifts 
the savings function to S(Y2). The Mckinnon - Shaw models policy prescription is to 
raise institutional interest rates and or to reduce the rate of inflation .
Real Rate
of Interest
ij -^Investment Saviifjf*
Figure 1. Saving and Investment Under Financial Repression 
The optimal result therefore, is to eliminate entirely the interest rate ceilings so as to 
maximise investment and raise further the average efficiency of investment. This is 
indicated on fig. 1 by the equilibrium at S(Y3)/I3 at r3 and a higher level of income Y3.
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Before I proceed to review each model separately, I want to discuss briefly five 
sections survey studies relating to the impacts of interest rates on saving, financial 
intermediation, investment, economic growth and the demand for money. I will briefly 
discuss the studies on the impact of financial intermediation on economic growth and 
the available evidence as well as the assessment of the empirical support for the 
financial repression paradigm.
1. THE IMPACT OF INTEREST RATES AND SAVING
The hypothesis advanced is that financial liberalisation will develop positive real rates 
of interest which will equate the demand for and the supply of savings and lead to 
increased saving (Thorton 1991). Williamson (1968) carried out one of the earliest 
studies in this area by doing a cross section study of the determinants of personal 
saving for six Asian countries. He adopted the real rate of interest, permanent and 
transitory disposable income as explanatory variables in his equation to explain 
personal saving. The role of interest rate in his study offered little support in that, the 
interest rate elasticity of saving in five of the Six countries in the sample were 
negative. The regression coefficients were not statistically significant at the 5% level 
(t - statistic).
Gupta reported a mixed results in three Asian countries he studied, with personal 
saving in India responding positively to real rates of interest and per capita disposable 
income (Gupta 1970). He postulated (1984a) that increases in the interest rate would 
affect financial saving positively and physical saving negatively based on his study of 
twelve Asian countries.
He concluded that support for the Mckinnon - Shaw hypothesis was quite limited by 
reporting a positive and significant coefficient for the real interest rate in only four 
countries (Gupta 1984b).
16
Furthermore, he analyzed separately (Gupta 1987) countries from Asia and Latin 
America using a pooled cross-section and time series data for the period 1967 - 76. 
By regressing gross national saving on nominal interest rate, permanent income 
transitory income, expected rate of inflation, the financial intermediation ratio and 
inflation uncertainty variable, he found that financial conditions do not affect saving 
in Latin America but they did in Asia1. He then concluded that pooling across 
continents were inappropriate.
Fry, over a series of studies, found a fairly consistent support for a positive effect of 
real interest rates on savings, for example, Portugal and Turkey (Fry 1977 & 1978); 
by regressing the ratio of national saving to Gross National Product (GNP), on the 
growth rate of GNP, the foreign saving rate and the real deposit rate of interest, with 
both exhibiting positive and significant interest rate coefficient. Giovannini (1983) 
contested the stability of Fry’s results by re-estimating the equation used by Fry, but 
for a later time and also he substituted the national saving with domestic saving 
variable and found the coefficient of real interest rate insignificant.
In De-Melo and Tybout (1986) study of Uruguay 1962 - 83, by regressing the ratio 
of gross domestic savings to GDP on real interest rate, the growth rate of real GDP 
and the ratio of foreign savings to GDP were found to be positive but not significant 
interest rate coefficient. Their restricted model using the data 1962 - 73, yielded a 
positive and highly significant interest rate coefficient. Perhaps this could be attributed 
to a greater shock in the economy between the period 1973 - 83 which caused the 
reported significant influence on the real interest rate. Rossi’s (1986) examination of 
the liquidity constraints using a pooled time series and cross section data also found 
the real rate of interest2, positive and significantly different from zero.
1 ,ie a positive and significant interest rate coefficient for Asia and insignificant for Latin America.
2 ... defined as a time deposit rate of interest or foreign interest rate adjusted for inflation .
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2. THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND INTEREST RATES
Financial repression postulation is that, higher real rates of interest increase the 
incentives to save by means of bank deposits. Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983, p.28), 
provided evidence on the relationship between interest rates and the growth of the 
broad money supply in real terms in a cross - section study of twenty one countries 
for the period 1971-80. Their study concluded that, the data supports the argument that 
positive interest rate policies stimulates output growth and that this stimulus is 
transmitted mainly through the intermediation of financial asset accumulation. The 
question here is whether the increase in intermediation comes from the shift out of 
unproductive assets such as gold or if there is a diversion of funds from the curb 
market.
The answer may be that curb market could actually reduce total intermediation3 
because funds diverted from the curb to the formal market becomes subject to reserve 
requirements (this is discussed in detail in chapter 6). For example, Van Wijnbergen 
(1982) found that substitution between the curb market and the time deposits has a 
greater importance than substitution between currency and time deposits in his study 
of South Korea.
Total intermediation can be defined as formal (official) banking system intermediation plus curb 
market intermediation.
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3. THE INTEREST RATES AND INVESTMENT
The hypothesis presented by empirical research is that increased real interest rates 
raise the quantity and quality of investment. This is effected from two sources; first, 
higher rates increases the availability of domestic credit to finance investment (which 
can be viewed to be similar to the savings effect). The second potential source is 
through Mckinnon’s (1973) hypothesis4 of the complementarity of money and capital. 
Abe, Fry, Min, et al (1975), Fischer (1981) & Jao (1976) tested the complementarity 
hypothesis and found a positive and significant coefficient by including real money 
balance in the investment or savings function.
Another group also tested the complementarity hypothesis by including either an 
investment variable or a savings variable in the demand for money function. Their 
results were mixed, for example, Akhtar (1974) using the investment rate rejected the 
hypothesis in a study of Pakistan. In Harris (1979), only Taiwan out of five Asian 
countries supported the hypothesis.
Fry (1978) using the savings rate, found a negative and significant coefficient in a 
pooled time series study for ten Asian countries and rejected the hypothesis. Finally, 
Thorton (1989 & 1990) using a time series data for India and Nepal found a positive 
and significant coefficient for the savings rate in a demand for money balances in a 
savings function. Based on this result Thorton concluded that the complementarity 
hypothesis was relevant for the poorest countries.
4 In this case, investment projects are lumpy and investors must accumulate their investment balances 
in the form of deposits until the required amount of principal is reached.
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4. INTEREST RATES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The empirical postulation is that increased real rates of interest promote economic 
growth. Fry (1980) indicated that about half a percentage point in economic growth 
was forgone for every one percentage point by which the real rate of interest is set 
below its equilibrium level (this is expanded in chapter 6).
Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983) identified a positive and significant relationship between 
interest rates and the rate of growth of real GDP while Khatkhate (1988) results is the 
complete opposite. Finally, Gupta’s (1984) results for twenty five Asian and Latin 
American countries were unfavourable but the results for India and Korea (1986), 
higher real interest rates raised economic growth.
5. IMPACT OF THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
Mckinnon5 stressed the basic complementarity between money and physical capital
wherein money was viewed ... as a conduit through which accumulation takes place.
But in an empirical test of several Asian countries using a pooled time series data, Fry
(1978), found little evidence to support Mckinnon’s hypothesis and concluded that:
"one would have to look a long way down the development ladder, to 
some of the world’s least developed countries in a search for 
complementarity (p.474)".
Mckinnon’s work is one of two catalytic pieces of work in financial development, the 
other being Shaw (1973), Both of them combined theoretical analysis and illustration 
of the malfunctioning of capital markets in developing economies.
A critical lesson from both works is that, at low real interest rates people would not 
want to hold much money or other financial assets. As a result, the financial system 
would not adequately be able to fulfil one of its primary functions of integrating 
capital and credit markets and equalising returns to investment. The hypothesis that
5 Mckinnon (1973, p.60) Capital and Money in Economic Development.
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money and capital are complementary was Mckinnon’s explanation for the way in 
which real interest rates impact upon saving, investment and growth.
The hypothesis was based on two assumptions. The first is that, all economic units are 
restricted to self finance and that there are important indivisibilities in investment 
activities. The second is that potential investors must accumulate money balances 
before they can be able to invest. The indivisibility of investment implies that the 
demand for money will be larger, the greater the ratio of investment to total 
expenditure. Therefore, complementarity is expressed by the following demand for 
money function:
(M/P)* = / ( Y/P, I/Y, 7 t, T) (1)
where M = money stock 
P = price level 
Y = nominal income 
I = gross investment
7t = the nominal rate of interest on bank deposits and 
T = expected rate of inflation 
The money stock is broadly defined in the formulation because it represented the 
conduit between saving and investment, while complementarity is reflected by the sign 
of the partial derivative with respect to the ratio of investment to income i.e:
5(M/P) / 5(I/Y) > 0
Fry indicated that the hypothesis rests on the assumption that investment opportunities 
are plentiful so that it is actually the supply of saving that is the binding constraint 
and not the demand for investible funds. This implies that domestic saving Sd, can 
be substituted for investment as the finance motive in the demand for money function. 
This is represented as :
(M/P)* = /(Y/P, Sd/Y, k - le) (2)
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The reversibility of the complementarity relationship posses the main obstacle. The 
conditions of money supply has an impact on decisions to save and invest, therefore, 
it works both ways. The savings function can be specified to be determined simulta­
neously with the demand for money as:
(Sd/Y) = f (  M/P, 5(Y/P), Sf/Y, E/Y) (3)
where 8 represents the growth rate of real income
Sf = foreign saving which also represents a substitute for 
domestic saving.
E = exports.
Testing for complementarity between money and capital in the finance motive for 
economic development, Thorton6 made the demand for money a function of the 
saving ratio and simultaneously, saving was made a function of the real money 
balances. Using the 2SLS method of estimation, his results indicated a strong support 
for the Mckinnon hypothesis in both the demand for money and the saving function.
6 Thornton, J. (1990), ‘The demand for money in India : a test of Mckinnon’s complementarity 
hypothesis’. S & D no2 1990, pp. 153 - 156.
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6. FINANCIAL DEEPENING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The hypothesis is that financial deepening and economic growth are positively related. 
Jao (1976) estimation of sixty seven developing and developed countries indicated a 
support for a relationship between financial deepening and growth. Restricting his 
regression to developing countries alone, per capita real money balances showed a 
significant coefficient. A positive relationship between real GDP and the real supply 
of domestic credit was obtained by Tun Wai (1980) in a time series study of twelve 
developing countries. Similar results were also obtained by Lanyi and Saracoglu 
(1963) between the rate of growth GDP and the rate of growth of the broad money 
supply. Mckinnon, Shaw and others assumed that causation runs from financial 
intermediation to economic growth, but an earlier work by Patrick (1966)7,
Fritz (1984) and Jung (1986), used Granger-type causality test to investigate the 
relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth. Fritz’s result 
confirmed Patrick’s hypothesis that financial intermediation causes economic growth 
at an early stage of development and the causation is reversed at a later stage, while 
Jung concluded for a moderate support for the supply-leading phenomenon in LDCs. 
Most of the evidence available provided a consistent support to the theoretical 
argument advanced by the Mckinnon - Shaw’s view for example Fry8. Dornbusch and 
Reynoso (1989) called the evidence in support of the financial repression paradigm 
"episodic". They argued that financial repression is only important when financial 
instability becomes the dominant force in the economy.
What Dornbusch and Reynoso failed to consider is the potential for a shift to savings 
from purchase of gold, real estate and other inflation hedges that predominate under 
financial repression. Higher domestic interest rates can also reduce the flow of savings
7 Patrick, Hugh T. "Financial Development and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries (1966  
p64 )..the direction changed in the course of economic development since as the process of real growth 
occurs , the supply - leading impetus gradually becomes important and the demand - following financial 
response becomes dominant.
8 Maxwell Fry - Money , Interest and Banking in Economic Development .Baltimore : The Johns 
Hopkins university Press 1988 pl54....The bulk of the empirical evidence is consistent with the Mckinnon- 
Shaw view that financial liberalization increases saving , improves the efficiency with which resources are 
allocated among alternative investment projects and therefore raises the rate of growth .
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abroad, thereby increasing the amount available for domestic investment.
Most of the empirical work concentrated their emphasises on the marginal changes in 
financial conditions rather than discrete changes that result from a deliberate program 
of financial liberalisation. A few African countries of which Nigeria is now among 
them, have taken steps to liberalise their financial system. Since 1989, Nigeria has 
moved quite considerably towards full financial liberalisation.
Ajewole9 (1989), provided a strong evidence for the relevance and workability of 
Mckinnon’s model of money demand in Nigeria. He indicated that the real demand 
for money in Nigeria is considerably influenced by real income and return on physical 
assets. His test also indicated that the broad definition of money performs much better 
than the narrow definition in the specification of money demand function with respect 
to Nigeria. His paper finds that there is no significant difference in real money 
demand when expected and current (actual) income are used and interest rates does 
not significantly influence money demand in Nigeria, even though it is correctly 
signed. On this basis he concluded that the Mckinnon model is relevant and very 
much workable in the Nigerian economy.
Just as Diaz-Alejandro (1985) pointed out, reform programs in many countries 
achieved success, especially in Asian countries but the support for liberalisation has 
been called into question by the experience of a number of Latin American countries. 
Their experience suggests existence of many potential pitfalls for financial 
liberalisation programs and under certain conditions could lead to a worsening 
economic situation; more especially, since liberalisation gives money holders access 
to interest-bearing returns. This could add to public sector financing problems by 
reducing government revenue from money creation. Therefore, for financial 
liberalisation to succeed, the conditions must include other factors such as: price 
stability, fiscal discipline and policies credibility10, realistic exchange rates, balanced 
budget and a conducive investment climate.
9 Joshua O . Ajewole - some evidence on demand for money in Nigeria A test of Mckinnon model of 
demand for money in developing economies . Savings & Development 1989 no.2 ppl83 - 197.
10 see Fry (1989 p26).
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6.1 Summary
This chapter sets out the structure of the thesis. The seminal works of Mckinnon, 
Shaw and the Neo-Structuralist are outlined. It reviews the hypothesis that a repressed 
financial system disrupts development especially the savings channel and the financial 
intermediaries, leading to inefficient allocation of financial resources among competing 
uses.
The role of interest rates and saving in determining economic growth are important. 
Hence the postulation that financial liberalisation will develop positive real rates of 
interest which will equate the demand for and supply of savings, leading to increased 
saving.
The thesis examines the impact of financial intermediation and interest rates. 
Analyzing the hypotheses that higher real rates of interest increase the incentives to 
save by means of bank deposits, leads to a critical analysis of the curb market.
On investments, empirical research suggests that increased real interest rates raises the 
quantity and quality of investment. That is, higher rates increases the availability of 
domestic credit to finance investment, as well as through the complementarity of 
money and capital. There are still some concern as the support for liberalisation. This 
is because of many potential pitfalls for financial liberalisation, which under certain 
conditions could lead to a worsening economic situation.
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Chapter 2
A REVIEW OF MCKINNON’S 
MONEY AND CAPITAL IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
Mckinnon attempted to demonstrate the common features of capital market distortions, 
examination of existing monetary theory and adaptation of a fresh approach to the 
relation between money and physical capital in developing countries. The Theses 
aimed to show why liberalisation of financial markets is necessary and how to achieve 
it without necessarily incurring social and economic costs.
Although his analysis paid less attention to the economies of Africa, one can still 
relate it very much to the Nigerian economy1. The analysis suggests that as long as 
potential access to international trade remains free, successful development remains 
mainly on policy choices made by national authorities in the developing countries. 
However, the inadequate economic performance of many LDCs has been attributed 
to repressive economic policies that they pursued. For example, Nigerian interest rates 
policy has been a subject of controversy. They were controlled and regulated up to 
1986 when the structural adjustment programme (SAP) was introduced2.
Money and finance as governed by the banking system played a crucial role in 
Mckinnon’s analysis. This is because of his concentration on the domestic capital 
market and the way by that market’s operations are influenced by monetary and fiscal 
policies. The expansion of real stock of money3 or its fall and high rate of taxation 
critically affects the relation between saving and income and the efficiency of
1 socialist economies will be included in so far as they use prices to allocate resources in commodity and factor 
markets ( Mckinnon 1973 p2) . note ..Nigeria is a capitalist economy .
2 Bullion CBN Vol 15 no2 April /  June 1991 pl5.
3 That is, the stock of money measured by its value in relation to the prices of goods and services .
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investment; a phenomenon which is very apparent in Nigeria.
Keynesian and Monetarist theory has failed to explain the dominance of real money 
balances in the capital markets of developing countries4. The theories to treat real 
money balances and physical capital as substitutes for each other, a relation of 
complementarity better explains the data in certain circumstances.
Mckinnon developed an alternative monetary model, even though the theoretical 
approach lacks the completeness and elegance of either the short run Keynesian theory 
or the long run Monetary growth models, but suitable for explaining the relationship 
between monetary processes and capital accumulation in developing countries. This 
is of course to a certain extent depending on which policy is adopted in relation to 
inflation versus deflation, higher or lower rates of interest and growth or stagnation. 
Mckinnon assumed that adopting the appropriate strategies will lead to liberalisation 
of foreign trade and rationalisation of domestic taxes and expenditure policy. 
Successful liberalisation will in turn allow for radical restructuring5, whereas, a 
correct policy towards the foreign exchange rate is necessary to secure control over 
the money supply.
Nigeria has now followed this doctrine of liberalisation - a complete overhaul and 
indeed a very radical outward looking restructuring of the capital market, with greater 
vigour since 1989. Although there is ample evidence of success, assessment of its 
success or failure still needs a little time.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international consortia of lenders 
from the industrialised economies has been a source of aid to Less Developing 
Countries (LDCs), in an attempt to liberalise foreign trade. Nigeria operated one of
4 The theories of monetary and financial processes which assumed capital markets to be ‘perfect’ with a single 
ruling rate of interest, whilst underdevelopment is overwhelmingly fragmented in real rates of interest.
5 of tariff, quotas and licensing restraints on foreign trade .
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the most stringent exchange controls throughout the 1970s up to 1986, The policy led 
to a massive capital flight from the country, in an attempt to secure a better 
investment elsewhere as a consequence of the repressive interest rates policy followed 
by the authorities6. There are two prevalent views about the effect of liberalisation of 
the constricted foreign trade sector. The first is that liberalisation is taken as the 
removal of import controls and tariffs7. The second is that foreign aid and/or other 
external credits should come with liberalisation of foreign trade8.
2.1 CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC FRAGMENTATION
Public intervention is generally viewed as pervasive and unsuccessful. The reason is 
due to the perception that a particular market or sector is malfunctioning and the 
authorities as a consequence are obliged to take action. This pressure for intervention 
is the result of severe fragmentation in the economy, which manifested in the form of 
distorted effective prices for land, labour, capital and produced commodities as well 
as unequal access to the same technologies.
Primary commodity exports enclaves in Nigeria were controlled by foreigners in the 
19th and early 20th centuries and much of the population remained outside of the 
market economy. Indigenous entrepreneurs had little access to capital or advanced 
technologies and limited skilled labour. Hence, eradication of economic and political 
colonialism requires introduction of new industrial activities, manufacturing of goods 
previously imported and mobilisation of domestic factors of production. The 
authorities attempt to achieve this through manipulation of commodities prices and by 
intervening directly to help some individuals or sectors of the economy at the expense 
of others. These are usually through large subsidies by the government in the form of
6 CBN Bullion April /  June 1991 p l5, Nigerian SAP p236 -237, Balabkin p9-10 . Nigerian 4th national 
development plan 1981 - 85 p.40 .
7 Gradual liberalization -(i) essential producer & consumer goods (ii) essential consumer items ; ie , removal of 
protection first from domestic industries that are capable to withstand foreign competitions and then , the infant 
industries .
8 Aimed to provide external financing for the increased imports that removal of controls seems to portend .
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tariff protection, import licenses, tax concessions and low-cost bank finance; mainly 
to the small urban elites.
The income inequality did not help to induce high rates of saving and the authorities 
remained reluctant to reduce the disposable income of the rich investors whose unique 
access to investment opportunities is guaranteed by the web of official controls and 
the endemic fragmentation.
2.2 THE IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION AND CAPITAL MARKET
Liberalisation does not require intervention in commodity markets hence, an explicit 
policy for improving the operations of factor markets is necessary to persuade the 
authorities to cease intervening in the market. Mckinnon’s main objection is not just 
the imperfections in factor markets but the use of Neo-classical approach of treating 
labour, land and capital symmetrically as primary factors,(1973 p. 8).
He hypothesised that fragmentation in the capital market causes the misuse of labour 
and land, suppresses entrepreneurial development and condemns important sectors of 
the economy to inferior technologies. Discrepancies in the rates of return on some 
physical and financial assets causes some worthwhile investments to be forgone.
Development is not accumulation of homogeneous capital of uniform productivity.
Hence, Mckinnon accused economic theorists and econometrician’s of incorporating
this into production functions and by so doing, most policy makers in LDCs held it
implicitly and followed a strategy of maximising short run gross investment in
virtually any form. In an attempt to develop a distinct alternative view of the role of
capital, he defined economic development as:
"the reduction of the great dispersion in social rates of return to 
existing and new investments under domestic entrepreneurial control".
By using the capital market in developed economies as an illustration, their success 
in monitoring the efficiency with which the existing capital stock is developed, by 
pursuing returns on physical and financial assets towards equality, thereby increasing
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the average return. He argued that, economic development so defined is necessary and 
sufficient to generate high rates of saving and investment. The adoption of Best 
Practice Technologies and learning by doing.
However, arbitrary measures to introduce modern technology via tariffs or to increase 
the rate of accumulation by relying on foreign aid or domestic forced saving, will not 
necessarily lead to economic development. Therefore, there is a need for unification 
of capital market, which will increase the rates of return to domestic savers by 
widening exploitable investment opportunities and eliminating other forms of 
fragmentation.
2.3 FISHERIAN APPROACH
Mckinnon argued that, this approach is not suitable when dealing with capital market 
in LDCs, because the income categories are not well defined, nor are the processes 
of saving and investment specialised as in the advanced economies.
By adopting Irving Fishers approach to Impatience and Inter-temporal choice; as 
extended by Jack Hirchleifer, he provided a framework for viewing the way in which 
the capital constraint impinges on the decision making of entrepreneurs. Inter-temporal 
decision making depends upon 3 factors (maximisation of entrepreneurial utility): First 
is endowment or owned deplorable capital, second is productive or investment 
opportunity and the third is market opportunities for external lending or borrowing 
over time outside the entrepreneurs own enterprise. The resulting dispersion in real 
rates of return reflects the mis-allocation of existing capital and represses new 
accumulation.
Most Nigerian entrepreneurs with potential production opportunities lacks resources 
of their own. They have no access to external financing. Those with substantial 
endowments may lack internal production opportunities. Many have no external 
investment outlets at rates of return that accurately reflects the prevailing scarcity of 
capital.
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The advantage of Fisherian approach is that it explains the individuality of each 
entrepreneur with own production opportunity which depends on specialised 
knowledge or expertise9. With availability of external financing, the need for public 
decision making in each sphere of economic activities is thus reduced, leaving only 
the problem of indivisibilities acting as a barrier to productive innovation. Without 
indivisibilties, self-financed capital accumulation-where saving and investment take 
place within the same firm, might well be sufficient for a slow diffusion of new 
technologies and a gradual reduction in the dispersion in rates of return within and 
between various enterprises.
Marginal innovative investment by poor but thrifty entrepreneurs would thrive because 
divisible investments could be financed directly by marginal reductions in current 
consumption. Given the constraint of self-financed, an entrepreneur can still decide on 
investment and consumption decisions that serve to allocate his capital over time. 
However, limitation to self finance biases investment strategy toward marginal 
variations within the traditional technology.
The Neo-Classical theory of technological diffusion and learning differs from this
analysis of external financial constraints. The Neo-Classical approach assumed an
existence of a perfect capital market which equalises all private rates of return,
disregarding the importance of indivisibilities. It also assumed similar production
opportunities for entrepreneurs. Imperfections in technological diffusion therefore
requires a different approach as to external or extra market effects.
Mckinnon disagrees with Kenneth Arrow’s suggestion
"[the economic implications of learning by doing, Review of economic 
studies vol 29 June 1962 ppl55 - 173 ] that learning by doing in an 
industry depends on the level of gross investment undertaken by 
individual firms and because of spill-overs, becomes socially beneficial, 
thus warranting subsidy to gross investment in high learning 
industries".
The view was based on the argument that traditional technologies coexist with modern 
ones and as such the authorities can determine which of the two has the highest rate
9 Factors of production available to him/her : family labour land holdings and structures .
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of return. He admitted that internal rate of return itself can attract enough resources 
to individual firm-households if an adequate capital market exists. In which case state 
subsidies can be used to encourage technical innovations in research and development. 
The essence of high rates of interest according to Mckinnon’s view is that artificially 
low cost loans or subsidized credit programs may be unnecessary and unwise10. The 
availability of loans and high rates of interest for both lenders and borrowers 
introduces a beneficial dynamism for development, such as increase in net saving, 
investment and technical improvement. The policy of running a low or negative rates 
of interest on financial assets and limited loan availability may not accomplish these 
benefits11. This point is discussed further in Chapter 5.
The major set back of capital accumulation through self finance is uncertainty, which 
fragments the interest rate structure so that it no longer reflects the community or 
entity’s collective time preference. Thus, the effect of risk is to lower the rate of 
interest on safe loans and at the same time raise the rate of interest on unsafe loans, 
hence offsetting the effects of bad debts or defaults in repayments.
In contrast to the fragmentation hypothesis, the existing theories of uncertainty assume 
that individual savers and investors are free to select whatever portfolios of physical 
and financial assets they choose. Which means that they can borrow and issue their 
own liabilities at a given rate of interest. James Tobin -(mean variance) and Kenneth 
J, Arrow -(state preference) explained the uncertainty phenomenon in their essays- 
liquidity preference as behaviour toward risks and the role of securities in the optimal 
allocation of risk bearing. The mean variance and state preference relates to the 
expected returns in holding an alternative physical and financial assets.
Tobin, in Optimal Monetary Growth [JPE Vol.76 July/Aug. 1968 p.854] indicated that 
risk - averters will hold safe assets with lower yields, while risk takers will hold high 
variance high return assets and may borrow or leverage themselves to do so.
10 Borrowing at a rate that exceeds the marginal rate of return under self financed investments .
11 R. Reichel The macroeconomic impact of negative real interest rates in Nigeria, S & D 1991 no3 pp273 - 282
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In developing countries, individuals and governments do not have a common menu 
of physical assets, with objectively defined probability distributions of rates of return. 
Therefore, investment and production opportunities will be highly differentiated.
The reason for the existence of subjective uncertainty among firms and households is 
that economic units are small, and it is difficult for outsiders to obtain reliable 
information if they contemplate obtaining a loan or to invest. LDCs have poor data 
on repayment and many units operate with little liquidity. Therefore leverage becomes 
a key consideration in assessing with this interpersonal uncertainty and imperfect 
information. Those firms that can obtain access to external financing will have their 
initial endowments as an essential form of collateral to ensure good performance. 
Thus, initial endowment and capacity to borrow are complimentary over a long range, 
while leverage is particularly limited for those with small endowments.
For Nigeria, finance is severely limiting the inter-temporal redistribution of 
enterpreneurial resources as well as collateral in demand for a quick visible payoff on 
the trickle of external finance that is provided [ie time and quantity dimension]. As 
a result of these constraints, the government have implicitly been influenced and 
responded by adopting a policy of Second-Best.
To summarise, Mckinnon essentially used the Two-Period Fisherian diagram to 
provide a graphic and technical account of how individuals may abstain from 
consumption (investment) in period one in order to argument their consumable output 
in period two. He also used it to demonstrate the problem of indivisibilities by 
assuming that internal investments within the firm can only be in the context of two 
distinct technologies; Traditional T1 T l ’ and Mechanised T2 T2’ .
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Figure 2.1: THF, RELATION OF INVESTMENT TO THE CHOICE
BF.TWF.F.N TRADITIONAL AND NEW TECHNIQUES.
I I TiO K A
Ike.
The diagram provided a sketch of how consumption constraint and limited endowment 
lock the entrepreneur into an inferior technology at point B indicating that with access 
to external finance, entrepreneurs will break out of the traditional mode with higher 
production, using new technology [at D] and with much improved consumption at [C] 
given the rate of interest slope [DC]. The external finance will therefore allow for 
new investment [Yx D J in the new technology and increased consumption in period 
one, ie; from B to C, while the gain in private and social productivity permits him to 
repay the loan in period two.
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2.4 THE INTERVENTION SYNDROME
Mckinnon attributed the intervention syndrome on public policies which circumvents 
domestic capital market as:
a. Tariff protection for infant industries: A technique commonly used by LDCs to 
implement the Import Substitution Strategy. He argued that only repayment of 
principal and interest without tariff protection would vindicate new industries, since 
early losses must be held to social account and also as learning has its own social 
opportunity costs. The fact is that, even with spin-offs from established firms optimal 
public policy will still need a functioning capital market for inter-temporal allocation 
in the learning phase and in the succeeding growth phases of the new industry.
b. Import licenses and financial leverage:
This has a number of merits to the affected firms such as the privilege to import at 
lower prices which enhances operating cash-flow of the firm, identifying exclusive 
right to import an essential commodity as an opportunity for the particular firm to 
obtain external financing more easily as well as force the restraint on leverage to 
relaxed. A major drawback to this, apart from the financial aspects is the bureaucratic 
inefficiencies it brings about and the monopolistic power which acts as the offsetting 
social cost for concentrating import licenses for essential inputs to a selected few 
industries so as to reduce fragmentation .
c. Corruption - While he did not conclude that corruption is endemic in LDCs, he did 
however, indicate that disequilibrium commodity prices arising from intervention is 
a likely outcome of corruption.
d. Diverting from microeconomic arguments in favour of assisting firms , restrictions 
on foreign trade tilt the whole structure of relative prices, reducing commodities in 
some areas as it raises some. The cheapening of capital goods therefore implies an 
acceptance of the doctrine of uniformly productive capital and a disregard of the need 
for rationalized inter-temporal and inter-entrepreneur allocations.
e. Most governments intentions has been to transfer the rural economic surplus which
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may be in the form of redundant labour or of inferior savings to the industrial sector. 
Failure to create the appropriate financial mechanism which will induce agricultural 
savers to part with their surplus voluntarily at the posited high rates of return to be 
earned in industry.
f. With land serving as a crucial endowment, limited leverage increases the importance 
of initial endowments in defining production opportunities. Therefore, land reform or 
redistribution should be given a priority in an attempt to achieve equality in current 
and future incomes in agrarian economies. According to Mckinnon, egalitarianism 
motives can hardly be faulted when differences in landholding are extreme and 
nonagricultural production opportunities are severely limited for those without the 
necessary capital.
His views were based on the findings of Minhas on India’s fragmentation [Minhas - 
rural poverty, land redistribution and development strategy: facts and policy, IBRD 
1970], by advocating for land consolidation, motivated by irrigation or green 
revolution without waiting for government action, ie through purchase. The idea is that 
it will achieve the requisite external finance or internal liquidity, especially if there is 
a prohibition on the resale of land, giving the example of the (ejidos holders) Mexico 
land reform of the 1920’s of such policy failure.
g. There is some kind of ambivalence in the treatment of foreign direct investment and 
commercial credit by the LDCs. Initially direct investments are accepted with tax 
concessions over a certain period and then followed by periods of xenophobia which 
includes the threat of nationalisation. Nigeria followed a similar policy in the 1960s 
through to the early 1970’s, then came the indigenization exercise by the then Military 
government. When the civilian government was returned in 1979, they reversed the 
policy and throughout the 1980s both the central and state governments sort foreign 
direct investment by any means they can. This is discussed in greater details in chapter 
5.
In the absence of domestic capital market, the use of foreign financial services
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becomes very attractive, although the risk for foreign investors in the domestic 
economy may be very expensive, the domestic nationals do not see it in that way. 
Hence the formulation of the hypothesis that domestic entrepreneurs have investment 
opportunities but lack financing from outside then' own enterprises to exploit these 
opportunities.
The pitfalls of reliance on direct foreign investments is the possibility of breaking the 
external financial constraint at the cost of relinquishing investment opportunities to the 
foreigners, therefore, forcing the government to intervene by introducing complicated 
bureaucratic controls. There is also the danger of returning to colonial economy where 
expatriates operate with freer access to external capital market in such a way as to 
deprive domestic entrepreneurial development.
2.5, THE IMPACT OF SELF FINANCE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Self finance is defined as the investment within a particular enterprise of savings 
accumulated in that enterprise. Through public interventions constraints on external 
finance are relaxed by enriching the holder of a production opportunity or by making 
that opportunity appeal’ to be more profitable so that the immediate cash-flow from 
it increased, for example, by raising output prices through tariffs or through subsidies.
The problem with using prices to generate cash-flows for investment is that it distorts 
their allocation functions in planning. Firms supported by government subsidies or 
import licenses or through increase in relative prices have their incomes increased 
irrespective of the level of efficiency and productivity. Changing the commodity terms 
of trade in favour of manufactured goods extracts forced saving elsewhere especially 
in rural areas, without compensation. The argument in favour of this policy is that the 
industrial sector may save more out of given incomes than do the rural people, so that 
the transfer increases total saving.
In contrast, self finance tilts the distribution of income towards the wealthy in urban 
areas, who already have some resources, hence a concentration of economic 
stratification while lucrative productive investment opportunities are forgone.
37
2.5.1 THE TAX - SUBSIDY SOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF THE
SECOND BEST
Tariffs and other trade restrictions constraints the domestic price structure by 
differentiating it from the foreign prices through increases in the domestic prices of 
the protected commodities. Higher internal prices also causes inefficiency by unduly 
restricting consumption of its output in an attempt to stimulate production. Therefore, 
the proposition that a direct production subsidy, leaving price unchanged, is the "Best" 
technique for stimulating production to some predetermined level. Mckinnon used the 
word " Best" to describe a technique or a policy that achieve some preassigned goal 
with the least social cost to consumers and to other producers. Thus, tariff is the 
Second Best Strategy and could diminish welfare even if there were some 
economically legitimate reason for stimulating production in one industry at the 
expense of the others. A crucial factor in the liberalization process is the elimination 
of price distortions.
Since fragmentated economy faces severe fiscal constraints, financing a production 
subsidy by raising taxes generates its own distortion. Tariff on competing imports has 
the advantage of being fiscally sound in the sense that consumers of the output of the 
protected industry are effectively taxed to subsidize producers. However there are few 
problems with production subsidy. Capital constraints are not recognised as to 
allocation of resources and budgetary problems. There is biasness towards self finance 
in the protected industry. There is no recognition of the role an external financial 
structure in facilitating efficient decision making over time.
Fiscal policy can be very important and can fulfil some essential roles in using 
differentiated taxes and subsidies aimed at specific industries. Apart from 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies, the tax instrument of the government can be 
fully employed financing public goods, redistributing income and mobilising an 
economic surplus of revenues over current expenditure of capital formation.
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2.6. MONEY AND THE PRICE LEVEL
On the nature of the financial structure in LDCs, Mckinnon gave an account of the 
observations by Raymond Goldsmith [1969 ch.l- 9 and June 1971 pp. 129 - 92]; that 
individual economic units issue relatively few primary securities as a proportion of 
saving, indicating the greater reliance placed on self finance by firms in LDCs in 
contrast to the industrialised economies.
Most of this limited flows of primary securities are obtained by the financial 
institutions rather than being placed directly with final savers. The liabilities of the 
monetary system - the central plus deposit banks, accounting for about two-thirds of 
all claims on intermediary financial institutions that are held by the public.
Modern financial sector consists of instead, indirect financial or intermediaries through 
which the monetary system operates. In the developed countries, there is a much wider 
spectrum of available financial assets of which some may be fairly close substitutes 
for money. Money acting as a legal medium of exchange is uniquely risky and default 
free for short term transaction.
Since creditors has limited knowledge of the repayment capability of potential debtors 
in LDCs, financial instruments other money can not easily be marketed. Therefore, 
money’s role as a means of payment and its sanction by the state, greatly enhance its 
value as an instrument of private capital accumulation. But the usefulness of money 
as a financial inshnment depends on the willingness of firms-households to hold it. 
However, over finite time intervals, no real financial asset is risk-less. The 
attractiveness of money depends on some combination of the percentage rate of 
inflation:
P = [ 5p / 8t ]/p (1)
(proportional changes through time in the designated variable) the nominal interest rate 
on deposit d and the convenience of holding money, especially in demand deposits 
and currency. P is the comprehensive price index of goods in terms of money, while 
the real return on holding money is d - P*. The instruments of monetary policy open
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to the authorities are the nominal interest rate on deposits d, and the rate of expansion 
in nominal cash balances M. P and P* are determined by using the interaction 
between the demand for and supply of money as the prime mover of the price level.
If the supply of nominal money rises faster than the demand for real balances, price 
inflation occurs. In contrast with Keynes, the divergence between ex-ante flows of 
investment and saving in other to establish an inflationary gap which can move the 
price level under conditions of full employment12. The demand for real balances will 
be positively linked to the rate of growth in real output, as well as being strongly 
influenced by the real return on holding money, with a possibility of rising more than 
output in times of rapid economic transformation. With m determining the actual and 
expected rate of change in the price level, the authorities can indirectly set the real 
return on money d - p* at any level they considers to be socially desirable.
In terms of causality, it can be either way that is, the rate of price inflation as 
determined by m can affect the rate of growth of real output both in the short and 
in the long run. Therefore, monetary policy strongly affects private propensities to 
save and invest in the LDCs.[p.40]. That is, conditions that make M/P attractive to 
hold enhances rather than inhibit private incentives to accumulate physical capital. 
Conversely, large real money holdings are normally the result of the monetary systems 
maintaining a high and stable real return to the holders of money.
Mckinnon in conclusion to this complementary hypothesis about inflationary finance 
and deposit rates of interest for accelerating development, deviated from the usually 
accepted monetary theory. His reason for doing so was that, both the Neoclassical and 
Keynesian theories were designed for the mature (ie the developed or industrialised) 
economies with functioning capital markets and may be unsuitable if uncritically 
applied to the fragmented economies.
12 Mckinnon ( 1973 p.39 )
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2.6.1 MCKINNON’S CRITIQUE OF THE PREVAILING 
MONETARY THEORY
The critique concentrated on the Neo classical theory because of their views of 
monetary and fiscal policy in determining the rate of capital accumulation and growth 
in real output, as well as the formation of prices and price expectation to the issue of 
nominal money. However, he did not assume that the Keynesian theory is the best 
alternative in dealing with the LDCs.
He was concerned about the Neo-Classical assumptions that; capital markets operates 
perfectly and costlessly to equate returns on all real and financial assets [other than 
money] with single real rate of interest. The assumption that inputs [including capital] 
and outputs are perfectly divisible with constant returns to scale, as well as the 
assumption of important transactions demand for money in avoiding the need for 
double coincidence of wants, that real money balances are socially costless to produce 
for satisfying the transactions motive.
2.6.2 SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN MONEY AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL
The “substitution effect" can be defined as an indication of the possibility that large 
real cash balances will inhibit the accumulation of physical capital in the private 
sector. Using the money demand function as an example; 
where Y = aggregate real income
r = the real rate of return on physical capital and non-monetary financial assets. 
The opportunity cost to wealth holders of holding money will be;
r - ( d - p* ) [1]
where d - p* is the real return on money.
Therefore, the equilibrium demand for money will be:
[ M/P ]D = H[ Y , r , d - ‘p* ] [1.1]
where : 5H / 5y > 0 , 5H / 5r < 0, and 5H / S( d - p* ) > 0.
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The substitution effect between money and real capital in the Neo Classical Monetary 
Theory can be considered as follows:
The economic power of 8H / 8r < 0 is that, money is held because of its role as a 
medium of exchange, whereas capital is held for its own separable rate of return. An 
increase in r will cause individual asset holders to switch at the margin from money 
to more beneficial capital, hence forgoing some of the transactions advantage of using 
money. At the same time, an increase in the real return on holding money for a given 
Y and r reduces the demand for physical capital in the portfolio of private savers.
In his consideration of the substitution effect between money and aggregate investment 
for an economy on a balanced growth path, Mckinnon used the monetary growth 
model of Levhari and Patinkin (the Role of Money because it took into account the 
theories by Milton Friedman, Harry G. Johnson, James Tobin et al; in deriving the 
Neo-Classical investment function that holds in equilibrium growth. In his exposition, 
money is assumed to be an input into the aggregate production function. That is 
without entering private utility functions but affects welfare only through increasing 
flow of real goods and services available to individuals. In which case the aggregate 
production function can be written as:
Y = G ( K , L , M/P ) [2]
where; K = divisible physical capital of uniform productivity 
[source of transaction demand for money];
M/P = the real stock pf money;
Y = real output quantity of goods and services;
L = Homogeneous labour input;
Therefore, if money is the productive social wealth such as physical capital, then 
increases in the real stock of money are a part of disposable income yD, where:
YD = Y + 8( M/P ) / dt = Y + ( m - p ) [3]
Note that the Neo-Classical assumption that savings function is arbitrarily specified
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as a given fraction, 0 < s < 1, of disposable income so that;
5K / 5t = G ( K, L, M/P ) - ( 1 - s )Y° [4]
Substituting equation [3] for Y° , yields the investment function:
I = 8K / 5t = sY + ( s - 1 )( m - p ) M/P [5]
Therefore, s - 1 < 0, and m - p > 0, or 
( s - 1 ) ( 'm - p ) < 0 .
where I = aggregate annual flow of investment in physical 
capital 
t = index of time 
s = marginal propensity to save 
Any increase in the demand for the real stock of money will reduce investment 
because in equation [5], the marginal propensity to save is less than unity, s - 1 < 0 
and ‘m - p >0 because the rate of issue of nominal money is always greater than the 
rate of increase in the price level in growing economy. The substitution effect here is 
the same as that of the stationary model of asset choice, hence the propensity to save 
s, actual saving will be directed either to real money balances or to physical capital. 
If real return on money increases, hence more attractive to hold M/P at any given 
level of income, investment in physical capital would decline.
Note: Cash balances are not needed as a store of value in the context of the Neo- 
Classical model. The private propensity to save is often assumed to be invariant to the 
real return on holding money and as such is invariant to monetary policy.
On the contrary, cash balances are a valuable current input into production processes 
as a medium of exchange, for example, Levhari and Patinkin included M/P as an input 
like labour or capital in the aggregate production function. It is important that, the 
authorities wishing to encourage private investment exercises some degree of caution 
on policies that raises M/P, within the Neo-Classical model framework.
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2.6.3 THE FULL - LIQUIDITY MONETARY POLICY
In the Neo-Classical model, governments were able to use the monetary and fiscal 
policy to maximise social welfare, by using the money supply M or its rate of change, 
in, and controlling it through the issue of nominal money as a transfer payment to 
the private sector or in return for current services rendered by the private sector to the 
government.
An alternative is to increase the monetary system through loans to individuals or 
firms, even though the banking system is assumed to have no comparative advantage 
as a financial intermediary. Another form of instrument at the disposal of the 
authorities is the nominal interest rate on certain classes of time and savings deposits. 
The Nigerian government adopted this policy since the mid 1980s and has successfully 
intensified its use to the present time.
In contrast, fiscal policy is viewed primarily as a device for using public saving to 
control the rate of aggregate capital formation over the long run and to overcome this 
problem another assumption is required. It is assumed that, ‘Fiscal Policy’ can be used 
costlessly to adjust the aggregate rate of capital formation by running a public sector 
surplus or deficit to increase or reduce the stock of real capital. The condition of 
equilibrium in private portfolios can be described as :
( d - p* ) + convenience yield of money = r. [6]
The government can increase real cash balances by increasing the real return d - p* 
and if d is close to zero, 'm can be set so as to achieve a steady Deflation ie p < 
0.
Raising the real return on holding money above r will not be necessary, because high 
portfolio changes from relatively illiquid nonmonetary wealth to highly liquid real 
money balances would occur once d - p* approaches r. Therefore, optimal strategy 
for securing full monetary liquidity can be described as:
d - p* [7]
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This implies that price deflation at rate r, the real return to capital ,is socially optimal 
if no formal deposit rate of interest is paid on holding of cash balances. The same 
principles applies if d = r when the price level is stable. The next step now is to 
consider the effect for real capital formation and growth and the possible effect of 
large expansion in M/P reducing investment in physical capital as a proportion of 
income due to the substitution effect.
Private saving can be directed towards maintaining the large monetary demand that 
full - liquidity rule seems to portray, especially if private saving is the only source of 
capital formation. Given the assumption about the costless use of fiscal policy to 
adjust aggregate rate of capital formation, the government can also use fiscal policy 
to increase public saving in order to compensate for substitution effect in private 
portfolios.
Maximisation is achieved when public plus private investment is adjusted so that the 
real rate of return on capital is equal to the rate of growth;
r = y [8]
This implies that, full-liquidity rule provided the best optimisation within the Neo- 
Classical framework. Holding this optimisation to be true by combining equations [7] 
and [8] the nominal interest on deposits is zero, full-liquidity monetary policy [7] 
including keeping the nominal stock of money fixed, so that prices decline at the same 
rate at which income grows, will yield
Y = d - p* = r [9]
That is, with m = 0, if d = 0. It can be concluded therefore that, the banking -
monetary system has no particular role to play in the process of capital accumulation, 
although they may appear to be doing so.
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2.6.4 THE NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH AND THE BIAS 
TOWARD INFLATION
The postulation here is that, the Neoclassical model does not provide a perfect fit for 
the fragmented economies in selecting asset portfolios, as well as the non inclusion 
of issues of primary concern to the LDCs in formulation of economic policies. Some 
of the issues omitted includes:
1. Improvement on the quality of the capital stock by reducing dispersion in rates of 
return (ie, problem of Imperfect capital markets);
2. The optimal commitment of real resources to the monetary system; and
3. The nature of fiscal constraints on government in adjusting the aggregate rate of 
capital accumulation.
The omissions then lead to bias conclusions regarding:
[a] the substitution effect between real money balances and real capital accumulation;
[b] the independence from monetary policy of the private rate of saving, and the use 
of the inflation tax as an instrument to promote social saving;
[c] the dominance of the diminishing returns in capital accumulation; and
[d] the failure of the model to generate a determinate demand for money.
Policies based on the Neoclassical model tends to be inflation prone because it 
arguments real capital accumulation in two ways: first, by increasing public revenues 
from the inflation tax on cash balances. This can be deployed toward real capital 
accumulation within the public sector or through a functioning capital market.
The second is through the substitution effect where private savers are induced to 
acquire more real capital at the expense of real money with their rate of saving out 
of private disposable income remaining just about the same. This indicates that social 
saving rises as a proportion of the aggregate income. The opportunity cost of this 
inflation is the reduced productivity of the economy as a result of the decline in the 
input of real money balances. There is also the problem of establishing a determinate 
demand for real cash balances in which case, the transactions motive for holding 
money can not exist. A determinate demand for money requires imperfections in the 
capital market, with different risks of default and rates of return on physical and
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financial assets.
2.7. THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN ACCUMULATING CAPITAL
Mckinnon followed the Neoclassical assumption of outside fiat money like cash and 
excluding intermediations between savers and investors by banks or insurance 
companies. The analysis highlighted the lack of organised finance in LDCs and the 
inadequacy of government substitutes for financial processes.
Reversing the earlier Neoclassical assumptions, he assumed that all economic units are 
confined to self-finance. Greater emphasis was placed on the indivisibility in 
investment hence, making cash balances the only financial instrument available which 
can be accumulated and sold freely. These alternative assumptions meant that 
restraints on external borrowing constraints individual enterprises from undertaking 
discrete investments with the best practice technologies. The resulting consequence is 
a creation of wide divergence on rates of return on physical capital.
Another alternative assumption is that governments do not participate directly in 
capital accumulation through the tax expenditure process or by using seigniorage from 
money issue for capital formation. This implies that revenues are only used to finance 
current government consumption.
Complementarity between money and physical capital; (1973 pp.57 - 61); will depend 
to the extent the individual saver - investor relies on one mode or to the real return 
on holding money and the inconvenience of storing his own product. Therefore, if d - 
°p* rises, money will be used more and the less the inventories acts as an efficient 
store of value (see figure 2.2 below). The proposition used a time profile of the cash 
balance holdings of two typical firm households. Assuming income to be at a constant 
level but disbursement subject to indivisibilities, measured by the veitical drops which 
are also equal for both firms. Figure 2.2 indicates that average cash balance holdings 
are positively related to the propensity to investment (save) under the formal constraint 
that all investments are self-financed.
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Figure 2.2 Alternative Time Profile of Holding Money for Consumption and 
Investment
Incorporating the time profile into a function with average demand to hold money 
such as points A and B on the diagram above will yield the determinants of the real 
stock of money M/P and the demand for it arising from capital accumulation:
( M/P ) = L( Y, I/Y, d - p* ) [7.1]
where the function L = investment / income ratio , I/Y;
Y = transaction motive for holding money (current income); and 
d - p* = the real return on holding money.
With the partial derivative of L being positive ie §L/5[I/Y]> 0 indicating 
complementarity between money and physical capital in fragmented economies. The 
assumption of a single real rate of return (opportunity cost of holding money) in this
case will be misleading because the application of this conventional approach to LDCs
is limited. Assuming ~r = return to capital and there is an exogenous change in the 
economy such as removal of foreign trade restrictions, so that investment would 
increase as "r rises.
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The new money demand function will therefore be:
( M/P )D = L( Y, ~r, d - p* ) [7.1]
where 5L / 5y > 0; 8L / 8~r > 0; and 5L / 8( d - p* ) > 0.
The complementarity relationship is represented by 8L / 8~r > 0, 
and in the Neoclassical model by 8H / 8r < 0.
Money and physical capital are treated as substitutable forms of wealth holding in the 
traditional portfolio while the process of accumulation takes place rather as a 
competing asset. The conditions of money supply has an impact on the decision to 
save and invest just like the Neoclassical model. This complementarity implies that 
as real return on holding money increases, so will self-financed investment over a 
significant range of investment opportunities.
The complementarity between money and physical capital for the investment function 
can therefore be represented as:
I/Y = F ( “r, d - p* )
where Sf / S~r > 0 and Sf / 8 ( d - p* ) < or > 0 representing the mixture of the 
‘conduit effect’ of money and the traditional ‘competing asset’ effect between money 
and physical capital.
2.7.1 OPTIMIZATION W ITHIN THE NEW MODEL
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Figure 2.3 Effect of The Real Return on Holding Money on Self-Financed Investment
The return on money set by the authorities is measured on the horizontal axis and the 
interval AB represents the complementarity between M/P and VY because of the 
‘conduit effect’. When the returns on money is greater than B, the competing asset 
effect begins to reduce investment. Therefore, a return on money equals to B 
maximises the rate of self-financed investment which is the rate of returns the 
monetary authorities would desire in the absence of other avenues for capital 
accumulation.
The other argument in favour of the optimum level of the real return on holding 
money is that, it will be socially desirable to prevent investments whose internal rates 
of return are actually negative , even though such investments as store of value may 
be privately undertaken if d - p* < 0. That is money acting as a store of value or as 
an inflation hedge.
The competing asset effect can actively constrain social waste if the return on money 
is kept positive because individuals will not hold nonmonetary assets with a return less 
than that earn on highly liquid cash balances. This indicates that the quality of the
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capital stock is directly and positively related to the real return on holding money, for 
example, Nigeria by adopting the IMF / World Bank textbook-stylised adjustment 
program, devalued the currency ‘naira’.
The ‘Knock-on-effect’ on the currency immediately as a store of value diminishes 
automatically both domestically and abroad. An example of the extent to the fall in 
value, especially in 1990, can be seen by the total loss in confidence in the coin Kobo 
(equivalent to pence), where racketeers started buying the Kobo and smelting it, 
because the metal has more value than the monetary unit itself. If the rate of return 
on holding cash balances is higher, this smelting of the coins will not occur.
One important consequence of the devaluation is that it has caused greater poverty, 
making accumulation for lump sum investments impossible especially in terms of its 
purchasing power. Disinvestment in traditional techniques and planning for quantum 
investments in new technologies can only be undertaken if there is a higher return to 
the holders of cash balances.
The traditional preoccupation with diminishing returns from capital formation can be 
dispensed with when the nature of financial restraint on individual enterprises in LDCs 
are taken into account. For Mckinnon, the financial institutions definitely have an 
essential part to play in removing the obstacles that confine self-finance, pooled- 
savings and efficiency.
This monetary system model based on self - finance is limiting.
The return at point B could be lower than that earned on many potential investments 
that could be undertaken if banks were active lenders for example.
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2.8 FINANCIAL REPRESSION AND INFLATION
The self finance assumption described the situation of developing countries with no 
operating capital market. Full liberalisation requires the confines of self finance and 
channelling of external funds to large and small investors who can earn high marginal 
and intra - marginal rates of return. Therefore, a case can be made for a more costly 
monetary system based on extensive bank lending to exploit more fully the ability of 
money and near monies to attract saving in an uncertain world. Financial repression 
can be said to have started a result of such action.
Bank credit remains a financial appendage of certain enclaves, exclusively licensed 
imports, large international corporations and various government deficits on current 
account frequently pre-empt the limited lending resources of the deposit banks. The 
inability of organised banks to penetrate the economic domain of the LDCs, in serving 
rural areas and small borrowers; leaves financing of the whole economy to the meagre 
resources of money lenders, pawn brokers and cooperatives.
One of the reasons for the low ratio of money to GNP can be attributed to the failure 
of banks to earn high equilibrium rates of return from their borrowers as shown by the 
low return to depositors. Another reason is that scarce capital is underpriced by the 
banks and not by the money lenders. Savers tend to respond to low returns by 
reducing their holdings of money and near monies, even below the social optimum. 
An increase in the efficiency of bank lending is therefore a necessary condition for 
enlarging the real size of the monetary system and for alleviating financial repression.
2.8.1 BANKING RESTRAINT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR 
TRADITIONAL CREDIT MARKET
Organised banking was developed in the LDCs mainly to serve expatriates who were 
engaged in developing exports of raw materials during the colonial period (Mckinnon 
1973 p.69, J. V. Lenin 1960 pp. 144 - 54). The indigenous individuals in the colonies 
were depositors rather than borrowers and funds were channelled to banks controlled 
from overseas such as London, which then would reinvest funds with borrower whose 
collateral and reputations were known to overseas bankers.
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With independence and the development of national banking in LDCs, the overseas 
colonisation of the banks disappeared and in its place a similar Neo-Colonial Banking 
system emerged. The mass of small farmers and indigenous urban industry remains 
financially repressed even though they own a significant proportion of the deposits on 
which the expansion of bank credits to the favoured enclaves are based. The poor 
farmers need capital to bridge the gap between the time when they grow or harvest 
their crops and when they actually market them. Only few agricultural loans were 
made by the organised banking system.
Facilities for holding deposits offers limited physical accessibility in rural areas and 
the rates of interest paid on deposits were low. This leaves the organised banking 
system to raise the cost of financing inventories of agricultural produce by making it 
high for traders and farmers and ensuring marked seasonal variations in grain prices. 
There is also the huge interest differentials between organised banking and informal 
rural credit in these LDCs13.
Rural money lending and credits offers only a partial substitute to the organised bank 
finance [Charles Nisbet, Economic development and cultural change, vol. 16 1967, 
pp.73 - 83]. Nisbet’s survey of Chile traditional credit market indicated only about 
30% use the state financial institutions. The organised banks have been free from 
competition and enjoys the yearly expropriation of monopoly profits, hence there is 
a skewed distribution of income. The interest rate ceiling may be due to attempts to 
regulate the monopoly power of the banking system.
The views expressed from the Chilean example were that monopolistic banking system 
with free interest rates use its power to maximise profits, regardless of the impact on 
aggregate economic activity. It was deemed to be essential to control interest rates to 
protect the public from the resulting unemployment.
13 E. C. Eboh et al Saving and Development no.4 1991 pp.361 -371 . Nigerian village money lenders and their 
usurious interest rates : an analysis of intervening factors.
Mckinnon 1973 p.71.
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2.8.2 POLICY RESPONSES TO FINANCIAL REPRESSION
The authorities can respond by extending the usury restrictions, that is, by using 
ceilings on interest rates charged by banks. The effect of such response is, it will lead 
to greater fragmentation in the returns to capital and more instability in prices, 
especially crops. The authorities may decide to allow money lending at high rates of 
interest but will attempt to mitigate some of its unfortunate social effects, like 
prohibiting pledging land as collateral, in order to prevent landless peasantry. The 
effect of such action is that access to finance will become more limited. Raising 
collateral for loans will become extremely difficult for the farmers to achieve, 
examples include, the Malaya land reservation and the Mexican ejidos14.
The authorities may adopt price stabilisation policy like holding grain inventories and 
setting up crop prices. The effect is, pressure will be put to the government to set 
prices either too high in favour of the fanners or too low in favour of the urban 
pressure to keep the cost of wage goods down Public inventory and marketing control 
can cause expropriation and mis-allocation of credits and other agricultural inputs on 
non price basis.
2.9 MONETARY REFORM AND SUCCESSFUL FINANCIAL GROWTH
Mckinnon expressed the view that to criticise the monetary policies of the LDCs can 
only be justified if it can be shown that the financial repression observed is not 
endemic and that its release is within the control capabilities of monetary and fiscal 
authorities. He used Japan and Germany as an example of sustain monetary growth 
relative to GNP. The two countries showed how a fully developed monetary system 
can be approximated in a fast growing economy. The reality is that, this has not been 
the case with regard to the LDCs, in breaking the repression syndrome.
Some LDCs that had suffered from the consequences of financial repression, did make 
a remarkable policy shift toward increased real deposit and lending rates that 
favourably altered the future course of their economies, for example, Korea 1964 - 66,
14 The Malayan Land Reservation Act - prevents money lenders (mainly the Chinese and the Indians ) from 
gaining title to the land . The Mexican EJIDOS are land parcels which can not be resold .
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Indonesia 1967 - 69 and Taiwan, These three countries are now in what is called 
‘financially transformed categories’, even though their monetary system has not 
reached the same proportion of GNP as have those of Japan and Germany. Korea, 
Indonesia and Taiwan provided a perfect analysis of successful but nonorthodox 
programs for stabilising the price level.
Germany and Japan are particularly interesting in assessing sustained financial growth 
because in both; the banking system dominates the capital market and direct finance 
is less important than in other advanced economies.
In Nigeria, indirect finance through the banking system is still the dominant mode. 
The capital market remained fragmented with widely dispersed rates of return. There 
are still high dependence on self-finance and the household savings were tapped by 
the organised business sector, therefore, economic transformation becomes essential.
One would expect that economic development will require inter and intra-sectoral 
transfers of the same magnitude as those of post Second World War Germany and 
Japan. Instead, what is found in the LDCs is a maintenance of small and repressed 
monetary system, coupled with extensive reliance on various fiscal and other 
interventions in commodity and factor markets as a substitute for bank intermediation, 
a second best device.
Mckinnon remarked that the lesson learnt from those LDCs that has undertaken 
financial reform are:
(1) It is within the monetary and fiscal capabilities of the developing countries to use 
high nominal rates of interest and control over money supply to embark on a sharp 
changes in monetary policy away from repression and towards real financial growth;
(2) Stabilisation of the price level need not be accompanied by an economic 
depression if policy permits the banking system to play its intermediary role;
(3) High nominal rates of interest can be managed effectively to offset expected and 
experienced inflation, depending on inflation being progressively reduced to moderate 
levels;
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(4) Optimal real rates of interest on deposits and loans for which capital scarce 
economies should strive, are surprisingly high but financial repression is not far away 
if monetary policy goes astray.
2.9.1 GROWTH AND SAVING
This analysis considers how growth itself increase the propensity to save out of 
aggregate income, especially when holdings of real money balances are high. An 
optimal monetary strategy will be one that weighs increased private investment against 
public seigniorage in determining how best to utilise the portfolio effect.
The Harrod-Domar model of equilibrium growth was used to illustrate the portfolio 
effect. The model assumed that saving was automatically transmitted into investment 
at a uniform rate of return, hence leaving out financial consideration. The 
output/capital ratio a  was constant and yielded the simple production function:
Y = gK [1]
where Y = aggregate real output (income); and
K = the stock of physical capital;
Implicitly, the equation assumes that technical change is sufficiently labour 
augmenting. Thus, labour does not need to enter explicitly as a separate constraint on 
production. Within this financial approach to economic development, the output/capital 
ratio could rise when new investment is accompanied by suitable monetary expansion 
or investment could be subject to diminishing returns in the classical sense. The saving 
or investment propensity in the unmodified Harrod-Domar model is a fixed proportion 
of income S, which can be expressed as:
I = 8K / St = sY. [2]
where t is an index of time.
Substituting equation [1] into [2] we have:
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Y = os [3]
where Y is the equilibrium percentage rate of income growth.
Equation [3] result implies that the rate of growth is the product of the marginal 
output/capital ratio and the marginal propensity to save. Assuming the parameter p, 
be given exogenously to the Harrod-Domar model, representing these other variables 
in the function describing the propensity to save:
s = s(Y, p) [4]
where 0 < s < 1; 8s / S‘y > 0; and 8s / 8p > 0.
Equations 3 and 4 gives the equilibrium growth path for this variable saving version 
of the Harrod-Domar model, once p is given exogenously.
That is, Y is defined by the implicit equation:
Y = o.s( Y, p ) [5]
The effect is that, the quantity Y is now dependent on the portfolio effect of growth 
itself operating on intended saving. Figure 2.4 illustrates the solution for equation [5]. 
The horizontal axis is the actual rate of growth and the product of the intended or ex 
ante propensity to save, a  is plotted on the vertical axis and the equilibrium growth 
at the point where the two are equal which is represented by the 45° line. Assuming 
AB is equal to the variable saving propensity represented as an increasing function of 
Y. Therefore, the intersection of AB at E is the equilibrium growth where the actual 
rate of growth in income generates the desired saving sufficient to support the 
investment necessary to maintain the rate E indefinitely.
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Figure 2.4 THE PROPENSITY TO SAVE AND THE RATE OF INCOME G 
GROWTH
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Considering the stability of this equilibrium position:
If actual growth were set at zero so as to eliminate the portfolio effect, then the 
propensity to save would still be positive and equal to OA. If this saving is 
successfully transmitted into net investment, the rate of growth would be driven 
upward. For equilibrium to exist at E, AB must be constrained to have a slope of less 
than unity, in order to prevent explosive growth in the context of the model.
5s / 8Y < 1 / a  [6]
The objective for constructing this growth model is to show the consequences of a 
market change in financial policy of the kind observed in some less developed 
countries. It provided an economic insight into why a discrete improvement in 
monetary policy can have a sharp impact on observed growth and saving rates. It also 
helps in permitting rapidly growing economies like Japan to sustain an extraordinary 
high propensity to save over a long period of time.
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2.9.2 FISCAL POLICY AND THE LIBERALISATION OF FOREIGN TRADE
Import tariffs, licenses and quotas all have contributed to the bureaucratic confusion 
and to the inordinate cheeping of some tradable commodities while creating undue 
scarcity of others. The strategy of industrialisation through import substitution has 
been disappointing. The endemic economic fragmentation and lack of generalised 
productivity growth have been aggravated.
Studies by the OECD and IBRD15 both recognised that a substantial relaxation of 
import restrictions, coupled with a suitable devaluation in the exchange rate towards 
an equilibrium level is necessary to expand exports and overcome the shortages of 
foreign exchange that most LDCs seem to face. Dependence on the production and 
export of primary commodities has to eliminated as economic stagnation was 
overcome. Hence, a more vigorous domestic capital market centred on the monetary 
system, can be a more efficient path of economic development.
2.9.3 TAX NEUTRALITY AND EXPORT REVIVAL
Most LDCs have followed an extreme anti-protectionist policy in the export sector of 
their economies. Implicit taxation of export industries is usually much greater than the 
visible direct restraints on actual export flows. Keeping imports out reduces the 
effective demand for and consequently the price of foreign exchange relative to the 
domestic costs of labour, capital, intermediate inputs that producers of export products 
must pay.
Since exporters sell in foreign markets at this less favourable real exchange rate, they 
are caught in a profit squeeze, which reduces traditional exports and blocks new 
export development, especially manufactures. It is common practice in LDCs as well 
as many advanced, to give exporters of manufactures special access to central or 
commercial bank credit at low real rates of interest. As these low or negative rates are 
passed back to depositors,it contributes to repression.
15 OECD - The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. IBRD - The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.
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2.9.4 INDIRECT TAXATION AND THE PROBLEM OF REVENUE
INELASTICITY
Developing countries rely heavily on a wide variety of indirect taxes that are not 
applied uniformly, for example, sales taxes, custom duties and stamp duties.
One of the adverse consequences of import substitution is that revenue from the 
indirect tax system has become less income-inelastic. As gross national product (GNP) 
grows, revenue from indirect taxes tends to grow less than proportionately and the 
problem is with the way it has been distorted to provide incentives for industrialisation 
to replace imports. In the past, most LDCs were producers of primary commodities 
only, which were mainly exported, hence tariffs on imported manufactures were the 
principal levies for raising revenue. In an attempt to try to achieve more progress in 
the structure, imports of consumer manufactures, especially luxuries goods were 
heavily taxed.
Growth brings with it a tendency toward budgetary deficits. Public saving does not 
keep pace and governments either allow more non-neutral small taxes to proliferate 
or turn to central banks for financing given the absence of capital markets for 
absorbing long term public debt. Excessive issue of nominal money can then cause 
inflation and a reduction in the real stock of money. Therefore, incorporating more 
revenue elasticity into a reformed tax system is necessary in order to avoid financial 
repression.
2.9.5 THE VALUE ADDED TAX
One way of maintaining revenue as income grows is by adopting a moderate uniform 
tariff on all imports. Although uniformity on tariff system for foreign trade would be 
a great improvement for most LDCs but it would not be a FIRST BEST solution 
because of inconsistencies with other taxes which remained.
However, introduction of uniform value added tax VAT can overcome the difficulties 
by combining the simplicity of a single ad-valorem levy on imports with generally 
neutral taxation of domestic and foreign commodities destined for final consumption. 
The problem here is how to administer the VAT in the absence of foreign trade.
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The tax base of value added can be defined;
(1) From a tabulation of gross sales, the tax paying firm can subtract all supplies 
purchased including capital goods as well as raw materials and semi finished materials 
in calculating its tax base.
(2) The value of capital assets purchased can be disallowed and a depreciation 
allowance substituted. It will be an easy task for the tax assessor if the consumption 
version is adopted with a single rate.
Note; value added refers to the sum of wages, salaries, profits, interest and rents 
generated within the firm, which are all to be taxed at the same rate, and the tax 
collector does not have to know or estimate these individually. All to do is to verify 
the dollar value of the gross sales of the firm which is a relatively easy business 
statistics to obtain. The tax payer has to supply evidence of materials purchased from 
other firms that have already been taxed. The tax base is then is the difference 
between gross sales and the value of those inputs whose purchase from suppliers can 
be verified.
For an open economy, they would then chose whether the VAT should be applied on 
the "ORIGIN" principle or on the "DESTINATION" principle. The distinction of 
course lies in the form of the border-tax adjustments chosen to reconcile the taxation 
of imports and exports, with the VAT system imposed on the domestic goods. If the 
authorities chose the maintain neutrality with respect to foreign trade, imports entering 
the economy will not be taxed because of the symmetry between import and export 
taxes.
In the case of the LDCs, the origin principle for VAT will not be desirable. LDCs 
have a long history of levying taxes on imports at ports and border-crossing stations 
because of the relatively visibility and sophisticated nature of international trade. If 
imports and domestic output were to be taxed under the destination principle, 
neutrality would require that exports be exempted from VAT in order to avoid double 
taxation of foreign trade. Apart from the zero tax on the VAT by the final exporter, 
rebates would be given for taxes that had been paid earlier on supplies that were
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purchased to ensure complete exemption of the product. Bias would be avoided if the 
VAT replaced import duties as a source of revenue and protective tariffs eliminated. 
It is not feasible or desirable, at least for the time being , in most LDCs to extend the 
tax to include the final retail stage of distribution, where collection of the tax would 
be costly and because of the large number of peddlers, vendors and very small 
merchants. Basic unprocessed foods are often exempted so that farmers are excused 
from legal tax liability in an attempt to ensure that food prices are kept low.
2.9.6 CONSUMER EXCISES
Since personal income taxation may be quite ineffective in LDCs there is a good case 
for continuing to tax consumer luxuries at different rates appropriate for each 
commodity in addition to the uniform VAT levy. In order to avoid unintended 
protection for domestic producers of consumer luxuries, countries should convert 
revenue tariffs to consumer excises, which will be collected by customs officials on 
imports but domestic producers of luxury goods would also become liable at the same 
rate with the tax collected at the factory gate .
This excise technique of taxing final consumers avoids bias foreign trade in the 
process of industrialisation and it also maintains or increases overall revenue elasticity 
as consumption and income grow. The degree of rate differentiation among individual 
consumption goods would depend on:
(1) The consequences for income distribution;
(2) The price elasticity of demand and the resulting revenue the government might 
expect;
(3) The enforcement problem;
(4) The historical level of the equivalent revenue tariff.
For consumer goods that are produced domestically as well as being imported , the 
conversion should be made in conjunction with a general removal of tariff and quotas 
on all imports. The resulting depreciation of the foreign exchange value of the 
domestic currency then tightens the burden on domestic industries as they adjust to 
losing their tariff protection and become liable for these consumer excises and the 
VAT.
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2.10 THE TRANSITION: EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY
AND THE ROLE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL
Despite the financial advice and support from the IMF, IBRD and other multinational 
lending consortia composed of creditors from the advanced countries to the LDCs. 
Some attempts have been made to secure liberalisation, both in foreign trade and 
domestic finance and fiscal policy. Substantial net inflows of foreign capital including 
stabilisation loans have been used frequently. Some policy changes towards greater 
liberalisation have been partial and short lived, while few countries succeeded on a 
sustained basis.
Mckinnon used an Alpha economy to illustrate the pitfalls in partial liberalisation with 
foreign capital. He concluded that a compromise solution between general 
liberalisation as promoted by the IMF and liberalisation that is confined to essentials 
may ultimately be worse than extreme. The protection and anti protection of such 
compromise or partial liberalisation can be further accentuated by an extraordinary 
inflow of foreign capital (Mckinnon 1973 p. 158)
Note; the assumption is that his alpha’s economy inflation has risen so that exchange 
rate pegged by central bank becomes overvalued, resulting in excess demand for 
foreign exchange leading to increased imports. Consequently, a fall in exports due to 
rising internal costs and a flight of short term capital as traders begin to anticipate a 
devaluation. To protect reserves, exchange controls are extended to intermediate 
products which in turn forces a slow down in domestic production. In addition to 
industrial recession, the flight of capital and the depletion of foreign exchange reserves 
makes it impossible for the government to continue to meet normal commercial debts 
of foreigners.
On his consideration of full liberalisation without foreign capital, Mckinnon 
constructed another paradigm, a Beta economy which uses political consensus to 
liberalise completely policies that are previously repressed. The focus is on the internal 
constraint rather than foreign capital. The government then increases its own saving 
by raising taxes and the prices of publicly dispensed services so as to reduce fiscal 
dependence on credit from the central bank. At the same time interest rates on
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deposits and loans are increased in order to stimulate the flow of private savings 
through organised banking.
Monetary constraint are eliminated on internal capital accumulation through raising 
the real interest rate on deposits and stimulating investment of higher productivity and 
maintain the level of output. As long as all import substitution industries have their 
formal protection lowered simultaneously, the compensating devaluation in the foreign 
exchange ensures that no single producer faces unduly harsh or subsidised 
competition. The delicate internal employment reallocation may be offset by an 
unusually large inflow of foreign capital that inhibits the exchange rate from 
depreciating sufficiently. Aggregate imports then would start to rise above exports so 
that tradable goods sector as a whole be negatively protected.
Previously protected import-competing industries which faces a significant adjustment 
problem, could have their problems doubled by unusual inflow of competitive imports. 
The capital inflow could trigger a decline in overall domestic output because an 
increase in the production of exportable’s need no longer counterbalance a reduced 
production of importable’s. As it liberalises, the authorities would deliberately avoid 
the unusual injection of foreign capital, whether of stabilisation loan or suppliers 
credits. It would also avoid repayment problems.
2.10.1 MISALIGNED INTEREST RATES AND CAPITAL INFLOWS
Using a short term interest capital movements, such as trade credits, a sharp rise in 
domestic nominal rates of interest and the expectation of exchange rate stability in the 
near term, increases the propensity of nationals to hold bank deposits, instead of 
foreign currencies. The idea is that the willingness to hold bank deposits would 
prevent capital flight, once complex exchange controls and rules on export retention 
are removed. Nigeria has followed some or all the reform procedures discussed so far. 
The currency, which the IMF and the World Bank argued is overvalued has since been 
devalued up to 40% by March 1992, Financial Times (London March 16 1992). 
Interest rate has been deregulated and the government now contemplating floating the 
currency.
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2.10.3 RESTRICTING INFLOWS OF SHORT-TERM CAPITAL
Given the complexity of the gliding parity for aligning foreign and domestic interest 
rates during liberalisation, some governments may find it too difficult to handle. 
Careful calculation of the division of exchange rate adjustment between the initial 
discrete devaluation and the magnitude and duration which foreign trade had been 
repressed and the speed to which inflationary expectations are to be dampened 
together with changes in nominal rate of interest.
There is strong tendency to restrict the use of short-term capital during liberalisation, 
especially supplier credits for imports, as a supplement to exchange rate policy. The 
LDCs can dismantle official regulatory devices set up for the express purpose of 
encouraging the use of foreign short term finance. Apart from the rejection of 
stabilisation loans and other government to government aid, the authorities may restrict 
the purchase of domestic financial assets by foreigners and sharply limit the trade 
credit that importers are permitted to accept.
The distinction between normal and abnormal commercial credits on imports are 
difficult to assess because of the various insurance programs for export credits on the 
part of the advanced economies. Fortunately such extraordinary measures will fade as 
financial liberalisation dampens domestic inflationary expectations and domestic 
nominal rates of interest can be reduced.
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2.10.4 SUMMARY
The analysis of financial development by Mckinnon challenged the case for low 
controlled interest rates and financial repression. The hypothesis advocated is for 
financial liberalisation and development as growth enhancing economic policies. This 
contrasts the monetary models of Keynes, the Keynesians and the Neo-Structuralist. 
Mckinnon’s postulation is that essential assumptions in these paradigms are erroneous 
in the context of developing countries.
Mckinnon provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the role of financial 
development in the process of economic growth. He proposes an alternative model in 
which real balances are complements to, rather than substitutes, for tangible 
investment.
Mckinnon formalised a complementarity hypothesis based on complementarity 
between money and physical capital. Complementarity is reflected in the demand for 
money function expressed as:
M/P = f(Y, I/Y, d - 7f ) 
where M is the money stock including saving/time deposits, demand/sight deposits and 
currency in circulation (M2). P is the price level, Y is the real gross national product 
(GNP), I/Y represents the ratio of gross investment to GNP, while d - Ke is the real 
deposit rate of interest (d is nominal deposit rate and tcc is the expected inflation rate). 
Complementarity works in both ways: the conditions of money supply have a first 
order impact on decisions to save and invest. Thus, the complementarity can be
expressed as an investment function of the form :
I/Y = f( rl, d - Ke ) [4.1]
where P is the average return to physical capital whilst, the partial derivatives of
complementarity is:
8( M/P ) > 0 ; 8( I/Y ) > 0.
8( I/Y ) 8( d - ne )
Mckinnon however, adopted the Tobin approach in developing a model based on 
commodity or outside money, which is money issued as loans to the government and 
not therefore available to finance private sector investment. Thus, if all financial
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institution liabilities consists of outside money, their assets must be entirely 
government bonds or gold, in which case the financial institutions do not intermediate 
between private savers and investors.
For selective credit policies to work, financial markets must be kept segmented and 
restricted. Selective or sectoral credit policies are common components of financial 
restriction. The techniques used to reduce the costs of financing government deficits 
can also be used to encourage private investments. Interest rates on loans for such 
approved investment are subsidised. Successful financial restriction is exemplified by 
a higher proportion of funds from the financial system being transferred to the public 
sector and by three effects on the demand for money:
[1] A rightward shift in the function;
[2] A higher income elasticity; and
[3] A lower cost elasticity
A successful financial restriction makes income velocity of circulation low and falling, 
allowing for a greater public sector deficit to be financed at a given rate of inflation 
and a given level of nominal interest rates.
In the financial development model by Mckinnon, he emphasises the dispersion in 
rates of return to investment in financially repressed economies, postulating that in the 
face of great discrepancies in rates of return, it is serious mistake to consider 
development as simply the accumulation of homogeneous capital of uniform 
productivity. Thus defining economic development as the reduction of the great 
dispersion in social rates of return to existing and new investments under domestic 
entrepreneurial control.
For Mckinnon, control over Public Finance is an essential prerequisite for successful 
financial liberalisation. This is more so given that government deficits are invariably 
financed by taxing the domestic monetary system. Foreign exchange controls 
necessitate a fixed exchange rate system. Therefore, large public sector deficits tend 
to be incompatible with financial liberalisation and development. The analytical
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explanation of how the real deposit rate of interest affects saving, investment and 
growth is based implicitly on an outside money model, which again is based on two 
assumptions. The first assumption is that all economic units are confined to self 
finance, while the second is on the indivisibilities in investments.
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Chapter 3
THE FINANCIAL DEEPENING
FINANCIAL DEEPENING IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
This chapter deals with the theory or hypothesis presented by Shaw (1973). The 
financial development hypotheses by Shaw (1973) is closely related to that of 
Mckinnon reviewed in chapter 2. It is worth bearing this point in mind, especially as 
their postulations sometimes tend to overlap each other. However, there are some 
obvious distinctions between the two theories which is mainly in the style of 
description and presentation rather than on the principles of the hypothesis.
The hypothesis presented by Shaw was that:
"the financial sector of an economy is important in its economic 
development and in a situation where this is repressed and or distorted, 
it can intercept and destroy impulses to development".
Like Mckinnon, Shaw postulated that in the market, money is the only good that 
trades against all other goods, while interest rates are the relative prices that have the 
most influence relevant to economic decisions. The distortion of the financial prices, 
interest rates and foreign exchange rates included, led to reductions in the real rate of 
growth and the real size of the financial system relative to non financial magnitudes.
Again, like Mckinnon, Shaw advocated that a new strategy that has the effect of 
‘Deepening’ finance, that is a strategy of financial liberalization is necessary for 
economic development. Financial liberalization is also linked with complementarity 
measures that extends beyond the financial sector.
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3.1 NOMINAL AND REAL FINANCE
To clear the analysis of money illusion, a distinction between the real values and real 
rates of return for financial assets from the nominal is essential. While the nominal 
finance takes the high growth path, the real finance follow the low path, partly 
because it is being taxed by inflation (ie deflated by the rate of inflation). The shallow 
finance in relation to national income or non financial wealth, can be taken to be low 
or negative real rates of return. In which case, the holders of financial assets including 
money are penalised or not rewarded for real growth in their portfolios (Shaw 1973 
p.5, Mckinnon 1973 p.96 - 98).
The distinction between nominal and real wage rates and wage incomes are of high 
importance to both trade unions and employers. Both the employers and the unions 
uses it in determining productivity and wage bargaining. It also assists in realising the 
four prices of money which can be classified as:
[1] Unity
[2] I/P an index for the purchasing power of money over a basket of goods and 
services. The real stock M/P, is the money stock valued at its relative worth in goods 
and services.
[3] Explicit price, that is, real deposit rate of interest d,
the sum of any nominal rate of interest d on money balances and the rate of change 
p in money second price : d = d - p.
[4] The foreign exchange rate, the ratio of exchange between one currency to another 
such as pound sterling to U.S dollar or the Nigerian naira.
Financial analysis would have been simpler had there been one exchange rate between 
currencies instead of a real or purchasing power parity rate as well as nominal rate 
and forward or future rates in addition to present or spot rates. In which case, the 
dominance of multiple pricing in all financial assets and non-monetary assets and 
money itself. The other distinction is between instruments of financial policy with 
some bearing on nominal amounts of finance and some on real amounts. Shaw 
adopted the position that financial deepening results from appropriate real finance 
policy. That is, real rate of return to real stocks of finance and shallow finance due
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to distortions in price.
3.1.1 MEASURES AND INDICATORS OF FINANCIAL DEEPENING
THE FINANCIAL STOCKS:
"Financial liberalisation policy and elimination or reduction of financial 
prices distortions lead to increased liquidity reserves. For example, it 
tends to enhance central bank’s stock of international liquidity and a 
reduction in frequent intervention through rations or licenses on the 
foreign exchange markets1".
Equally fascinating is the capability of diversifying the range of financial assets so as 
to enable borrowers to adjust their debt structures and the lenders their portfolios by 
the appropriate margin. Deepening eases the strain on taxation and moderates demand 
for foreign savings. Capital flight is an evidence of an aversion to finance. Financial 
deepening prevents or halts it, or at least minimises the scale of capital flight.
In relation to shallow finance, organised finance has been dominated by the banking 
system and in the process gave them oligopolistic power in the financial sector. 
Finance through the foreign exchange is dominated by external grants of aid, high cost 
supplier’s credits and direct investment from abroad. The curb market on the other 
hand is limited to short term transactions at some high risk from borrower’s default 
and government repression.
Financial deepening therefore, increases the real size of the monetary system and 
generates opportunities for the profitable operation of other institutions. Interest rates 
is one of the essential measures and indicator of financial deepening, especially for 
revealing existence of substitution of investment for current consumption. This implies 
that real rates of interest will be high where finance is deepening. The financial 
markets tend to prefer to trade at interest rates that overvalue the future in terms of 
the present (refer to section 5.6.1 of Chapter 5),
1 See Ronald I. Mckinnon , Money and Capital in Economic Development , 1973 pp.22 - 29 . The 
intervention syndrome.
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A common feature of shallow finance is the over-valuation of domestic currency on 
the official markets for spot foreign exchange. For instance, the regulatory policy 
demands of premium on domestic balances in terms of foreign balances as well as 
premium in present balances on future balances. Shallow finance has the effect of 
discouraging exports and saving, but encourages imports and consumption, which is 
not what LDCs actually need.
3.2 THE AIMS OF FINANCIAL DEEPENING (FD)
Financial liberalisation tends to raise the ratio of private domestic savings to income, 
as well as savings from foreign sector (Shaw 1973 p.9 - 12, Mckinnon 1973 pp.77 - 
79). An increased real growth of financial institutions supplies more investors with 
access to borrowing as well as incentive to save and to accumulate equity which in 
turn makes borrowing cheaper.
Liberalisation allows for a smoother financial process of mobilising and allocating 
savings to replace to some extent the fiscal process, inflation and foreign aid. Fiscal 
policy is backward in lagging economies and its potential to generate sufficient 
revenues is constrained by demands for government consumption and investment 
financing, thereby affecting the economic efficiency and social equity which in turn 
wipes out the benefits of capital accumulation.
For a good number of LDCs, foreign aid has to some extent been a perfect substitute 
for domestic savings and the aid gap analysis can therefore be termed as a partial 
indication of excess demand for savings in these economies that uses relative price to 
repress domestic savings. Liberalisation offers the tool to broaden the allocation of 
savings and diversification of the financial market, thereby allowing for greater 
investment opportunities and competition for the savings flow2.
Financial repression in LDCs is partly the cause of unemployment because of the 
combination of low interest which inhibits savings and the relatively high minimum - 
wage rates to guarantee the supply of labour. For instance, in Nigeria a minimum
2 In repressed economies, savings flow mainly to the saver’s own investments, thus self finance prevails 
, but offers no portfolio choice or possibility of a common market.
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wage of N100.00 per month called the Udorji Award3 was introduced in 1975. 
Although the economy was in a boom at the period 1972 - 1977, with a relatively 
stable oil price, the economic constraint of this minimum wage upon the middle sized 
firms was high, as most of them can not afford to increase their workforce. This 
marked the beginning of a long haul in Nigeria’s unemployment experience, even 
though the award brought enormous benefit and higher standard for those already with 
job.
Minimum wage may be beneficial in liberalised economy but certainly not in a 
repressed economy because investment flows to capital-intensive production despite 
the scarcity of capital and the excess supply of labour. Financial liberalisation and 
similar structural reform policies aims to equalise the distribution of income or at least 
narrow the gap between them. It also attempts to reduce the monopoly rents that flow 
from import and other licenses to the few importers and bank borrowers.
To summarise the objectives of FD, financial liberalisation and deepening assists in 
creating a stable output and employment growth as well as ensuring for a more 
flexible foreign exchange rates which can absorb some of the shocks of international 
trading4. As for the origin and context of financial repression, its dominance springs 
from strategy, inflation, interest rate, exchange rate and domestic prices. That is, 
inflation reduces real rates of interest, making saving to appeal* cheap while exchange 
rate policy pushes down the domestic price of foreign exchange. The strategy also 
reduces relative prices for domestically produced primary products, hence making 
industrial raw materials cheap for the urban industrial enclave, as well as the benefits 
of low rates of interest and cheap imports.
Shaw sees the low food prices in the urban areas as being subsidised in order to 
cushion the effects of wage demands. His postulation is that the strategy created a
3 A commission chaired by Chief Jerome Udorji to review the wage structure of the public services in 
Nigeria .
4 See Mckinnon’s flexible exchange discussion in chapter 2.
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Dual Labour Market; one for capital intensive industries and the other for industrial 
labour unionized, making it easier to predict the trend of fiscal policy. It causes excess 
demand for savings spill-over to capital account balance of payments. Therefore, 
borrowing at high cost or short term credits pending availability of funding. This may 
be satisfied by foreign direct private investment or through grants of official aid.
The general purpose of reform or structural change is to move away from relative low 
levels of income and consumption through changes in the national matrix of products 
and their inputs. Never-the-less, some choices of strategy such as interventionism 
with fixed nominal prices and rationing on some critical markets are done deliberately, 
perhaps due to mistrust of the market forces on the grounds of elasticities of response 
to relative prices - high or low for desired outcomes, market uncertainties and 
vulnerability to exploitation and greed or that the country is different. It could also be 
due to reflex experience with colonialism in one format or the other, such as a strong 
governmental apparatus or a weak stratum of endogenous entrepreneurship.
The cost of learning the development process by doing it in a context of effective 
markets and flexible prices may seem unacceptable and the quick way to post colonial 
economic independence may be through intervention (see Mckinnon 1973, the public 
intervention syndrome). The choice of strategy also include class interest, such as 
those that benefits from the monopoly rents or subsidies, will oppose to market forces. 
Microeconomic decisions which are favourable to one segment of the economy are 
often taken without the necessary care and consideration of their implication 
elsewhere.
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3.3 THE DEMAND FOR MONEY 
Definition :
"Shaw defined demand on the market for money as demand for real 
money because there is an absence of money illusion due to rational 
behavioural choices made by households and firms on the basis of real 
variables".
Demand for real money is a portfolio demand for one form of wealth constrained by 
total wealth and consumption as alternative form of wealth and by anticipated real 
rates of return (r). This can be expressed in the regime of steady growth as Y ’
(refer to Feige and Parkin, AER June 1971, pp.335 - 349, the optimal quantity of 
money, bonds, commodity inventory and capital). Therefore real money is demanded 
on the basis of its own rate of return rm. The optimal allocation of wealth by the 
wealth holder will then be:
rm = r = rc [1]
With perfect common markets in the economy, optimisation by wealth holders is at 
the same relative price. Thus, equation [1] is a condition for collective optimisation 
resulting to:
rm = u + d - p* [2]
Assuming d = 0, real money wealth is in the private optimal amount when:
u = r + p* = rc + p* [3]
where p* is the prospective rates of change 
d is the nominal deposit rate 
u is the real marginal product and 
rc is the consumer’s rate of time preference .
Equation [3] indicates that the marginal productivity of money can be deduced from 
the opportunity cost of holding money, the nominal or money rate of interest 1 = r + 
p*. In which case the money demand function can be derived from the production
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function5 as follows :
Dm = 1( Y ’ , rc , r , rnl) [4]
Full liquidity or satiation level of demand for money or of demand for money in 
proportion to income can be derived from equation [3] as:
u + d = r + p* = rc p* [5]
Also, equivalent stock of money is desired if:
u - ( -  p*) = r = rc [6]
The effect is that, the expected and realised deflation at rate p* will be equal to the
rates r and rc which induces demand for money to the limit at which the marginal 
product of money is zero. At this point the monetary system cannot retain its revenues 
from seigniorage and inflation tax.
The basis for money is the service it performs in clearing the area’s matrix6. Shaw’s 
postulation was that in lagging and underdeveloped economies, more than one 
currency area may exist and imperfect foreign exchange markets between the areas 
may reduce the scale of common markets in output, wealth, labour and securities. 
Mismanagement of money supply and inefficiency in provisions of services in the 
payments and intermediation processes causes reversion to segmented markets and 
barter.
The chance of default by a spending unit on markets where it incurs deficits increases 
as real money balances are held in lower average volume. This risk diminishes if the
5 Productivity function of money’s diminishing marginal u, 
the wealth constraint and the optimization condition .
6 The boundaries of the market for money are a currency area where spending units uses money to clear 
surpluses of net selling and deficits of net buying in other markets ( Shaw 1973 ,p.60 ).
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spending unit has access to borrowing facilities (although borrowing can be 
expensive). It also diminishes if the spending unit holds other disposable assets than 
money. The problem with inventories is storage cost which of course can be relieved 
by adjusting payment intervals. One form of saving is through the accumulation of 
money. This represents a substitute for saving through self - finance of physical 
investment, purchase of primary securities or acquisition of non-monetary indirect 
financial assets.
The demand for money depends upon own - yield and opportunity yields and on 
wealth or permanent income, the expected stream of returns to wealth. This stream is 
not perfectly foreseen and is subject to revaluation by income recipients, which may 
be downward in recurring periods of crisis and economic constraints thereby forcing 
demand for money to fall. It may be upwards when there are public policies that 
implies renewal or acceleration of economic growth, therefore pushing demand for 
money upwards. Thus, the determinants of instantaneous demand for real money can 
be expressed as:
Dm = 1 (Yp, rc, r, dn, rm, t) [6b]
Where Yp, rni, t relates to positive effects on money demanded.
The variable t is included as a stimulating effect on demand for money of 
technological improvement in the monetary sector
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3.4 THE SUPPLY OF MONEY AND INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY
POLICY
The monetary system function is to supply the appropriate stock and rate of growth 
of real money balances and providing services of payments mechanism in which the 
balances are used. There is a monetary and fiscal (or intermediation) functions.
The former brings the monetary system to the market for money, while the latter is 
for the market for capital. With the growth in real money and maintenance of the 
money stock being costless, real money supply function can be written as:
M = M / P = q( i, d, p*, w, e, g, t ) [ l .l]7
Given the absence of money illusion in equation [1.1] the quantity theory8 
interpretation of the price level can be expressed as:
P  = M  - Dm [1.2]
Where M represents the rate of growth in the stock of real money, Dm is the rate 
of growth in the stock demanded, p* is the expected rate of inflation, i the rate of 
interest, t technology, w the real wage cost, e is the real user cost of physical capital, 
g is the supply price of risk in banking (by the private or state enterprises) and d the 
deposit rate.
The stock of real money can be supplied by an indefinite large number of appropriate 
combinations of M and P. The same applies to M and P  i.e, growth of real stock 
of money to that of nominal money and price level.
M  = M - P  [1.2]
The long run, continuous equilibrium in the market can be expressed as:
7 No money demand illusion .
8 Refer to James Tobin,‘Money and Economic Growth’ (Econometrica Oct; No.33, 1965, pp.671 - 84; 
& ‘The Neutrality of Money’ (Comment, Econometrica, Feb; 1967, pp.69 - 72).
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M = D m [1.3]
while the difference is expressed as:
P = M  - Dm [1.4]
That is, the rate of change in prices P  as determined on the market for money. The 
rate of inflation or deflation preserves the equilibrium in that market, given the rate 
of increase in real money demanded by wealth holders and in nominal money supplied 
by the monetary system. Hence, the manipulation of M by the supplier of money 
constitutes instrument of monetary policy because it is a means of regulating P. 
Conversely, the expected rate of change in the price level is for regulating real deposit 
rate d - p* or d, and the nominal deposit rate as well.
The monetary policy optimality can be achieved when the price level is flexible, with 
a constant stock of nominal money. Given a condition of steady state - growth, 
including income - elasticity of demand for money, the rates of price deflation and 
income growth would be equal. As a result, the nominal deposit rate will be 
influenced by the difference between income growth and the rate of return to physical 
capital.
To obtain full liquidity in money holders portfolios, the rate of increase in nominal 
money must be at Y  + W + w and the nominal deposit rate at r + W + w. This 
can also be called the Wage-Push Inflation; with W equal to the money-wage rate 
and w = growth in labour’s marginal product.
Shaw explained this by using the analysis of the US economy by Milton Friedman 
(The Optimum Quantity of Money), because of their experience with inflation and the 
nature of labour. Shaw’s postulation centred on the interdependence between the 
market for capital and the market for money.
Using a barter economy, applying the situation of the equilibrium in the capital 
market;
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I = sF(K, L) [1.5]
By reducing equation [1.5] to a per capita basis and dividing I/L by the capital stock 
K and assuming a balanced growth equation [1.5] becomes:
[s - (1 - s)7cn] f(k) = nk
nk = sF(k) [1.6]
where n = growth of output, capital and labour 
k = capital - labour ratio 
s = propensity to save which is constant 
nk = growth in demand for capital 
sF(k) = savings available to finance it
David Levhari and Don Patinkin in their article, The role of money in a simple 
growth model’, (AER 1968 pp.713 - 753) provided an extensive coverage of this 
analysis. James Tobin, The interest elasticity of transactions demand for cash’ 
(Rev.Econ Stat. 1956, 38 pp.241 - 47), Money and Economic growth (Econometrica 
Oct 1965 33, pp.671 - 84) and The neutrality of money (Comment, Econometrica 
Feb, 1967 pp.69 - 72) also provided analysis of the subject.
The next consideration is the saving - investment and deadweight money9.
I = sF(K, L) - 5(M/P) [1.7]
Assuming real money demanded to be a constant proportion [o] of income with the 
market for money in equilibrium, equation [1.7] can be rewritten as:
I = sF( K, L ) - o 5F(K,L) [1.8]
9 ie introducing money as wealth , given the rejection that an economy is better off with barter and 
without money.
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dividing by income, equation 1.8 becomes:
sp = s - on [1.9]
where sp = physical propensity to accumulate physical wealth.
s = constant propensity to accumulate wealth in both physical and money form. 
Adjusting equation [1.6] for a barter economy by excluding monetized savings, the 
following equation is derived:
That is the substitution effect of growth in real money against real capital. It also 
implies that if the money - income ratio [o] is a positive function of real deposit rate, 
the real rate of interest and real deposit rate, are directly related and also, the real rate 
of interest can be reduced by expected inflation.
Shaw concluded that the consumer welfare in capital market only is improved by a 
low or even negative deposit rate. It also suggests that welfare is highest when there 
is no money at all.
Another important consideration is the saving - investment with money as income and 
as a factor of production. To reconcile the money satiation required for optimality in 
the market for money with that of optimality on the market for capital meaning no 
money at all. The first step is to regard growth in real money as income, thereby, 
replacing equation [1.8] by:
nk = (s - on)f(k) [2]
Y’ = F(K, L) + o SF(K/L) [2.1]
I = s[ F(K, L) + o 5F(K, L)] - o 8F(K, L) [2.2]
Substituting equations [1.9] and [2] we have:
81
sp = s - (1 - s)on [2.3]
and
nk = [ s - ( l - s ) o n ]  F(k) [2.4]
Refer to Tobin’s Monetary growth theory, Econometrica 1965.
This implies increasing the physical savings ratio. Another solution is to include the 
income effect of growth in real money, that is, including real money as a factor of 
production, which can be represented as:
where ; Y = output, K = Stock of capital and L = Homogeneous labour time. The only 
inputs are labour and capital, but refined versions includes real money as a productive 
factor (M/P), all assumed to be mutually substitutable and positive. Therefore, 
reversing equation [2,4] the equilibrium condition on the capital market can then be 
represented as:
Thus, real money per capita increases the flow of physical savings per capita to the 
capital market. Each steady growth rate n in output and labour force permits a higher 
capital - labour ratio k. This indicates that money raises capital - labour and 
consumption labour ratio.
The final consideration is the Public - Policy and the Dilemma of Optimality. The 
assumption is that public policy has the perfect costless solution for the dilemma that 
money satiation occurs at the expense of optimality on the capital market. The central 
issue to optimal money is the real deposit rate that reduces the marginal product u of 
money to zero, and for the best k and r, the physical - savings propensity sp. That is, 
the authorities can use fiscal policy such as spending on public consumption or 
reduction of tax rates, where k is too high. In which case, monetary technique
Y = G(K, L, M/P) [2.5]
nk = [s - (1 - s) on] g(k, m) [2.6] 
g’(m) > 0.
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affecting d and fiscal technique affecting sp are socially costless and can be combined 
to eliminate the optimality dilemma.
The problem in this case is that, money is not neutral and changes in real deposit rate 
do affect the production, savings and consumption functions. An adjustment in the tax 
rate, government consumption and investment will be therefore required.
Shaw concluded that the stock of real money, its rate of change and its yield are not 
neutral and public intervention is required, if the optimal deepening of both money 
wealth and physical wealth are to be achieved.
MONETARY INSTRUMENTS:
Real deposit rate is the main instrument of real monetary policy, which can be 
manipulated through P and either nominal deposit rate or charter policy. The LDCs 
are likely to encounter difficulties with charter policy with regards to enforcing 
competition within the banking industry. The authorities may therefore introduce factor 
inputs and enforce competitive levels of loan and deposit rates and urge for 
acceleration of technical change in monetary and banking services. According to 
Branson, the Federal Reserve Bank controls the level of the money supply first by 
setting reverse requirements against demand deposits and then by changing the amount 
of reserves it supplies, both on its own initiative and on the initiative of the banks10.
Optimality of monetary policy is crucial to the market for money and the market for 
capital. With heterogeneous output and inflexible prices as well as labour and the 
money wage rates in the W index, variations in w resulted to relative changes of real 
wage rates. Deviations of p and 'w have consequences in the price structure that 
affect stability of income, distribution of income and its rates of growth.
The consequences of the erratic changes in p is that those averse to risk could be 
influenced to divert their demand from money and wealth, which means that p must 
be stable.
10 William H. Branson, Macroeconomic Theory and Policy, 1979, Harper International Edition, New 
York. Second Edition, 1979, p.268.
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The conclusion drawn by the model that the optimal nominal deposit rate is equal to 
the money rate of interest cannot be upheld in the developing countries because of the 
lack of uniform rate of interest, as well as procurement of real cost to the monetary 
system.
3.5 WHAT IS A MONETARY SYSTEM
The monetary system is a financial intermediary attracting savings from spending units 
that forego consumption to acquire increments of real money. The savings were then 
allocated to other spending units, some for private or government consumption and 
investment. Other functions include:
Exchange of its own money debt for the primary debt of spending unit for augmenting 
real money balances. It intermediates between savers repaying their primary debt to 
the monetary system and new borrowers.
Money may be a state as well as private issue. It may involve exchange of the state’s 
money debt for the primary debt of the private sector or exchange of increments in 
real money balances for private savings that the state can redirect to the private 
investing sector or utilise for its own purposes including capital accumulation, 
consumption or transfer payments. As for the production conditions; production in 
LDCs tends to be for subsistence and trade with a heterogeneous inputs, technologies 
and segmented markets for inputs. The conditions of aggregate production can be 
written as :
Y = H(Kj ....Kn, L* ...Ln, T) [1.0]
where : Y is the real income;
K = production goods;
L = Heterogeneous labour services; and 
T = Collection of production Processes;
The subscripts (Kn, Ln ie, non-monetary finance) employed, where T defines the
technology in the financial production function. Equation [1.0] implies a dual income
effect of growth in real money growth in the stock of real money extending
production possibilities within any constellation of related markets and making feasible
the extension of market boundaries. Under the flows of income and product account;
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the net national income by factor shares can be defined as:
Y = rK + wL [1.1]
where r is the rate of return on the heterogeneous physical wealth and w is the rate 
of return to human wealth. The interpersonal income distribution are affected by 
productivity of owned factors and by market power and also by fiscal distributions and 
transfers. In which case, competitive factor markets cannot be assumed. Equation [1.1] 
included earnings of factors employed in financial industry but excludes growth in real 
money.
Y = C + I = C + S [1.2]
representing the aggregate allocation of income to consumption, savings and 
investment. This means that, income is either consumed or it is invested, while 
investment is financed by savings. According to the analysis, money and non-monetary 
financial assets do appear in sectoral measurements of the allocation and disposition 
of income11.
Savings demand are in a way additions to real money balances and other financial 
assets, whereas investment is supply, in part of additions to the real stock of primary 
securities. The monetary system and other financial institutions intermediate by 
incurring real money and non-monetary indirect debt that savers wishes to hold and 
by buying real primary debt that investors wishes to owe. Intermediation to increase 
the stock of real money can be achieved either by increasing nominal money or by 
decreasing the price level, with the same level of adjustments in the number of bonds 
B or in the real value of each bond in the monetary systems portfolio.
The other objective of financial policy is to maintain the spread of non-monetary 
financial institution’s realised rate between r and their own deposit rate d.
11 Shaw 1973, p.57; J.G. Gurley and Shaw, ‘Money in a Theory of Finance’, Ch.l - 3; also Gurley and 
Shaw, ‘Financial Structure and Economic Development’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 
1967, pp.257 - 268.
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3.6 MARKETS FOR NON-MONETARY FINANCIAL ASSETS
The postulation is that economic opportunities may exist for deepening not only in 
money but also in other financial assets. Financial differentiation induced by one 
variety or another of market imperfection is sometimes wasteful of factor inputs to the 
financial industry. It is also ineffective in raising rates of saving and neither does it 
improve the savings allocation12.
Constraints in the demand and supply functions for financial assets in LDCs limited 
the efficient differentiation and justifies the primary emphasis on real growth in the 
monetary system. The wealth constraint plus saver’s inexperience in estimating yields 
and savers traditional commitments to some forms of self financed investment 
contributed to the small selection of financial assets on the demand side. This implies 
that a large selection of assets would probably subdivide the total market into 
inefficient smaller groups whereas, on the supply side are the scarcity of resources for 
the financial industry, indicating the need for specialisation in a few markets.
On the side of regulation, the government is constrained enough in fulfilling the basic 
functions without distraction for supervising a complex financial system. Although, 
Shaw objected to import substitution on market for financial assets as on markets for 
goods and labour, he argued that importation of financial service may be necessary for 
LDCs in other to alleviate the burden on the domestic financial industry on the capital 
market.
He noted in a report by the OECD (General Report: committee for invisible 
transactions)13, that the experience of the developed economies suggests that 
comparative advantage or disadvantage among economies in provision of financial 
services may have a long term staying power. Hence free finance is better than 
subsidy in some circumstances for wealth accumulation.
12 Therefore , it is not financial deepening ( Shaw 1973 p.68).
13 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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3.7 FINANCIAL GROWTH AND THE RATE OF SAVING
Development process involves changes in private and social rates of capital 
accumulation and when accelerated development ends, both private and public budgets 
deviates from capital accumulation to consumption. These discontinuities can be 
associated with financial constraint and liberalisation.
Financial deepening and associated measures tend to change the distribution of income 
within the private sector as well as between private and public sectors, with a 
tendency of a shift in favour of labour against property. Financial deepening eliminates 
the uncompensated inflation tax on monetary and other financial assets for example, 
hyper-inflation indicates that taxation raises the rates of return to physical wealth and 
so stimulates savings (Kessel and Alchian; Effects of Inflation, JPE 1962 pp.521 - 
537). In contrast, savings are reduced by the tax because it drives savers from real 
money and other financial assets and shrinks the flow of intermediation. The reason 
for this outcome being that total tax revenues are adversely affected and because of 
its adverse income effects from demonetisation.
On the investment effects of financial growth, given the homogeneity of capital and 
the best technique, there seem to be several opportunities for financial growth to 
improve the investment mix in LDCs. Financial growth allows for the unification of 
the capital market, reduction of inter-regional and inter-industry differences.
The temporal widening of the capital market and the liberalisation of interest rates 
from low ceilings can moderate the investment dualism that so often occurs in 
developing economies. Hence liberalisation policies minimises the part played in 
investment decisions by windfall gains and losses. Similar to Mckinnon, Shaw 
postulated that larger lumps of investment are feasible in the private sector when 
savings are pooled in financial markets as well as diffusion of superior technologies 
as a result of information accumulated in financial institution.
Financial deepening offers an opportunity for development of new facilities for 
disposing of partial equities in wealth or for shifting ownership completely. The 
savings effects of financial deepening tend to increase wealth income ratios for a
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given mix of wealth and also reduces its rate of return, while the income and
investment effects raises rates of return. On capital and employment; the essence of
financial liberalisation and deepening as postulated by Shaw are:
"to release real rates of interest to disclose the scarcity of savings and 
to stimulate saving. The other point is to raise accessible rates of return 
on investment and to discriminate more effectively between 
investments".
Given the elasticity of substitution between factors in the production function, the 
elasticity can be defined as:
e = - 5( L/K ) / 5( w/r ) [1]
L/K w/r
where r = rental rate of capital rather than interest rate, e is higher than unity, 
therefore any decline in w relative to r increases the labour employed for every unit 
of capital utilised .The same scenario applies to wL relative to capital’s share of 
income and output.
One of the main arguments the IMF and the World bank used to present against 
Nigeria is the size of its population14. With high population and labour force, the 
prospect for rapid and socially placid development looks bleak. However, the Nigerian 
census figure of 1991 which stood at 88 million seems to suggest that the institutions 
has over-estimated the population and uses it as a negative instrument to escalate the 
size of the problem. This is not to say that there is no problem with regards to 
employment but with a realistic figure, the authorities could be able to identify the 
sources of the problem and address it accordingly15. In the context of this analysis, 
if interest rate elasticities are low for the substitute of labour against capital and 
savings and consumption,the aggregate investment will therefore be sensitive to the 
price of savings. This causes unemployment in the long run unless if there is a
14 See the world report 1989 and the world bank’s accelerated development and sustainable growth .
15 See world bank’s Sub-Saharan Africa, from crisis to sustainable growth , 1989,pp.37 - 62.
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substantial foreign assistance. It also indicates a possibility of a higher rate of urban- 
migration and intensified capital-intensive production, with labour depending on extra 
market processes to protect its share of income. Roe,(1989) provided a look at the new 
orthodoxy which claims great potential for high nominal interest rates as an element 
in policy instrument for LDCs16.
The structure of money and finance can be large in LDCs with the choice based on 
the principles of maximising income, savings, investment and employment effects. 
Therefore, the portfolio performance of financial enterprise depends upon its 
absorption and unbiased use of information about capital productivity.
Two critical issues of organisation emerges, which are:
[1] The degree to which the state shares in financial enterprise; and
[2] The context with which the state regulates private financial enterprise.
Both of these issues are discussed in chapter 5.
3.8 TECHNIQUES OF REPRESSION
The shortage of physical and human wealth in most LDCs has created a huge 
investment opportunities at high real rates of return. Evidence of this can be found in 
aggregate data. That is if changes in national income are divided by concurrent or 
lagged investment and the result multiplied by capital’s share in income. It can also 
be found in project data to report marginal rates of return to physical wealth that 
dwarf average returns in developed economies. The postulation is that there is no 
shortage of investment opportunities but there is shortage of savings for their finance. 
As highlighted in the beginning of the chapter, there are complex price manipulations 
in almost all markets in the LDCs, especially in markets for financial assets. 
Intervention tends to comprise a positive and variable inflation rate along with 
stipulations of loan and deposit rates at banks and other institutions of the organised 
financial market17. The technique presented by Shaw is very similar to the Mckinnon
16 A.R. Roe, ‘Interest rate policy, employment and income distribution, 1989, pp.71 -101.
17 The inflation rate indicates the pubic policy in fixing a rate of growth in nominal money that exceeds 
growth in real money balances demanded ( Shaw 1973 p.81 ),
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analysis of South Korea 1962 - 67. There are indications of excess supply of primary 
securities in lagging economies that results from the combination of investment 
opportunity and controls over interest rates in intermediation. There are various ways 
of tackling this problem of excess supply including credit rationing among borrowers 
which according to Shaw (1973,p.85) the inflation inelasticity of demand for money 
represented an evidence of financial repression.
Two important elements to the limitations of rationing is that it is expensive to 
administer and vulnerable to corruption. In the case of Nigeria, financial corruption 
is not something new. Implementing such policy will only serve to exacerbate the 
level of corruption especially among the civil servants and bank officials. The other 
problem with such policy not being feasible for Nigeria is the inherit bureaucracy that 
associates with it. The nature of public service and other institutions alike are 
entrenched with bottlenecks and will only lead to stagnation of operations which is 
already crippling business operations in the country. Effective low ceilings on real 
loan rates intensifies risk aversion and liquidity preference on the part of 
intermediaries.
Low or negative and uncertain real deposit rates repress voluntary and total demand 
for real stocks of claims, including money, against financial intermediaries. The 
presumption is that repression of indirect finance reduces total desired stocks of 
financial assets plus the constraints on self finance of investment and the private 
domestic ratio of savings to income. Thus negative real loan rates are left to rationing 
to clear excess bids for loans at intermediaries.
DIRECT FINANCE
The effect of repression in organised finance is to increase amounts of funds 
demanded on the curb market at each rate of interest, while the effect of repressive 
measures on the curb is to reduce funds supplied there at each rate of interest. Some 
LDCs do have a stock market. For example the Lagos Stock Exchange which is now
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the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The establishment and history of the stock exchange in 
Nigeria is discussed in detail in chapter 5. The stock exchange only trades in few 
issues including the issues of stock exchange itself.
The domestic stock of physical wealth is too small in the usual case and its growth 
rate is too low for diversified trading in equities . Hence long term direct finance 
without compulsion upon savers becomes rare. The other problem with the Nigerian 
Stock market is that the number of public quoted companies are small. The market 
still has a long way to go before it can be looked upon as a source of direct finance 
and international competition with the London stock Exchange, Wall Street, or Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. However, its activities so far are encouraging as more and more 
companies are being quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The government 
privatisation program is another source of inspiration for the Stock Exchange to widen 
its scope of operation and for greater number of participating companies.
Finally, the complexity of law, accounting and other elements of sophisticated trading 
in long securities are too expensive for operations on the small scale that a repressed 
financial system achieves.
INDIRECT MEASURES OF REPRESSION
Savers and investors are given incentives in tax law and administration to use financial 
process sparingly. Apart from tax inflation other taxes discriminate against income 
from financial assets. Taxation in Nigeria tends to be fairly moderate or it can be said 
to be a very weak policy instrument as far as the economy is concerned at present. 
There is no sales tax or VAT or taxation of real properties, only the basic income tax 
and corporation tax.
Inflation and crowding or urbanisation tends to increase the value of properties plus 
various other factors which makes it an attractive means for savers as they reach 
toward their desired wealth-income ratios, that is, appreciation in value, design etc. 
Taxation is also moderate with self-finance than with intermediation or direct finance, 
example retained business earnings are often exempted from tax.
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Indirectly, savings of public firms are taxed through allowance of subsidy prices on 
electric power, transport etc. While public policy discriminates against financial 
technique, economic surplus is being diverted from saving to the investing sector by 
non financial means. There is also the issue of international economic policy bias-ness 
against the domestic financial process.This is worsened by the overvaluation of 
domestic currency which depreciates the foreign financial assets. As a result of the 
fragility of capital towards regulation, there is a strong tendency for multiply 
restrictions.
Shaw identified four major reasons for the existence of financial repression and why 
financial liberalisation is not very common in his analysis of the logic and illogic of 
financial repression. The reasons includes:
(a) Historical antipathy to usury;
(b) Lack of effective control over rates of growth in nominal money and rates of 
change in the price level;
(c) The misinterpretation of the role of finance in the various models of aggregate 
economic behaviour; and
(d) Empirical decisions that the potential beneficial results of real financial growth are 
not worth the costs involved and that alternative solutions of capital scarcity are 
superior.
For reason (a), high rate of interest are considered to be exploitative and the solution 
for them appears to be prohibited. It is also considered to be inflationary. If owners 
of physical capital pay high rates of interest, it is argued that, they must pass on the 
charges with a cost - push effect upon prices of final outputs. This implies that, the 
burden of anti - usury laws is a heavy one to prevent stagnation and 
underdevelopment, to protect the defenceless against exploitation and to contain 
inflation. Shaw’s analysis here is parallel to that of Mckinnon, especially in their 
utilisation of Keyne’s ‘natural man’ and his opposition to the ‘Classical Theory’ in 
relation to anti-usury laws. Rudolph Blitz and Millard Long, ‘The Economics of Usury 
Regulation’ JPE 1965 pp.608 - 619, provide a further critique to anti-usury laws.
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For reason (b), real financial growth and deepening do not occur unless nominal 
money is under effective constraint or the inflationary effects of monetary indiscipline 
are compensated by changes in relative prices including interest rates and foreign 
exchange rates18. The management of nominal money can be and often is the victim 
of fiscal policy as shown by Mario H. Simonsen, ‘Brazilian Inflation: post war 
experience and outcome of the 1964 reforms’.( also s e e  )19
As an illustration, consider a government committed to real expenditures Gt in the 
current fiscal period, to nominal expenditure GtPt. The nominal revenues depend upon 
a tax rate q, local real income Y (assumed to be constant) and on the price level 
Pt - 1 (ie previous period price). Bearing in mind that fiscal policy requires a balanced 
budget, with Gt = qYt, but expenditures must be maintained even if it results to deficit 
which can only be financed through the expansion of nominal money.
The assumption here is that, with real income given, real money demanded and the 
real money stock are constant at M. Shaw then inteijected a current private 
expenditure of nominal X that is financed by monetary expansion with growth in 
nominal money as:
5Mt = GtPt - q(YtPt . ,) + Xt [2.0]
Given Gt and qYt to be equal:
5Mt = Gt (Pt . P t . 1) + X t [2.1]
Therefore, [(5M)t]/P = (GP)t + Xt 12-3]
18 Uncompensated expansion of nominal money is a tax on real balances and rational holders of financial 
assets evade the tax by shifting to forms of wealth that are less vulnerable.( see Shaw 1973 p.95 ).
19 The World Bank Sustainable Growth and the World Bank Report 1991, pp.31-49, Paths to 
Development.
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ie dividing by the current price.
( M.M)t -  (GP)t + X, [2.4]
The substitution for M and removal of the subscript t yields the expression for real 
money demanded as a positive function of real income and negative function of 
expected inflation. This can be written as:
M  = [GP + X ]/I(P*)Y
An increase in X of excess money supply can therefore result to government deficit, 
which must be financed by the inflation tax M.M. According the study of a ‘model 
of self-generating inflation1 by Dean S. Dutton (Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
May 1971 pp.245 - 262), this could lead to a cumulative force imposing and 
reimposing by successive periods with q, the tax collection rate tending to fall in 
accelerating inflation. With evidence from the Brazilian inflation and the 1964 reforms 
the nominal money management can become a causality of fiscal policy.
In explaining the reason (c) and (d), Shaw adopted the Keynesian General Theory . 
This is represented by the equations :
M = 1 (Y, r) P- [2.5]
ie the equilibrium on the market for money; and the equilibrium on the market for 
savings.
x(r) = sY [2.6]
In this case, the expansion of the nominal money seems to be the appropriate 
instrument as it appears to eliminate capital scarcity. The authorities can increase M 
to reduce the marginal liquidity yield of real money and the bond rate of interest r. 
The expected outcome is to achieve a higher level of output, which will increase the 
flow of savings and the stock of capital with falling marginal product of capital, a rise 
in the wage rate and per capita consumption level.
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If the assumption of nominal money expansion is the best instrument to eliminate 
capital scarcity, the idle resources would be required to generate savings for the capital 
expansion that would lift income from poverty levels. The problem with this scenario 
is that, the monetary system issues nominal money not real money and acceleration 
of issue would result in realization of inflation and expectation of inflation and also 
lower nominal and real rates of interest.
Shaw’s postulation was that in the long run, the fix-price (equations 2.5 & 2.6) model 
would be a disastrous guide to policy. He argued that this is close to structural 
inflation model that rationalises repressive financial policy in the LDCs20. Shaw 
rejected the view that relative price of money I/P in this analysis would be determined 
on markets other than the market for money in the long run. He argued that some 
expositions of structuralism do not take into account the role of demand for money 
in the inflation process and in finding a stable relationship between nominal money 
and the price level.
Structuralism supports the view that excess money supply, positive or negative, has 
initial effects on output and employment. It failed to emphasize on the after effects 
and that inflation foreseen and compensated is neutral (Bronfenbrenner and Holzman, 
‘Survey of Inflation Theory’ AER 1963, pp.593 - 661, Shaw 1973 p.103). Full 
employment depends not on a on stable rate of increase in the price level but on a 
rising rate of increase in P and hence M. To contain the effects of real employment, 
P must stay ahead of P* (see Friedman AER 1968 pp.l - 17 , Lucas and Rapping 
1969 pp.342 - 350, Tobin AER 1972 pp.l - 18), Shaw used the General Theory to 
rationalise distaste of monetary authorities and for low-velocity deposit balances and 
powerless coin and currency balances and calling upon it to justify financial 
repression, especially the trade-off structuralism commitment to rising inflation, with
20 Note, i’ = r + p* and x(i - p*) = sY is about the substitution effect of growth in money . Their 
usefulness upon the reduction caused by the substitution effects on growth in physical capital is to expand 
the nominal money . In this case inflation imposed exogenously on the market for money creates an excess 
demand for money in private portfolios . To satisfy excess demand condition would require expansion of 
nominal money or in the wrong way, by reduce demand for investment, reduced employment and output 
and reduced savings to finance investment.
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the rate depending on the target of full employment.
The analysis presented are not the kind from which financial liberalisation evolves, nor 
of development that simply ignores finance. The implication is that requisite domestic 
savings must come through by some of the usual channels such as inflation tax. It also 
indicates that savings can be achieved upon the implementation of specific controls.
3.9 FINANCIAL REFORM
The following discussion examines the monetary system and the curb market mainly 
on the exchanges for long-term securities.
The Growth Trajectory of Demand for Monev:
The method the monetary authorities usually follow during liberalisation is clearly 
shown in the real money demand function of private spending units. Shaw gave as an 
example, the Korean step in money deepening in early 1963, to minimise finance of 
the central government’s fiscal budget by money issue. Monetary growth begins with 
an awareness by the monetary authority that there is a money demand function and 
then an estimation of the function. Indications of the possibility to underestimate and 
of the excess demand for money may precipitate a deflationary crisis or that growth 
may be over estimated and that excess supply of money through new issues may 
rekindle inflation can be identified before hand.
As soon as the critical transition is past, growth in real money demanded can be 
expected to take a comparatively stable trajectory. On the inflation target, real deposit 
rate acts as the essential policy mechanism on the market for money. There are two 
possible ways for obtaining the yield of money rm. First is the payments services 
supplied by the monetary system. The second is the P and P*, the actual and 
expected rates of inflation. These are available in a free or open market economy.
In the case of exogeneity of nominal money, the nominal deposit rate and the rate of 
inflation acts as the conduit for regulation of the real deposit rate. Nominal money is 
the instrument for regulation of the price level given the long-run growth rate of real 
money demanded M noting that the rate of inflation is determined by M.
Long-run financial deepening is at best improbable unless M  is at the discretion of
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the monetary authority and is adapted by it to the economy’s choice among inflation 
rate21. Therefore, deepening requires exogeneity of the money supply to the 
economy’s real sectors. Looking at the goals and instruments on the market for 
capital, Shaw adopted the view that money is debt of the monetary system which can 
be issued to purchase the present or existing wealth to finance governmental and 
private dis-saving or to draw savings from money holders to capital accumulation.
In this case the monetary system is taken to be a financial intermediary, both borrower 
and lender of savings. The path commonly followed by LDCs in pursuit of economic 
growth includes low or negative rates of interest, cheap imports of capital goods, tax 
concessions for investment and tariff protection for capital intensive production. 
Liberalisation in finance is for scarce prices for savings to increase the rates of saving, 
enhance savings allocation, induce some substitution of labour for capital equipment 
and assist in income equalisation.
3.9.1 THE CURB MARKET
Curb markets causes a dual financial system in Official and Unofficial financial 
system in an economy that accommodates its operation. No where in the world is this 
dualism more apparent than in the developing countries, including Nigeria. Since the 
commencement of the structural adjustment program in Nigeria curb market has 
become a very buoyant business sector in the country. The government recognising 
its scale of operations both in the urban and rural areas has decided to grant them 
licences to operate.
The curb market operation in Nigeria is of particular interest, in that its origin and 
existence cannot be accurately determined without any subjectivity or bias-ness. It is 
essentially part of the culture of the society. The only difference now is that it has 
been acknowledged by the monetary authorities as part of the financial intermediaries 
in the country. Shaw identified two major implications for the curb market in financial
21 note also that nominal money can take the form of loan expansion by the central bank or government 
, e.g , Ghana 1963 - 65; hence , control of nominal money .( see Shaw 1973 pp. 119 -120).
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liberalisation program:
1. The curb market will have to encounter competition from deepening in the 
organised sector; and
2. The curb market should be offered opportunities to become part of an integrated 
capital market, incurring risk and lower costs of other kinds as an open rather than 
covert activity.
Shaw concluded that dealers and brokers on the curb market may be assisted in 
moving into organised finance, including banking. However, the problem lies with 
the scarcity of data and their totally unreliability.
3.9.2 ASSESSING THE OBJECTIVES OF INNOVATION IN LONG-TERM 
FINANCE.
This implies the organisation of bond markets for risk-averse investors in corporate 
wealth and of mortgage markets to finance diffusion of control over property. The 
intention of these markets is to divert savings to newer and smaller ventures not only 
for democratisation but also for innovation of processes and products and for 
employment of resources previously idle. As discussed in chapter 2 and in the public 
intervention policy in this chapter, Credit rations, import licenses and tax favours leads 
to concenuation of economic power. Shifts imposed on terms of trade against 
agriculture, exports and labour transfers wealth into narrow ownership, hence the need 
to remove negative real rates of interest and allied devices.
New measures are required because the old techniques of finance have failed to 
account adequately for growth. Foreign aid is becoming increasingly difficult to 
acquire by the developing countries, more especially African states. Then* own 
predicament has been systematically worsened by the constant plague of one natural 
or human assisted disaster to another. The African countries dependency on foreign 
assistance is or can be said to be at its lowest ebb, judging from the position in the 
1960s and 1970s.
Tax reform commissions have generated no apparent optimism that tax income ratios
98
can be raised or that the income and inflation elasticities of tax revenues can be 
increased. Most developing economies monetary systems seems to be stagnant and the 
yield to inflation taxes has fallen as expected inflation has caught up with realised 
inflation. Perhaps, the LDCs can adopt the new instruments of ‘Long Term finance 
to reduce chronic excess demand for savings’. The legal system, supply of skills and 
communications facilities have reached the capacity of using new financial techniques 
cheaply in some countries. The stock of capital is large enough to bring within reach 
the scale of economies of sophisticated long term markets.
3.9.3 LIBERALISATION AND LONG-TERM FINANCE
As reported by Robert P.Collier in a review paper of the Bank of London and South 
America (1969 pp.347 - 360), "equities are not a defence against relatively high and 
unstable inflation nor is the indexation of bonds and mortgages". For Shaw, monetary 
reform with deepening of money is an indispensable fust thing to do. This means that 
until it occurs, the path of returns to any item of capital stock is a perilous random 
walk. Recurrent overvaluation of the foreign exchange rate depresses export 
enterprises, vulnerability of enterprises to unpredictable changes in credit rations, tax 
concessions and allowance of foreign exchange import licenses. The other problem is 
that specific price controls have arbitrary effects on earning which also undermines 
the horizons of savers in a repressive economy. Given all these circumstances, it is 
quite easy to induce the authorities into implementation of an apparatus of long term 
finance, more especially when the economy has become disillusioned with repressive 
policies. The devaluation of the Nigerian naira in March 1992 is believed to have 
removed the biggest constraint in negotiations with the IMF team. It was hoped that 
a new standby agreement could be reached which will lead to further rescheduling of 
Nigeria’s $30bn external debt. The government of Babangida intended to float the 
naira as far back as 1986 after delivering the government budget that seemed capable 
of producing a realistic exchange rate but never executed the plan until 1992.
The central Bank on the other hand are proposing a fiscal restraint, prudent monetary 
policies, public sector rationalisation and curbs on state spending. In 1990 inflation 
was running at 50 per cent and the naira overvalued by about 50 per cent. Now the
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government are attempting to recover lost ground. Doubt about the government’s 
renewed commitment to reform is based on more than its struggle with the foreign 
exchange rate. There are clear evidence of gross mismanagement and wasted resources 
on a scale that has done great harm to Nigeria than good.
Table 1.
THF. NTGF.RTAN EXCHANGE RATE 1991 - FIRST QUARTER 1992
Average exchange rate naira / $
1991 9.96
Jan / Feb 1992 9.75
March 1992 18.00
Source: FT March 1992.
Table 1.2. THE NIGERIAN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
At Constant 1984 Prices 
Year_____________ Nbn
1981 70.4
1982 70.2
1983 66.4
1984 63.0
1985 68.9
1986 71.1
1987 70.7
1988 77.8
1989 83.5
1990 90.4
1991(1) 94.3
1992(2) 95.5
Source : Federal Office Of Statistics and National Planning Nigeria.
(1) Provisional; (2) Forecast.
In Nigeria’s situation, the recently elected governors have inherited debt-stressed state 
treasuries and empty bank balances at a time of crumbling infrastructures which 
indicates the lack of room for manoeuvre on the part of the federal government. To 
meet the IMF criteria, the government has got to merge the official and competitive 
market exchange rates and substantially reduce the budget deficit which has been
estimated at 11.4 per cent of GDP in 1991. An effective move to slow down the rate 
of inflation and a reduction in the domestic petroleum subsidy is inevitable. Nigeria 
in the past three years has continued to attract substantial inflows of foreign direct 
investment quoted to be $lbn a year, which is more than the whole of sub-Saharan 
Africa. The offsetting effect of this is the huge amortisation burden of $3.8bn per 
annum, including a net repayment of $300m to the world bank. However, Nigeria’s 
scale of liberalisation is subject of a separate chapter.
Finally, as suggested by Kent Sims (the development of private financial markets in 
Pakistan, 1970,p. 16), there are early steps to be taken in arranging ‘transactional 
linkages’ between intermediaries with respect both to new security issues and to 
secondary transactions. These linkages permits intermediaries to optimize their own 
mixture of assets. This implies that the early stages of development in long term 
finance should facilitate and exploit economies of intermediation while at the same 
time exercising caution not to concentrate power among financial institutions. In 
financial reform money deepening is the first step, while diversification of 
intermediation becomes the second objective.
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3.10 FISCAL POLICY AND FINANCIAL DEEPENING
The term financial deepening in economic development is one of the 
methods of escaping from underdevelopment. This is achieved through 
income, savings, investment, employment and distribution effects.
This section examines the fiscal techniques with particular attention to the various
ways in which it complements, displaces or frustrates the technique of financial
deepening. A faster economic development can only occur when compatible fiscal and
financial reforms are undertaken. Deposit and loan rates are commonly used by
governments as instruments of tax and subsidy. They use these financial prices as
fiscal instruments to create or accumulate revenue and as a regulatory device. The
relative prices of financial assets are taken to be the real deposit and loan rates.
Assuming finance to be costless and financial markets perfectly competitive and
government not intervening, deposit and loan rates would be equal and accordingly
would approximate marginal rates of return to capital. In reality of course,
governments do intervene in the structure of real interest rates, distorting the structure
as a way of imposing taxes and granting subsidies.
In terms of budgetary considerations, governments undertaking reforms tend to pledge 
to do without inflation tax. Nigeria’s own reform is perhaps slightly more difficult to 
assess, given that the government are in the process of handing over government to 
the civilian politicians. This problem of government transition re- echo’s Friedman’s 
comment:
"Governments tends to look little farther than the next election. If that 
election is close, an increase in the rate of monetary expansion is 
bound to provide the government with more revenues. The effects on 
revenue, let alone on more fundamental economic and social matters 
will come later (Government revenue from inflation, JPE 1971, pp.853 
- 854)".
However, inflation tax is a reduction in real deposit rate, which of course can be 
reduced for the governments benefit without inflation. The government can force its 
debt upon commercial banks at rates of interest below free-market rates. The savings 
in interest cost borne by money holders if deposit rate is reduced correspondingly, by 
bank stockholders if bank profits are affected. Another view is by bank borrowers if 
banks raise private loan rates, are the equivalent of revenues from the inflation tax.
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Alternatively, the central bank can supply reserves to commercial banks by purchase 
of government securities and pay reserve deposit rate less than free market rates. To 
prevent bank evasion of the tax, a reserve requirement can be imposed (Harry 
Johnson, Problems of efficiency in monetary management, JPE, 1968 p.977). 
However, not all revenues from the deposit rate tax flows into the government budget. 
The other reason is that banks are collecting the inflation tax for themselves. 
Borrowers and stockholders of other financial institutions can realise similar 
advantages from any rise in P relative to nominal d and these advantages can be 
capitalised for sale as private wealth22.
Most revenues accruing to the government are extracted from private financial 
accumulation by explicit taxation as well as the inflation tax. The compulsion by 
savers to hold directly or indirectly, government securities bearing nominal rates of 
interest below free market levels is another source of revenue to the government. 
Shaw illustrated the budgetary stringency among LDCs by using Ghana as an example 
where it was estimated that during the 1960s, the country’s GDP was rising at a rate 
of 2.5 percent per annum. The current costs of government increased at a rate of 10.5 
percent per annum and the government’s income by way of taxation rose by an 
average of 10 percent per annum, hence leading gradually to increasing difficulties in 
finding the resources to finance the development program (see The Republic of Ghana, 
Budget Statement for 1971-72).
It has become evidently clear that governments attempts to find resources for current 
and development budgets will involve growth in public debt at a rate faster than 
growth in the national wealth as measured by the GDP, in principal bases of taxation 
and in fiscal revenues. As a result, the service on the public debt has become an 
impediment to development policy.
22 See Shaw 1973 p. 153
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Table 1.3. DOMESTIC PUBLIC DEBT
Year ( Nbn )
1980 26
1985 40
1987 50
1988 66
1989 81
1990 107
1991 120
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
Table 1.4. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT :At a Constant 1984 Prices
Year Nbn Growth/Decline ( % )
1981 70.4
1982 70.2 0.2 -
1983 66.4 3.8 -
1984 63.0 3.4-
1985 68.9 5.9
1986 71.1 2.2
1987 70.7 0.4-
1988 77.8 7.1
1989 83.5 5.7
1990 90.4 6.9
1991(1) 94.3 3.9
1992(2) 95.5 1.2
Source : Growth / decline rate computated irom the Nigerian HJS & JNF ligures ol 
GDP.
Take for instance Nigeria’s domestic public debt T1.4, which has consistently rose 
from $26bn in 1980 to $120bn in 1991. Referring to T1.4, the Nigerian economy 
experienced a negative growth rate in GDP between 1981 and 1982 of 0.2 percent. 
The worst decline in growth was in 1983 of 3.8 percent, recovering slightly in 1984 
to 3.4 percent. 1985 marked a turn-around with GDP showing a positive rise from the 
figures of 1984 of 5.9 percent and recovering from a negative slump of 0.4 percent 
in 1987 to reach the highest peak of 7.1 percent in 1988. It could be said that while 
1987 took the full impact of the SAP introduction in 1986, the government reaped it 
biggest reward of the reform in 1988.
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Discussion on the deposit rate tax regulation is in chapter 5; which explores the 
interdependence of financial and fiscal techniques in the saving - investment process.
3.10.1 SUBSIDISED LOAN RATE AND CREDIT RATIONING 
In LDCs loan rate is prevented from reporting capital’s marginal product in alternative 
uses and of equating demand for investment with the savings flow, while in organised 
markets, it is an administered price set at differential levels that requires complex 
rationing techniques to resolve excess demand for funds.
It represents a flexible price at a very high rate in traditional or curb markets, hence 
conferring subsidy on rationed investment from revenues supplied partly by the 
deposit rate tax on savers.
The flexible rate in turn imposes a tax on demand for funds, excluded from the 
organised market by rationing for the benefit of savers with access to curb market 
facilities. By extending the subsidies and imposing taxes, the loan rate is transformed 
from a financial to a fiscal instrument in the saving-investment process (Shaw pp.81 - 
88, 125 - 128 & 158 - 163).
Shaw provided an example with the Korean interest rate reforms and loan rate 
structure. Mckinnon (1973) provided the original argument that high nominal interest 
rates can help provide a more favourable short-run time path of real output than 
stabilisation which emphasises a reduced rate of monetary expansion. Kapur (1976a, 
1976b) explored this viewed at a greater length. The fundamental implication of this 
is that in developing economies, commercial bank credit is the most important external 
source of financing for productive enterprises. A sudden reduction in the rate of 
monetary expansion, normally a common phenomenon in LDCs attempts to eliminate 
excessive inflation and external disequilibrium, will exert a direct effect on the ability 
of productive enterprises to hold working capital and so enforce an immediate and 
perhaps large reduction in real output and employment.
An alternative approach which eliminates the excess supply of money which is the 
root cause of inflationary pressures by using the interest rate to stimulate the demand
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for money balances, can potentially avoid the squeeze on credit and working capital 
and so avoid the loss of real output23.
The sharpest criticisms labelled against subsidy is that it impoverishes an economy 
and deepens the imperfection of the capital market. Subsidy induces excess demand 
for the factor, capital that is scarce and increases excess supply of complementary 
factors especially labour that is plentiful and distracts the economy from the best 
production possibilities.
Van Wijnbergen24 was very critical of the restricted and unrealistic portfolio choices. 
He argued that the favourable consequences of higher deposit interest rate in the 
Kapur model (portfolio choices) derived from the assumption that higher deposit 
holdings and bank loans arise entirely as a result of substitution away from an asset 
such as cash which is wholly unproductive in terms of financing business activities. 
His own postulation is that the specification of portfolio choices in LDCs should allow 
for the possible use of funds directly or indirectly to provide loans in the curb market. 
Hence, a three way model portfolio substitution involving cash (assumed 
unproductive), time deposits and curb market loans. His assumption was that the 
administrative fixing of the time deposit interest rate and the bank’s requirements to 
hold part of it as reserves will be impossible for the commercial banks to meet all the 
demand for working capital loans which the economy generates. The remaining 
unsatisfied demand is met by the curb market and the interest rate on curb market 
loans adjusts to equilibrate this residual demand with the supply of loans which are 
made available to it (Roe, 1989).
Shaw regarded the loan-rate subsidy as a dubious efficiency for stimulating 
entrepreneurship and forced feeding of infant industries. Subsidy accrues to promoters 
of new firms, but high returns to promotion should not be confused with high returns 
to entrepreneurship or with compensation to infant industries for its learning costs.
23 A. R. Roe, Interest rate policy, employment and income distribution, in the book, Market 
Liberalisation, equity and development, 1989 p.87.
24 Van wijnbergen 1983a, 1983b.
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Hard pressed for revenue, the treasury or the finance minister can switch to the 
savings market by lowering rates for treasury bills, possibly by decree. The banking 
system and longer term securities can be thrust into social security funds, pension 
funds and portfolios of insurance companies. Savers are captive tax payers and sadly 
enough, the government very often do not give adequate consideration as to the 
opportunity cost of savings in planning its expenditure budget. Savers in the lower- 
income category are discriminated against and the long maturity segment of the capital 
market is closed to private securities. There is rarely public accounting for subsidy and 
the deposit rate taxes that finance it and also it is not reported in fiscal budgets, as 
well as obscured by accounting convention.
As for fiscal aid to finance, subsidy of deposit rates of interest in the organised 
financial sector is used to divert funds from the curb and by the authority as allocation 
technique. The theory of monopolistic price discrimination appears to fit many of the 
features of fiscal financial tax - cum subsidy. The government representing the 
monopolist as seeking to divide the market into fragments, by differentiating the 
product may be able to limit a price reduction when desired to expand output. To 
some of the customers, maintaining this charges to others has a negative effect to total 
revenue, while to increase price in order to expand output, to some of the suppliers 
it will have a positive effect on total costs.
With regards to coordination of fiscal and financial strategies, financial deepening and 
fiscal strength are mutually dependent for example, Chile 1960 - 61 and 1965 - 66 
(Arnold Harberger, JPE, 1970, p. 1012). Public policy lets tax base slip away and 
government substitute import quotas and licences for tariffs etc. To avert slippage in 
LDCs, training seems to offer the solution. Slippage begins with the phrasing of tax 
law and regulation which creates a thriving industry of tax avoidance and evasion, 
including losses of revenue from shortcomings (Kaldor, Essays on Economic Policy 
Yol.l p.216), in valuation of income or property or turnover as well as the 
administrative costs of inefficient bureaucracy.
Considering fiscal perversity and the loan rate, the technique of finance in the saving -
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investment process allows relative price in the form of loan rates to act as the factor 
for deciding between investment alternatives for scarce savings. Thus, bring savings 
into the capital market and depends on the market measures and competitiveness for 
employing them where marginal social productivity is highest.
The un-reliability of this technique is based on two main factors:
[1] The participants in a capital market cannot obtain an appropriate ranking of social 
productivity or disregards it and attend to a ranking in terms of private advantage.
[2] Demands for savings in a capital market are interest - inelastic, so that loan rate 
has no power to discriminate.
The conclusion drawn on this was that little is to be gained by development of the 
capital market intervention to correct private perceptive, rationing and transfers of the 
investment function to government. The danger is, participants in the capital market 
are likely to abuse them by monopoly power.
To overcome the problem would be to deepen finance so that more buyers and sellers 
of loan fund have access to the market and also to lower the differentiation of 
financial institutions that fragments the market into detached groups. A direct action 
against monopoly power that derives from fiscal perversity is another way of tackling 
it. Turnover taxation provides a bonus for vertical integration. Tax exemptions 
discriminate for established investors at the top of the scale in terms of profits. Failure 
to tax real property, capital gains and higher incomes allows market strength to 
accumulate. Subsidised loan rate with rationing in shallow capital markets is not the 
answer.
In concluding the discussion on fiscal policy and financial deepening Shaw presented 
reforms in two perceptive. He noted that where capital accumulation lags and is 
misdirected, financial and fiscal structure and policy are jointly to blame.
Deposit rate tax and loan rate subsidy are fiscal penalties or punishment to the 
financial system. Fiscal system is not deep or elastic enough as savings and it distorts 
savers demand for financial assets and choices by financial institutions between loan
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options. Inflation reduces the fiscal base and elasticity and the administered pricing 
while aversion to risk and inflexibility creates opportunities for fiscal perversity. 
Therefore, reforms that can assist to liberate finance should include:
1. Elimination of taxes that yields small returns net of exemptions and administered 
costs;
2. Reduction of delays in tax assessments and collection;
3. Tightening of tax administration;
4. Schedular taxation of income can be rationalised, with fewer distinctions between 
sources and less discrimination against income from financial assets;
5. Rationalisation of government pricing;
6. Revaluation and title to property; and
7. Tariffs can be efficient substitute for import licensing, therefore a strong need for 
value added tax as a centre piece of the fiscal scheme. However, it does not provide 
opportunities for avoidance, evasion and slippage that are so offensive to equity.
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3.11 FINANCIAL DEEPENING IN THE OPEN ECONOMY 
Lagging economies imposes disequilibrium on this market as it does on domestic 
markets for money and other finance and attempts to clear excess demand with a 
variety of interventions. The other postulation is with reciprocal effects of distortion 
in domestic finance and international trade on current account. In general the analysis 
focused on the long, to issues of growth and stagnation rather than stability or 
instability.
In an open economy, money becomes tradable and markets appears to determine the 
price for the foreign exchange rate against external money. There may be a multiple 
market on which domestic and external money trade against each other, each with a 
rate of exchange example, official and black or spot and forward markets. 
Disequilibrium, arbitrary intervention and risks are the common features of the LDCs 
foreign exchange markets. As Gunnar Myrdal in Asian Drama Vol.3, 1968, p.2082 
puts it; "foreign exchange difficulties are not a temporary exigency but a normal and 
permanent condition in very poor countries".
Shaw adopted Jagdish Bhagwati’s theory and practice of commercial policy, to 
illustrate the scenario for disequilibrium money identity:
Where B is the current account of the LDC economy’s balance of payment with 
disequilibrium (negative), representing unsustainable excess of aggregate demand for 
goods and services relative to national output or excess to the desired investment 
relative to savings25.
In view of the monetary authority’s little stocks of international reserves and limited
25 Excess demand precipitates a crisis that can only be resolved temporarily by substantial devaluation 
below borrowing point and by other measures of emergency ... Shaw pp. 196 - 197.
B Y E [3.0]
Usage or National 
Expenditure
Trade Bal National 
Income
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borrowing capacity in external capital markets, a regime of quantitative restrictions on 
imports became introduced, that is, a regime of multiple exchange rates for imports 
followed by export subsidies, substitution of tariffs for other restraints on imports and 
devaluation. This is exactly the kind of exchange rate regime in operation in Nigeria. 
The government official rate pegged at N18.00 to $1.00, and in the curb market at 
N25 to N30.00 to $1.00. Following the high band in exchange rate, imports of foreign 
goods becomes restrained, causing to some extent severe shortages especially of 
machineries and other finished products from abroad. Evidence, of this can be seen 
in none renewal of contracts or maintenance of existing infrastructures and falling 
manufacturing outputs and investments ( see table 1.5 below).
Table 1.5 THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY UNDER THE REFORM  PROGRAM
Period 1981-86 1987 - 91
GDP Growth (% p.a ) 0.2 5.7
Investment (% of GDP) 12.0 6.0
Inflation (% p.a ) 17.0 24.0
Exports / GDP (%) 14.3 18.0
Imports / GDP (%) 11.3 3.8
Budget Deficit (% of GDP) 5.3 3.7
Source : Central Hank ot Nigeria
From table 1,5, it can be seen that investment under performed, averaging 6 percent 
of GDP26, as against 12 percent before the start of the reform. Equally, imports 
collapsed as a share in GDP, itself a partial explanation of the poor investment level 
in the country. The situation is not helped either by the constant rise in the rate of 
inflation, which in the period 1987 / 91, stood at 24 percent, compared against 17 
percent in the period 1981 / 86.
Shaw admitted that the scenario is incomplete because it neglects the role of markets 
for money and capital. However, this can be updated by the current and capital 
accounts in the international balance of payment, with only transactions between
26 The Gross Domestic Product ( GDP ) is taken to represent the national wealth
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monetary authorities omitted (Harry G. Johnson, International trade and economic 
growth, pp. 135 - 168). This can be represented as:
B -  Rf + Rr - Pf - Pr = R - P [3.1]
Where Rf = receipts by residents of payments from foreigners;
Pf = payments by residents to foreigners;
Rr and Pr are identically equal, representing payments and receipts between 
residents.Before the government decided to float the naira, what it always does is to 
fix a parity against centre money27 on the foreign exchange market, with a narrow 
band between lending and borrowing points. This then generates excess demand for 
foreign exchange by driving B to negative levels. The other consequence is that it 
induces excess offers of payments P from domestic money balances relative to bids 
in all markets for receipts R that restore balances. That is, it imposes excess supply 
on the market for domestic money.
Shaw argued that, policy in LDCs makes a gesture of integration with the centre 
economy, but its bias is autarchic and the fixed parity with a narrow band is illusory. 
This point could be true, because the developing economies currency through fixed 
parity are grossly overvalued. Maintaining such parity will not only be illusory but 
will be undermining the exports sector of the economy.
In relation to the instruments of exchange control, all markets in the LDCs are pressed 
with excess money supply and with a common pattern of devices to suppress its 
effects. Excess money supply drives nominal rates of interest higher once inflation has 
come to be expected. In both cases the authorities intervenes with price ceilings. Their 
intention for intervening is to support money’s relative price I/P and to hold down 
money’s opportunity cost and keep real interest rates low.
27 Centre money implies currencies such as the U.S dollar or the British pound and the German mark. 
They are so because the economies of these western industrialised countries are very strong . Also they are 
used, especially the dollar in international trade pricing standard .
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There is also differentiated rationing at each of the various stipulated prices. 
Therefore, excess demand for any input including foreign exchange is increased by 
disequilibrium pricing for other inputs.
In the case of disequilibrium money and market structure, there tend to be a dual 
effects of controls which are:
[1] The centralising effect, which implies privileged access to rationed supplies;
[2] Fragmentation of market structure by multi-monetising the economy. That is, 
money in the usual form ceases to be the only means of payment and in some markets 
cannot be accepted as a medium of exchange unless it is combined with a ration ticket 
or coupon. In which case, money’s utility in search and bargain becomes reduced. In 
Therefore, money’s income effect is lost and the disequilibrium system is not money 
deepening.
3.11.[1] TRADE POLICY AND FINANCIAL GROWTH
The implication of trade policy and financial growth is that financial repression, 
exchange rate disequilibrium and policy bias against comparative advantage in 
international trade are interlocking restraints on development. Interventions in flows 
of trade on current account provides new incentives for financial repression, as well 
as imposing an implicit multiple pricing on the foreign exchange market. Also 
distortion of prices of savings and foreign exchange mis-allocation demand and supply 
among tradable and domestic goods.
The important points with the effects of financial repression upon trade is shown by 
reduction of domestic savings. Shallow finance as a result led to distortions in trade, 
hence savers responds to low and unstable real rates of return on financial assets by 
shifting demand of imports of consumable, to consumable’s with high import content, 
and to domestic goods with export potentials.
The subsidised loan rates effect is the imposition of bias-ness on trade and the 
diversion of savings into capital-intensive products and processes. Subsidised growth 
in plant and equipment imposes a growing burden on the balance of payments of
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imports in the form of spare and replacement parts. On the effects of trade distortion 
upon finance, financial policy distorts international trading by the lagging economy 
and trading policy reciprocates with distortion of finance.
As for international capital flows, financial repression and fiscal inadequacies helps 
to create a savings gap at rates of growth in national product that approach the 
aspirations of developing economies. Financial repression upon capital flows imposes 
a consistent bias for export of domestic savings and also induces cycles of savings 
flows, tides in and out that cannot be absorbed by efficient adjustments on current 
accounts for trade. As excess demand accumulates on foreign exchange before a 
reluctant adjustment of the exchange rate, savers foresee and respond to prospective 
devaluation.
The inflow of aid has inflationary potentials. The grant from abroad is a tax on foreign 
savers to finance some miscellany of imports to the lagging economy, and as a conduit 
for new levy of the inflation tax on domestic savers. According to Shaw, this 
demonstrates the seamless web that binds all elements of finance: international, fiscal 
and monetary in restraint of growth.
311 [2] THE CHOICE OF POLICY AND FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE
Shaw’s hypotheses was that real money policy for deepening the financial system 
includes specification of target growth rate, preferably low, for inflation of the 
domestic price level. One instrument in guiding price level, given growth in real 
money demanded is the growth rate of nominal money. Flexible exchange rate 
provides an alternative instrument for small developing economies that imports a rate 
of inflation from the industrialised countries and adapts growth in nominal money to 
it through balance of payment adjustments.
Disequilibrium emerges when taste diverge and the use of both control instruments; 
domestic nominal money management and the inflexible exchange rate, provokes a 
confrontation of monetary authorities with the authorities of the small economy 
inevitably the loser. Flexible pricing helps with freedom of trade in goods and capital
114
in the presence of chronic differentials rates of inflation or of chronic differences in 
the variability of inflation rates.
Real money policy for deepening indicates free convertibility on the foreign exchange. 
Money’s maximum income effect and other benefits from financial markets depends 
on freedom of payment and transfer through the widest efficient matrix of transactions. 
It is not achieved when payments are forced to run a gauntlet of rationing and are 
subjected to the costs and risk of black markets. The optimal foreign exchange market 
arrives at a single or unified spot rate of foreign exchange rather than a multiple rates 
in conjunction with interventions to clear excess demands.
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3.12 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Shaw in his analysis is very critical of low controlled interest rates and financial 
repression. In his financial development model, financial institutions intermediate 
between savers and investors. There are loan rate ceilings as well as deposit rate 
ceilings in most financially repressed economies and there are few competitive 
banking system in the LDCs.
Shaw’s view is that the real rate of interest as the return to savers is the key to a 
higher level of investment and as a rationing device to greater investment efficiency. 
The increased quantity and quality of investment interact in their positive effects on 
the rate of economic growth. Growth in the financially repressed economy is 
constrained by saving and investment opportunities.
The theory postulated by Shaw, has as its policy prescription for the financially 
repressed economies, two options;
[1] To raise the institutional interest rates; or
[2] To reduce the rate of inflation.
Abolishing interest rate ceilings produces the optimal result of maximising investment 
and raising investment’s average efficiency.
Shaw argued that the expanded financial intermediation between savers and investors 
resulting from financial liberalisation and financial development, increases the 
incentives to save and invest and raises the average efficiency of investment.
The reason for this is that, it raises real returns to savers and at the same time lower 
real costs to savers by accommodating liquidity preferences, reducing risk through 
diversification, reaping economies of scale in lending, increasing operational efficiency 
and lowering information costs to both savers and investors through specialisation and 
division of labour.
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Chapter 4
THE NEO-STRUCTURALIST MODEL
The chapter is to examines the Neo-structuralist models, the empirical evidence on 
transmission mechanisms and income distribution and the effects of financial 
liberalisation on inflation and short-run growth.
The main importance of the Neo-structuralist model from that of Mckinnon and Shaw 
school is that, it provided analysis which are fundamentally different, based on the 
following five assumptions:
[1] Wages are determined institutionally or exogenously through class conflict;
[2] Inflation is determined by the relative strengths of capitalist and workers;
[3] Savings occur through profits only and not wages;
[4] Price level is determined through fixed mark-up over costs of labour, imports, and 
working capital finance, that is,interest rate (Taylor 1979); and
[5] Developing Countries depends on imports of raw materials, capital equipment and 
intermediate goods.
Assumptions 4 and 5 indicates that a restrictive monetary policy that raises interest 
rates and a devaluation that raises the price of imports can produce stagflation. That 
is, an acceleration in the inflation rate and a reduction in the rate of economic growth 
at the same time.
At the centre of the Structuralist model of Developing Countries is the Curb Market, 
in which money lenders and domestic banks intermediate between savers and 
investors. The Neo-structuralist claim that banks cannot intermediate as efficiently as 
the Curb Markets between savers and investors because the Reserve Requirement 
constitute’s a leakage in the process of financial intermediation through commercial 
banks. The public is assumed to hold a congeries of assets such as currency, precious 
objects, land and real estate, termed Gold. The other two assets held are bank deposits 
and curb market loans. This is the first major difference between the Neo-structuralist 
and the Mckinnon - Shaw models.
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Mckinnon and Shaw models emphasises on two assets; Gold or other inflation hedges 
and money in household portfolios, which means that, the substitution into money 
must come from substitution out of inflation hedges.
Taylor (1983, p. 100) noted that financial liberalisation can not yield the desired result 
under the conditions of standard assumption that financial assets are gross substitutes. 
Van Wijnbergen indicated that, whether higher deposit rates do increase the total real 
supply of credit would depend on the required reserve ratio and on whether the 
increased holdings of real money balances come mainly at the expense of inflation 
hedges or mainly from direct lending in the curb market1.
The conclusion drawn by Edward Buffie, Akira Kohosaka (1984), Taylor and Van 
Wijnbergen was that in practice, financial liberalisation is likely to reduce the rate of 
economic growth by reducing the total real supply of credit available to firms.
Given the assumption of a free movement of funds between the Banking System and 
the Curb Market by the Neo-Structuralist, savers and investors can use either or both 
markets. This implies that, the relevant interest rate in the Structuralist model is the 
curb market rate because it represents the marginal cost of borrowing and entering into 
the money demand function since curb market loans constitute an alternative to 
holding money balances.
One notable significance is that any rise in the curb market rate also raises the price 
level since a rise in the curb market rate increases the cost of working capital. Prices 
are determined by fixed mark-up’s over costs in all the Neo-Structuralist models. 
Secondly, an increase in the curb market rate also reduces output by deterring 
investment. Commercial Banks are required to maintain a compulsory fixed reserve 
ratio 1 - q, with the Central Bank. The Central Bank do not extend a credit facility to 
the private sector as its function is to act as the Government Bank, Bank for other 
Banks, Bank for International Monetary Agencies and Foreign Governments. Hence,
1 See Fry 1982c,p. 1051.
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the reserve money or high powered money which forms the cash base is wholly 
Outside Money. Three forms of assets are held by the household sector: currency or 
gold, bank deposits and curb market loans. When the deposit rate of interest increases, 
it also raises the demand for deposits and reduces demand for currency and curb 
market loans.
Van Wijnbergen noted the need to incorporate the curb markets into the Monetary 
Models of the Developing Countries. The model postulated by Van Wijnbergen was 
partly based on the Wicksellian Credit Availability Effect, which was also used by 
Domingo Cavallo (1977), Fry (1980b) and Keller (1980). The reason for the inclusion 
is that, LDCs are dependent on credits to finance their working capital. The other 
reason is that, their debt/equity ratios tend to be high.
Like Shaw, Van Wijnbergen adopted the Tobin - Type portfolio behaviour on the part 
of the household sector to analysis the effects of financial liberalisation2. Hence, the 
allocation of the households real wealth W between currency CC, time deposit TD and 
direct loans to the business sector through the curb market3 Lh. From this, Van 
Wijnbergen obtained the following financial development model in the steady state:
CC = f  (tt, i, rtd, y)W [1.0]
TD -  f d(7T, i, rtd, y)W [1.1]
Lsh = fO t, i, rtd, y)W [1.2]
where the left hand variables including i and y (on the right hand) are the endogenous 
variables while the right hand variables represented the exogenous variables, n is the 
inflation rate, i is the nominal curb market rate of interest, rtd represented the real time 
deposit rate of interest and y is real income.
2 Van Wijnbergen 1983a, pp.435 - 436.
3 The curb market can also be referred to as the unorganised money market.
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CC is currency at constant prices, TD is time deposits at constant prices while Lsh 
denotes household sector loans to business firms through the curb market at constant 
prices and W represents real wealth.
It follows that since demand for currency and time deposits are positively related to 
income, the household sector’s supply of funds to the curb market is negatively related 
to income, given the level of wealth. According to Van Wijnbergen (1983a,p.436) the 
cash base, which consists of currency in circulation and bank reserves is not supported 
by any private assets because it originates from transfer payments. The bank loan 
supply in real terms Lsb to the business sector will depend on their demand for excess 
reserves, the level of deposits and the required reserve ratio.
This can be expressed algebraically as:
Lsb = b(it, rL)q.TD [1.3]
where rL denotes the bank lending rate in real terms. The nominal bank lending rate 
is fixed by the government below its equilibrium level as opposed to the curb market 
interest rate which is free to find its market clearing equilibrium level.The equation 
for firms demand for loans which is determined by the real product wage w and 
output y can be written as:
Ld = L(w, y) [1.4]
In this formulation, loan demand is completely inelastic with respect to the curb 
market rate of interest.Therefore, the equilibrium in the curb market can be expressed 
as:
f'Oc, i, rtd, y)W = L(w, y) - b(7C, rL)q.fd(7r,i,rtd,y)W. [1.5]
From equation [1.5] through differentiation, the upward-sloping LM curve is obtained 
while by differentiating the simple Keynesian output equation:
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y = A(i -n, y) [1.63
where Ai < 0, and 0 < Ay < 1 (4).
From equation [1.6] the IS curve is obtained. See figure 4.0 below.
Curb
Market
Interest
Rate
Figure 4.0 The IS-LM Curves in Van WiibergeiTs Model
The IS curve does not shift because a change in the time deposit has no effect on the 
goods market therefore, the money market is only subject to two effects which are:
[1] A higher time deposit rate increases money demand and as a result shifts the LM 
curve upwards; and
[2] The substitution out of currency and into time deposits increases the money supply 
and shifts the LM curve downwards.
4 See Branson 1987,pp..
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The required reserve ratio and the relative elasticities of demand for currency and curb 
market assets with respect to time deposits will determine the net shift in the LM 
curve. The Policy Implication is that, a rise in time deposit will influence people to 
substitute from curb market loans to time deposit resulting to the total supply of funds 
to the business sector declining. The assumption here is that the curb market provides 
one-for-one intermediation whereas banks provide only partial intermediation due to 
the reserve requirement. In which case the LM curve shifts to the left, the curb market 
rate rises and output falls.
However, when people starts to substitute mainly from currency to time deposits after 
a rise in the time deposit rate, the total supply of funds to the business sector 
increases, the LM curve shifts to the right and the curb market rate falls forcing output 
upwards. This scenario gave rise to the Neo-Structuralist expectation. Van Wijnbergen 
argued that in the long run the initial decrease in financial deepening as a result of the 
higher market rate will persist over time5.
The other policy implication is that a tight monetary policy reduces growth by 
squeezing total credit availability. That is, if the supply reducing effect of such policy 
is greater than the demand reducing effect, the balance of payment on the current 
account will deteriorate after the introduction of such policy.
4.0 THE EFFECT OF PERFECT CAPITAL MOBILITY
Given a perfect international capital mobility, domestic credit policy has no effect on 
investment since the real borrowing rate remains at the world level. On the other hand, 
a restrictive domestic credit policy does affect disposable income in this situation by 
increasing the country’s debt service burden. An increase in the cash base will raise 
the output through the credit availability effect and slows inflation. The accelerated 
monetary growth need not be inflationary as long as it is all spent on productive 
investment.
5 Van wijnbergen 1983a,pp.448 - 449, Maxwell.! Fry 1988,p.93.
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4.1 TAYLOR’S MODEL
Taylor provided an accounting identity and empirical relations that characterises the 
LDCs. He reformulated the analytical models applicable in developed economies to 
fit the developing economies. Taylor’s analysis emphasises on the importance of 
structural features like surplus labour, the distinction between tradable and non­
tradable goods (terms of trade between the rural and urban sectors) and the changing 
distribution of income among different socio-economic groups. He also analyses the 
effects of an increase in the time deposit rate when households hold gold, bank 
deposits and curb market loans.
His results are closely similar to those of Van Wijnbergen depending on the extent of 
the financial intermediation that the commercial banks can legally provide. The 
informal or unorganised market has no reserve requirement which enables them to 
direct resources toward firms with greater efficiency. Therefore, unless the banks are 
able to draw hoarded assets such as gold into deposits when the nominal deposit rate
of interest id rises, the overall effect of reform can be stagflation.
The subscript id denotes a partial derivatives with respect to the interest rate on loans 
to firms and the deposit rate.
His analysis of the effect of monetary contraction used a model in which the output 
Y is determined by the available fixed capital K which can be expressed as:
Y = aK  [1.7]
Dividing output into labour, capital and interest costs:
PY = (1 + i )wN + rPK [1.8]
where P = the price level
i = the nominal curb market interest rate 
w = the nominal wage rate
N = the quantity of labour and
r = the profit rate.
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As the labour and all other current inputs are paid for in advance, the interest cost of 
working capital can be denoted as iwN. Substitutability factor was not allowed in the 
model, thus, labour use is proportional to output.
N = BY = BcfK [1.9]
Substituting equation 1.9 into 1.8, gives the expression for the profit rate as:
r = o[ 1  - ( 1  + i)wB ]
P [2.0]
By inverting equation 2.0 we obtain the expression for the price level:
P = o w d  + i)fi
«y - r) [2 .1 ]
Therefore, the equilibrium condition for the goods market in real terms will be:
C + I + G = Y [2.2]
Given s is a fixed fraction of saving out of the total profits rPK, consumption in 
nominal terms will be:
PC = (1 + i)wN + (1 - s)rPK [2.3]
Hence, the saving - investment balance can be expressed as:
g + %<5 - sr = 0 [2.4]
Equations 2.0 and 2.4 determine the equilibrium price level. The growth rate of the 
capital stock (investment) depends on the difference between the profit rate and the 
curb market interest rate, both expressed in real terms as:
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g = go + h[r - (i - 7C)] [2.5]
The final price level can be expressed as:
P = (s - h)crw(l + i)fi [2 .6 ]
[s - (h + x)]a - g0  + h(l -iz)
The above equation implies that an increase in the curb market rate will raise the price 
level through working capital cost push but will lower the price level by reducing 
investment demand. Whatever circumstances that prevail, an increase in the interest 
rate will lead to a reduction in the rate of economic growth, as long as the increase 
in the profit rate affects savings by more than it affects investment. This condition is 
also represented by equation 2.4; the standard stability condition.
The equation for IS curve or the equilibrium in the goods market can be written as:
(s - h)g(l + i)wfl - h(i - k) + g0  - [s -(x + h)]a = 0  [2 .7 ]
P
An increase in the price level raises the nominal value of firms fixed capital. The 
implication of this is that such windfall gains stimulate investment, leading firms to 
demand more loans. As more and more resources are drawn into the curb market from 
deposits through a higher rate, the loan market equilibrium curve will become upward 
sloping.
Taylor provided the same argument as Van Wijnbergen on the policy effects using the 
IS - LM curve. Under a tight monetary policy, the commodity market equilibrium 
curve will shift to the right. It could also occur when the money demand function 
shifts upwards. This is illustrated by the Taylor’s two asset model (see figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1 ;
Short-run Equilibrium in Taylor’s Two Asset Model
The long run effect is that it could result to an increase in the curb market rate of 
interest, a decline in investment and a fall in the rate of economic growth. This led 
to the postulation of an aggregate supply function of the form:
X = x[P /(1 +i)w ] [2.8]
At the price level P an increase in interest rate i would lead to cost pressure that 
would induce producers to reduce their output X. Alternatively, if supply falls more 
than demand, the resulting aggregate excess demand would lead to a rise in the price 
level as shown in figure 1.1. Therefore, monetary contraction in the short-run would 
slow growth, drive up prices, reduce output and increase unemployment6.
6 Taylor, ‘Structuralist Macroeconomics ’ 1981,p.97. The result produced by Taylor is the same as that 
obtained by Van Wijnbergen, as well as Kohsaka (1984,p.428).
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Using a Tobin - Type portfolio framework, Taylor produced his full model with 
households holding bank deposits, curb market loans and gold that yields an 
equilibrium in the curb market. The equilibrium condition can be written as:
wfiaK - H + Cfi. id. %, rczHH + PK + PzZ) = 0 [2.9]
1  - q
where; H = cash base
1  - q = required reserve ratio 
k = inflation rate
%i = rate of change in the price of gold 
Z = quantity of gold held by the public sector.
Under the condition of equation 2.9, the general price level and the price of gold falls, 
the level of investment and growth declines. Diagrammatically, this shows a 
downward sloping curve of the commodity market equilibrium (see figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2:
Taylor’s Three-Asset Model: The Short-Run Equilibrium
Figure 4,2 shows the effect of an increase in the deposit rate of interest id which 
increases the money demand Md due to the increase in the substitution out of curb 
market loans.
"Therefore, unless there is another combination with expansionary 
monetary policy such as a reduction in the reserve requirement, it is 
unlikely that financial liberalisation will yield a beneficial economic 
performance in the medium term (Taylor, 1983,p. 122, Fry 1988,
p. 1 0 0 )".
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This means that, if the aggregate demand effects dominates the supply effects after an 
increase in the deposit rate, the inflation rate would decline and the real wage rises 
because of the lagged indexing system. Thus, the rise in real wage reduces the profit 
rate, investment and growth. According to Giovannini (1983b) a strong saving 
response to higher deposit rates could salvage the growth rate, however, empirical 
results on this evidence is weak.
In another empirical work, Buffie (1984) argued that, if the above statement by 
Giovannini is the case, the long-run multipliers can be opposite in sign to the short-run 
multipliers. That is, the curb market rate may rise in the short run because the total 
supply of credit falls with the substitution from curb loans to bank deposits. As for 
the long-run effect, the curb market rate could fall if higher deposit rates stimulate a 
sufficient increase in savings to counteract the leakage through reserve requirement.
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4.2 THE CURB MARKET UNDER THE NEO-STRUCTURALIST
In an attempt to extend the model by Van Wijnbergen, Jung and Chang 1984, 
introduce two alternative curb markets models:
[1] A competitive curb market with close links to the banking system on both the 
demand and supply side;
[2] An uncompetitive, primitive and fragmented curb market operating independent­
ly from the banking system.
Their analysis suggests that substitutability between time deposits and curb market 
loans may not be high for large savers because the assets have different risk attributes. 
Small savers responds to an increase in the time deposit rate than the larger savers. 
Therefore, the effect of financial liberalisation would be an increase in the total supply 
of credit to the business sector.
In both the competitive and uncompetitive curb markets, interest rates adjust to clear 
the market. Both markets can be taken to be unofficial private bank, as the 
government will not bail them out in the event of insolvency. The implication of this, 
is that, they are likely to hold reserves to meet defaults which will probably be greater 
than the official banking sector and as such their financial intermediation will be 
limited. Imperfect information and the small scale of operation may prevent the 
unofficial private banks from allocating credit as efficiently as the official banks.
Finally, the argument about the inefficiency of the curb market in allocation of 
resources disproves the Neo-Structuralist claim and their conclusion about the effects 
of financial liberalisation.
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4.3 THE NEO-STRUCTURALIST DYNAMISM
Both Taylor and Van Wijnbergen specify rational formation of expectations in their 
models, which in a non-stochastic model implies an assumption of perfect foresight. 
Since the expected inflation is actual inflation, it follows then that, expectation can not 
provide a source of dynamic adjustment.
Taylor’s dynamic adjustment analysis involves a profit squeeze where the mark-up 
rate* t varies over time as a function of capacity utilisation u or the level of 
unemployment. Assuming the labour capital ratio N/K = Bu and the Capital / full 
employment labour supply Nf to be K. The labour employed to the total labour force 
N/Nf to be p. Thus, a simple substitution would yield the expression:
p = (N/K)(K/Nf) = Buk.
In the case of the mark-up rate, it would vary over time as follows; given the 
conditions stated above:
5x / dt = a ( l  - Buk) [3.0]
or
5x / dt = a ( l  - p) = a ( l  - Buk)
Hence, % falls when p rises and full employment is approached, that is, if the level of 
capacity utilisation respond positively to the mark-up rate, the profit squeeze that 
occurs as capacity utilisation rises and unemployment falls would produce conver­
gence to a stable growth path. The convergence may be monotonic or cyclical7.
If the fully employed labour grows at the rate of g*, then the growth rate of k will be:
8 k / 5t = (g - g*)k [3.1]
7 Taylor, 1983,p.35, Fry,1988, pp.102 - 103.
131
Now let A (hat) over a variable denote its growth rate. 
Therefore, the new expression will be:
Ka = (5k / 8 t)/K = KA - La [3.2]
and
Ka = (5k / 5t)/K = g [3.3]
Given this ideal growth trajectory, the variables will adjust according to the 
JACOB IAN equations 3.0 and 3.1 (a two dimensional system).
| - aBk(5u / 5x) -aBu | [3.4]
| K(5g / 5x) 0  because g = g* at
— 1 equilibrium.
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6 k/St = 0 (g = g*)
Ratio of capital to fully employed
labour force K
Figure 4.3: DYNAMICS OF ADJUSTMENT TO STEADY - STATE GROWTH IN 
A PROFIT - SQUEEZE MODEL.
Note : Dynamics within a steady - state solution as defined by p = 1 and g = g* 
implies that a full employment of labour and the capital stock is growing at the same 
rate as the labour force at the steady state.
For a two dimensional system like equations 3.0 and 3.1, the stability conditions are 
that the trace of the Jacobian matrix must be negative and the determinants positive. 
The determinant of the matrix in 3.2 is positive, while the trace will be negative when 
5u/8x > 0 .
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Taylors conclusion from the above deductions was that when the level of capacity 
utilisation responds positively to the mark-up rate, then distributional changes induced 
by a profit squeeze will lead the economy toward steady growth. In effect, the profit 
squeeze that occurs as capacity utilisation rises and unemployment falls would 
produces convergence to a stable growth path. The convergence may be monotonic 
or cyclical as mentioned earlier. This is illustrated by the spiral path sketched in figure 
2s. Taylor suggested a wage adjustment process as an additional source of dynamic 
adjustment for an inflationary economy.
Looking at the structural adjustments in Nigeria, one crucial element the authorities 
have turned a blind eye to is the problem of wages. Nigeria exhibits a situation of 
high devaluation of the currency, high inflation and high unemployment and yet the 
government is preoccupied with a solution to stabilising the exchange rate and the 
external debt problem. Given the hypothesis by Taylor and the Nigerian case, wages 
catch up with higher prices only at discrete intervals, this is because in equilibrium, 
wages are fully indexed to the price level. The lagged adjustment means that the 
average real wage is related inversely to the inflation rate. The consequence is that 
dynamic mechanism has actual money wages growing faster than inflation when real 
wages are high.
Rapid money growth produces lower inflation, a higher growth rate and higher real 
wages when the interest rate effect that raises working capital costs dominates. Faster 
money growth produces higher inflation and higher growth but lower real wages, 
when the interest rate effect that reduces investment dominates. Therefore, the 
dynamic adjustment mechanism simply traces out the path from one steady-state 
situation to another. Once again, convergence can be monotonic or cyclical 
(M. Fry,1988,p.103).
Van Wijnbergen model discussed earlier in this chapter, treated inflation as exogenous, 
but his dynamic model of the Korean economy (1982), treated it as endogenous. His
8 Taylor, 1983, p.35. ‘ Cyclical convergence towards the equilibrium could be expected’.
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dynamic adjustment comprises of two categories:
First is the partial adjustment in the consumption and investment demand, firms price 
setting behaviour, the unemployment rate and financial asset and liability demands. 
Second is the expected-augmented Phillips curve used to determine the nominal wage 
rate w. The workers target real wage is set at w* and at the end of each period, their 
nominal wage demands are based on their current nominal wage and the price level 
anticipated in the future time period Pe.
4.3.1 THE WAGE SETTING SCENARIO
Assuming an inflationary shock previously erode the real wage below w*, workers 
will, raise their wage demand; hence we have the expression:
wA = C0  + Q F  + C2 (l/U t . j) + C3 (w* - wt . /P t . j) [3.5]
where; Ut. 1 denotes unemployment rate at the end of previous time period and A (hat) 
representing the percentage rate (%) of change. Thus, if w* becomes a declining 
function of Ut_ l7 equation 3.5, can then be rewritten in terms of observable variables 
as:
wA = ao + ^ F  + a^ l/U t. 0 + a3 (wt . /P t . [3.6]
The equation for the expectations-augmented Phillips curve included in the Van 
Wijnbergen model can be expressed as:
p = K e + £(Ad - y ) [3.7]
where pA = rate of change in domestic prices. 
ne = expected inflation 
Ad = aggregate demand and 
y = aggregate supply.
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Disequilibrium between demand and supply is eliminated through gradual price 
adjustment because of the stickiness of the domestic price in the goods market. The 
other essential factor is the rational expectations. This means that ne will always be 
equal to 7t, the actual inflation rate. This can be decomposed into domestic and 
imported components of the form:
5pA + ( 1  + 8 )7 1* .
where n is the foreign inflation rate .
As noted by Mckinnon, monetary contraction has the initial effect of reducing credit 
in real terms because prices do not rise immediately to their new equilibrium level. 
Therefore, the net effect on inflation will depend on whether the credit squeeze 
reduces supply through the working capital channel by more than it reduces 
investment demand. Empirically, it will be interesting to test the inflation rate for the 
effects of monetary contraction as well as the demand and supply effect in Nigeria. 
Especially as some observers of the Nigerian economy are attributing the fall in 
imports as a reason for the falling rate of investment caused by the credit squeeze 
(Financial Times survey of Nigeria 1992).
Stabilisation through deposit rate can also produce adverse results as stressed by Van 
Wijnbergen because with substitution mainly out of curb market loans, the real credit 
supply is reduced by the interest rate reform. This means that, the cost push inflation 
would occur in the short-run as higher interest rates are passed on in prices and output 
falls due to the credit availability effect. This implies that the Mckinnon and Shaw 
policy instrument model is as destructive as the monetary contraction in the Neo- 
Structuralist Economy (Fry, 1988,pp. 104 - 105).
As for solutions, Van Wijnbergen postulated a growth reducing effect of monetary 
deceleration as a first step toward increased money stock level. This will then be 
followed by a gradual reduction in its growth rate9.
9 The optimal control solution of Kapur (1982) is also similar to this postulation by Wijnbergen.
136
However, an initial monetary acceleration in conjunction with interest rate 
liberalisation will also be required to stabilise growth (Fry, 1988).
For the credibility problem of such a strategy, Van Wijnbergen (1982, p.6 6 ), indicated 
that an initial reduction in the deposit rate of interest would serve just as well as an 
increase in the money stock level.
Taylor believed the curb market to be agile or competitive, while Chang and Jung do 
not share his view and I am inclined to share the view of Chang and Jung.
This largely because it will be extremely difficult if not impossible, for the curb 
market to finance a large scale financial investment or to see the curb market loan 
system become as competitive as the official financial intermediaries.
In the Taylor, Chang and Jung models, all has the velocity of circulation between 
currency and time deposits as indeterminate, hence it would appeal* as if the monetary 
expansion can stimulate aggregate supply by more than the aggregate demand which 
will lead to a reduction in the price level.
In Mckinnon, Shaw and Neo-structuralist models, the government uses revenue raised
from the reserve requirement tax for transfer payments. For example, assuming the
government has a fixed PSBR10, any increase in real money demand would be met
by a reduction in the required reserve ratio. This means that, the marginal financial
intermediation of the banking system will be the same as the curb market, especially
if the cash base is not entirely outside money.
According to Fry;
"if one assumes that the official banking system is more efficient at 
allocating investible funds than the curb market and the households 
substitute mainly out of unproductive tangible assets, that is inflation 
hedges, when the real deposit rate of interest increases, financial libera­
lisation raises the total real supply of credit, the quantity and quality of 
investment and the rate of economic growth".
10 PSBR - stands for public sector borrowing requirement.
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The Neo-Structuralist models produced exactly the opposite of the Mckinnon - Shaw 
model, indicating that an increase in the real deposit rate of interest toward its 
competitive free-market equilibrium level will be accompanied by a reduction in the 
inflation rate and an increase in the rate of economic growth. Both the Mckinnon- 
Shaw school and the Neo-Structuralist expect higher reserve requirements to reduce 
funds available for investment by reducing the demand for deposits or reducing the 
fraction of a given volume of deposits that are available for investment.
Anthony Courakis (1984, 1986) provided some evidence under which higher reserve 
requirements would generate a larger volume of deposits. For this condition to happen, 
the demand for loans would have to be interest inelastic relative to the demand for 
deposits that equilibrium deposit rate rises with an increase in the required reserve 
ratio.
Fry’s (1981b) partial equilibrium on tapping consumer surplus through differential 
pricing of non-homogeneous components of the money stock, showed that the 
monopolistic profit maximising or cost-minimising deposit rate can be secured from 
a competitive banking system through the imposition of differential reserve 
requirements against different types of deposits.
4.4 THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The focus here is on the household allocation behaviour and the issue of 
substitutability between curb loans, time deposits and currency or inflation hedges. 
Wijnbergen provided a model which included the time deposits, curb loans and 
inflation hedge. Although his estimates seem to indicate greater substitutability from 
curb loans than from inflation hedges into time deposits after an increase in the time 
deposit rate of interest, evidence of movements in the curb market interest rate 
following time deposit rate changes do not support the Neo-Structuralist hypothesis 
that higher time deposit rates reduce the overall supply of credit.
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4.4.1 FINANCIAL SAVING AND PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION
The financial aggregate generally consists of currency in circulation, all types of bank 
deposits excluding government and inter-bank deposits and deposits held in non-bank 
depository institutions. Financial saving however, is the process of accumulating 
financial assets, which is directed toward claims offered by depository institutions.
M3 is the growth in the inflation adjusted or real magnitude of the monetary 
aggregate. Is employed to measure financial saving, and the changes in the liabilities 
of the financial system represented by the increase in its resources. Therefore, it is 
taken that inflation - adjusted growth in M3 is an indication of the extent to which 
financial intermediaries can increase the supply of credit in real terms or in relation 
to the level of economic activities. The demand side determines the rate of change in 
the real stock of financial assets whereas, the nominal stock of financial assets is 
determined on the supply side, and the imbalances between the demand and supply 
are reconciled through inflation.
Fry estimated a time series for 14 Asian developing countries covering the period 
1961 - 1983. His pooled time series result showed that the rate of change in the real 
stock of financial assets is influenced by the rate of change in per capita permanent 
or expected real income 51og(y/n)e, the change in real deposit rate of interest 5(d - tc) 
and the lagged dependent variable, that is;
5log(m) = 0.928 5log(y/n)e + 0.847 5(d - if) + 0.414 5log(m)t . j [4.0]
(8.578) (17.141) (10.568)
R - Squared Bar = 0.573 
where m = per capita real money balances (M3)
The above result showed that the interest rate effect on financial saving is substantially 
greater than the interest rate on national saving. In this case, an increase in the real 
deposit rate of interest increased the proportion of saving directed toward investment 
through the financial intermediation channel.
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Lanyi and Saracoglu (refer back to chapter 1) provided evidence on the effect of 
interest rate policies on financial deepening, as measured by the rate of growth in real 
M2 money balances 5log(M2/P). Where P the price level and the interest rate policy 
index r yields the following:
5log(M2/P) = 4.460 + 6.140(r) [4.1]
(5.776) (5.873)
R-Squared Bar = 0.61
From this result Lanyi and Saracoglu concluded that positive interest rate policies 
stimulates output growth, and that this stimulus is transmitted mainly through the 
intermediation of financial assets accumulation.
On the question of causality, Jung’s 1986 Formal Granger - Causality tests indicated 
the predominant direction of causality is from financial conditions to the rate of 
economic growth.
Fry in his analysis was more concerned about the allocation efficiency of portfolios. 
He argued that holding institutional interest rates below their free - market equilibrium 
levels, the proportion of saving directed through financial intermediaries will be sub- 
optimal. He postulated that an increase in the institutional interest rates towards their 
competitive free - market equilibrium level would improve allocation efficiency due 
to the ensuing substitution effect and also enhance the efficiency with which financial 
intermediaries allocate the larger real volume of investment funds at their disposal.
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4.4.2 TIME DEPOSITS. CURB MARKET ASSETS AND CREDIT 
AVAILABILITY
The empirical question of whether increased demand for time deposits caused by an 
increase in the real deposit rate of interest reduces the demand for currency (inflation 
hedges) or the demand for curb market loans, has been a major part of contention 
between the Mckinnon - Shaw school and the Neo-structuralist.
Van Wijnbergen used a portfolio model in which households allocate wealth among 
curb loans, time deposits and currency. He estimated the demand for time deposits in 
real terms, TD/P. His function included the nominal curb market rate ic, the time 
deposit rate it, and the inflation rate re, all compounded ie;
Log(TD/P) = iAc + it - rcA + log(yA) + log(TD/P)t .,  [4.2]
Equation 4,2 is derived from a model of household portfolio allocation among curb 
loans, time deposits and currency, with real returns on these three assets rc - rc, rt -rc, 
and -rc. The demand for time deposits depends on it - rc and the returns on the two 
substitute assets can be expressed as :
Log(TD/P) = b ^  + rc) + b2 (it - rc) + b3 (-rc) [4.3]
Assuming all assets to be gross substitutes; bt < 0, b2 > 0, and b3 < 0.
Therefore, rearranging equation 4.3, equation 4.4 is derived,
Log(TD/P) = b i  + b2it + Brc [4.4]
where B = -bx - b2  - b3i 
Thus b3 = - B - bt - b2
This represents a restricted coefficient of the interest rates and inflation. In the model, 
the curb rate coefficient was greater than the inflation coefficient leading Van 
Wijnbergen to conclude that in the Korean case, the elasticity of substitution is higher 
for curb market loans than for currency. He however, failed to explain whether or not
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the coefficients of the curb market rate and the inflation rate are significantly different. 
Maxwell J. Fry argued that using actual inflation rate as a proxy for jce under 2SLS 
procedure would bias its coefficient downwards (Fry 1988,p. 161).
Equation 4.2 represented an estimation of the demand for time deposits using nominal 
instead of real returns for all the three assets.
(Note; the nominal returns are ic, it, and k which are portfolio allocation 
among curb loans, time deposits and inflation hedges).
Both Taylor and Van Wijnbergen treated currency and inflation hedges as synonym­
ous, despite the fact that currency yielded a zero nominal return, as opposed to the 
nominal return on inflation hedges which is the inflation rate.
Fry argued that combining the two models could produce a different results. Fry’s 
assertion was that an increase in the time deposit rate of interest would lead to an 
increase rather than a decrease in the total supply of credit in real terms. An 
examination of the behaviour of the curb market rate is another alternative for 
ascertaining whether or not total credit supply increases or decreases after a rise in the 
real time deposit rate of interest.
Kohsaka study of Korea (1984), showed Korea’s interest rate reform of 1965 to have 
effect on the curb market rate only from 1967, after which the curb market rate 
declined. His result showed no change in the real credit supply in the short run but did 
show an increase in the medium run. However, the interest rate reform in Taiwan did 
increase total credit immediately.
The possible explanation for the different short-run outcomes in Taiwan and Korea is 
that reserve requirements were raised four times between 1965 and 1967 in Korea to 
absorb capital inflows from abroad. The segmented financial market produced cheap 
foreign credit for large firms but tightens domestic credit conditions for firms unable 
to resort to the foreign markets. The implication of this is that, it demonstrates the 
potential opportunities for large firms to utilise their economies of scale to attract
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foreign credit, as well as for foreign direct investment. It also highlights the benefits 
and drawbacks of financial liberalisation.
In the case of Nigeria, the authorities pursued policies which exhibit the features of 
financial repression from the period 1970 to 1985. These policies include; tight interest 
rate controls; bank deposit and credit controls; and direct investments. The official 
interest rates were averaging around 3 percent to 6  percent in the period 1970 to 1981, 
while at the same period inflation was averaging about 16 percent. Only in 1972 were 
real interest rates positive for savings deposits. From 1982 to 1983 interest rates were 
raised to 7.25 percent and 9.5 percent in 1984 to 1985, hence enabling positive real 
rates in 1985 (see table 4.1).
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Table 4.1
Year GDP a t
factor
cost in
constant
(Naira)
prices.
Nominal
Savings
Interest
Rate
(% )
Annual
Inflation
Rate
(%)
Real
Savings
Interest
Rate
(%)
Nominal
min.
Lending
Rate
(% )
Real
Lending
Rate
(%)
1970 5500.4 3 - - 7 -
1971 6951.9 3 16.1 - 1 1 . 2 7 -7.9
1972 7646.2 3 2.7 0.30 7 4.2
1973 11223.6 3 5.7 -2.54 7 1.25
1974 18652.0 3 12.5 -8.5 7 -4.9
1975 21475.1 4 33.5 -22.07 6 -2 0 . 6
1976 27317.8 4 2 2 . 1 -14.8 6 -13.2
1977 32051.8 4 21.3 -14.3 6 - 1 2 . 6
1978 33660.4 5 60.5 -34.56 7 -33.3
1979 39938.6 5 1 1 . 6 -5.9 7.5 -3.6
1980 43280.2 6 1 0 . 0 -3.6 7.5 -2.3
1981 56602.2 6 20.9 -12.3 7.75 - 1 0 . 8
1982 60483.1 7.5 7.9 -0.35 10.25 2 . 2
1983 63293.4 7.5 22.9 -12.5 9.5 -10.9
1984 69950.3 9.5 39.8 -21.7 10.5 -20.94
1985 78775.8 9.5 5.6 3.7 9.75 3.95
1986 79740.4 9.5 5.4 3.9 10.5 4.7
1987 n/a 14 1 0 . 1 2 3.5 17.5 6.7
1988 n/a 12.07 39.3 -18.9 16.3 -15.9
1989 n/a 1 2 40.9 -20.5
---3"!—‘ . 1 1
25.5 -10.9
Financial and Economic Review; The CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts; 
The' Nigerian Digest of Statistics.
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Between the period 1962 and 1970, the Nigerian government adopted a fixed credit 
ceilings and interest rate ranges , allocating about 35 percent of each banks loans to 
domestic firms. However, the international oil price rise in 1973 created a huge 
domestic liquidity and the government became a net lender to the banks and rejected 
interest rate rises to restrict credit, hence reinforcing the adoption of credit allocation 
and control.
During the mid 1970’s, the central bank was setting the share of loans and advances 
which each bank should make to each 16 different sectors of the economy. Agriculture 
and other priority projects get the lowest interest rate ceilings. It also sets targets for 
banks to increase branches in rural areas. The banking development in Nigeria is 
analyzed in the next chapter.
The government indigenisation programme ultimately insisted that 60 percent of the 
equity in foreign owned banks should be owned by Nigerians and Nigerians should 
manage the banks. The side effect of this policy was to concentrate Corporate or 
Economic Power with the commercial banks which hold 80 percent of all bank 
deposits. The financial repression pushed savers to look for alternative assets which 
would provide a greater and safer returns.
Despite the low interest rate, financial savings increased because many Nigerians 
benefited from oil funds. However, this created a problem of capital flights, which 
grew much more rapidly during the period of relative economic growth, that is, early 
to mid 1970s.
The cost of capital for investment was higher than necessary because oligopolistic 
banks were able to insist on high intermediation costs with a wide margin of 3 to 4 
percent between deposits and loan rates. When the oil price eventually fell after 1981, 
the effects of repression became abundantly clear. Big banks profits increased 
reflecting their ability to attract viable projects, while small and newer state owned 
banks, with weaker portfolios due to politically directed lending, faced growing bad 
debts and several of them ultimately collapsed.
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4.4.3 INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The evidence from Gilbert Brown (1973), Cho (1984) and Tybout (1983), showed that 
financial liberalisation do improve income distribution; while Vogel (1984) provided 
evidence that subsidised credit increases income accruing to the wealthiest 1 0  per cent 
of the population from a study of Costa Rica.
Contrary to these studies, the one from Ness (1974) indicated that Brazil’s attempt to 
stimulate capital market development in the Mid 1960’s through strong tax incentives 
to buyers of new equity issues worsened their income distribution.
In the case of Korea, their financial system was not liberalised to the extent of 
Taiwan, with its selective credit policy confined to exports. For example, between 
1966 and 1977, institutional finance in Korea operated a zero real interest rates and 
also a selective credit policies that directed subsidized funds to priority sectors. The 
studies from Asian and Latin American countries indicate a support for the theory that 
low interest rate and selective credit policies do lead to industrial concentration and 
to a less equal income distribution.
Cho conclusion was that, the low interest rate policy in Korea transferred wealth from 
small depositors to large borrowers, resulting in highly capital - intensive production 
techniques being chosen and a lower demand for labour.
Tybout noted that selective credit policy in Colombia favoured large firms, as small 
firms were liquidity constrained and as such could not expand. The situation was 
worsened by the artificial low market prices, which induced large firms with access 
to cheap credit to take over smaller firms, with the consequence of high concentration 
in the economy.
The lesson from these studies is that financial repression and the ensuing credit 
rationing worsen’s income distribution and increases industrial concentration. 
Therefore, subsidised credit policies discriminate against rather than favour small 
borrowers.
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The effects of financial liberalisation on inflation and the short run growth is 
examined by Van Wijnbergen and Fry. Fry’s real money demand is determined by one 
or more price variables and a budget constraint in his model for Turkey. This implies 
that tangible assets used as inflation hedges rather than bonds are the dominant 
substitute assets for broad money. He estimated expected income growth first and then 
adjusts previous years actual income level for expected income growth in current year. 
His justification for this approach was that the rate of growth in GNP follows a 
random walk (Fry, 1988,p.l67).
The findings by Fry on the relationship between the short and medium term rate of 
economic growth and the real deposit rate of interest are consistent with the Mckinnon 
- Shaw model. The assumption based on the Fisherian Phillips curve, is that, if higher 
real deposit rates increases credit availability in real terms, the rate of economic 
growth would rise in the short run following an increase in the real deposit rate. 
However, if real deposit rates reduces total credit availability in real terms due to 
substitution from curb market loans into time deposits subject to the reserve require­
ment leakage as the Neo-Structuralist argued, then the rate of economic growth would 
decline.
It can be implied that disequilibrium interest rate and exchange control systems in 
Nigeria prior to the economic reforms, indicate that real money demand determines 
to a large extent the real supply of domestic credit because domestic credit is the 
primary asset backing the monetary liabilities of the banking system.
For example, using Fry’s Turkey model, the supply link between credit availability 
and real economic growth would come from the ratio of credit to output. The normal 
or noncyclical growth Yn would then be determined by among other factors, namely 
the volume and productivity of investment.
This can be expressed by the following equation ;
% = (p - V) - xe - S(d - n f  [4.5]
Where p is the rate of growth in M2, v is the population growth and n represents the
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continuously compounded rate of change in the GNP deflator. 8 (d - rc)e is the expected 
change in the real deposit rate of interest and xe is the expected growth in per capita 
real GNP.
Equation 4.5 shows that an acceleration in the nominal money growth would raise the 
inflation rate and the general price level. Conversely, an increase in the P /F  ( price 
level / expected price level), would raise growth in real GNP. This can be shown by 
the following equation:
x = (xna) + (P7PeA) + (d - n f  [4.6]
Where xna is the trend growth in the adjusted real GNP against fluctuations in 
agricultural output about its long run trend. P is the actual price level, while F  is the 
expected price level.
Equation 4.6 represents the standard short run Phillips curve trade-off. It also implies 
that when expected inflation rises, leading to a reduction in both P /F  and d - rce, the 
growth rate declines. In the long run equilibrium, P will be equal to F  because 
inflation is fully expected or anticipated and only the negative impact of the lower real 
deposit rate d - rce would be felt. With d held constant and below its market 
equilibrium level, the long run Phillips curve would produce a negative relationship 
between inflation and growth in a financially repressed economy such as Nigeria 
through the real credit supply mechanism, even before the effect of inflation on the 
savings rate and on the average efficiency of new investment is taken into consider­
ation.
Equations 4.5 and 4.6 also shows that a higher deposit rate of interest reduces inflation 
and raises the growth rate at the same time. In which case, the optimal monetary 
policy must set the nominal deposit rate at its upper bound, for example, abolish all 
institutional interest rate ceilings. According to Fry one method for solving this 
problem would be to fix a minimum deposit rate and to require banks to satisfy all 
deposit demand at that rate, thus producing competitive results. This would be subject
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to the condition that loan demands are elastic at rates above the competitive loan rate 
of interest.
Van Wijnbergen proposition in relation to inflation and the short-run growth started 
off by dividing the economy into export and non-export sectors, with the export sector 
facing a perfectly elastic supply of credit at a special export loan rate of interest, 
whilst the non-export sector faces credit rationing. Real consumption, investment and 
intermediate imports are all affected negatively and significantly by the real curb 
market rate of interest. His wage equation is a standard expectations - augmented 
Phillips curve, with unemployment negatively affected by the wage rate. By using 
Okun’s law, unemployment alone is determined by the gap between potential and 
actual output; unemployment and actual output are both seasonally adjusted .The 
financial sector of the model determines the banking system’s balance sh ee t.
In his model for the Korean economy, he specified a function that determines the 
nominal amount of inter-office borrowing by Japanese branches in Korea from their 
parent banks. Inter-office borrowing is influenced by the ratio of the korean bank 
lending rate to the Japanese call money and the level of foreign borrowing which is 
affected by the difference between the Korean bank lending rate and the three - month 
Euro-dollar rate. The nominal supply of bank loans to the non-export sector was 
influenced by the difference between the Korean bank lending rate and the bank of 
Korea’s discount rate. He found that direct foreign borrowing by the non-bank private 
sector was affected negatively by the Euro-dollar rate and positively by the curb 
market rate.
Like Fry, Van Wijnbergen also used the Tobin’s portfolio allocation model in his 
money demand model. His result for the time deposit demand in real terms was 
affected negatively and significantly by both the curb market rate and the inflation 
rate, while positively and significantly by the time deposit rate of interest11.
11 See Maxwell J.Fry, money,interest and banking in economic development, 1988. ppl81 - 183, and 
Van Wijnbergen, 1982,pp. 140 - 166.
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He completed the analysis with an accounting identity for M2 money supply which 
equals net domestic credit to the government plus bank loans to the export and non­
export sectors plus net foreign assets minus other liabilities. The changes in other 
liabilities are derived from the revaluation of net foreign assets due to exchange rate 
changes.
The curb market interest rate is determined by the equilibrium of M2 supply and M2 
demand. The demand for M2 is the sum of the demands for time deposits and M l. 
Wijnbergen found that a rise in the time deposit rate produces greater substitution 
from curb market loans than from M l component of the money stock into time 
deposits.
Given that there is no intermediation leakages from reserve requirements in the curb 
market loans, this pattern of substitution reduces the aggregate supply of domestic 
credit and raises the curb market interest rate. He then analyzed three dynamic 
simulations of the model. The first is the base run, followed by a one - short reduction 
in the money stock by 5% and the third traces the effects of continuous reduction in 
the monetary growth by 10% each over a three year period.
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4.4.4 SUMMARY
The Neo-Structuralist model demonstrates a restrictive monetary policy that raises 
interest rates and a devaluation that raises the price of imports. That is, an acceleration 
in the inflation rate and a reduction in the rate of economic growth simultaneously.
The core of the Structuralist model is the incorporation of the Curb Market, in which 
money lenders and domestic banks intermediate between savers and investors.
The structuralists do not wholly believe that financial liberalisation can yield the 
deshed result under the conditions of standard assumption that financial assets are 
gross substitutes. Their conclusion was that in practice, financial liberalisation is likely 
to reduce the rate of economic growth by reducing the total real supply of credit 
available.
Taylor’s model provided an accounting identity and empirical relations that 
characterises the developing countries economies, by reformulating the analytical 
models applicable in developed economies to fit the developing economies.
Taylor’s result and that of Van Wijnbergen are similar depending on the extent of the 
financial intermediation that the commercial banks can legally provide. This is more 
so given that, the Curb or Unorganised Market has no reserve requirement which 
enables them to direct resources toward firms with greater efficiency.
Taylor, by using a Tobin - type portfolio framework, produces a full model with 
households holding bank deposits, curb market loans and gold that yields an 
equilibrium in the curb market.
The analysis by Van Wijnbergen, Chang and Jung 1984, suggests that substitutability 
between time deposits and curb market loans may not be high for large savers because 
the assets have different risk attributes. Small savers responds to an increase in the 
time deposit rate than the larger savers. Hence the effect of financial liberalisation 
would be an increase in the total supply of credit to the business sector. However, the 
inefficiency of the curb market in allocation of resources disproves the Neo- 
Structuralist claim and their conclusion about the effects of financial liberalisation.
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Fry, in his analysis of the allocation efficiency of portfolios argued that holding 
institutional interest rates below their free - market equilibrium levels, the proportion 
of saving directed through financial intermediaries will be sub-optimal.
A major departure of the Neo-Structuralist from the Mckinnon - Shaw school is on 
whether increased demand for time deposits caused by an increase in the real deposit 
rate of interest reduces the demand for currency or the demand for curb market loans.
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Chapter 5
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
AND
THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
PRODUCTION
On the review and appraisal of the structural adjustment programme, the Nigerian
minister for finance, Chu Okongwu stated:
"A useful departure point is a review of the developments and the 
proximate causes of the economic crisis which led to the structural 
adjustment programme (SAP). Although the causes of our predicaments 
are by now well-known, human memory is rather short and it is easy 
to forget or play down past problems especially where the pains have
worn thin. A review of the antecedents is therefore essential as a
backdrop to the introduction of the SAP1".
Growth could be taken to imply positive changes in the economic variables but such 
changes might not necessarily guarantee national development which should be 
reflected in quantitative and qualitative improvements in the living conditions of the 
people. As stated in the aborted Fourth National Development Plan 1981 - 85 
Guidelines: "The over-riding aim of development is an improvement in the living 
conditions of the people using the resources, human and material, with which the 
country is endowed".
The. Second and Third National Development Plans are comprised of laudable 
objectives and programmes which were thwarted by incongruous policies.
The Fourth plan was aborted by the manifestations of policies pursued in the two 
previous plans. The Second and Third Development Plans attributed a higher priority 
to agro-allied2 and export industries but in the end they received low policy
incentives. For example, the Operation Feed the Nation, the National Accelerated
Production Programme and the Green Revolution, all were introduced in order to 
mobilise resources for agricultural development.
1 Dennis Odife, Structural Adjustment and Economic Revolution in Nigeria 1989,pp,3 - 7.
2 That is the agricultural and related products.
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The Economic Stabilisation Act, which involved some stringent exchange and trade 
control measures provided no significant improvement in the country’s foreign 
exchange position, or the domestic economy. This culminated to the introduction of 
more stringent measures in 1983 and 1984 and which were retained in the 1985 
budget, but yielded little result. Three key factors that are important to production in 
the Nigerian economy include: Agriculture, Industry and Finance.
5.0 AGRICULTURE
The Nigerian economy was significantly transformed from one dependent on 
agriculture to one heavily dependent on oil. This is shown by the contribution made 
by agriculture to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declining from 40 per cent in the 
early 1970’s to about 20 per cent in 1980, whilst by 1980, oil accounted for about 22 
per cent of GDP, 81 per cent of government revenue and 96 per cent of export 
earnings.
At the time of independence in 1960, the main source of revenue to the then regional 
governments was agriculture. Agriculture contributed to about 70 per cent of the total 
GDP and above 80 per cent of exports. Nigeria’s total land area is about 231 million 
hectares of which about one third is arable land and land under permanent crops; and 
more than half of the potential agricultural land in the country is not utilised. Hence, 
Nigeria has the potential for agricultural growth although this sector has been 
systematically neglected3. Confirming this view is the fact that annual growth in 
agricultural production was averaging about 1.5 per cent in the 1960s and 1970s, while 
the economy as a whole was growing at 6 per cent in the 1960’s and more than 8 per 
cent after 1973 when the price of crude oil escalated.
With reference to the reasons for the decline in agriculture, the third national 
development plan identified the following factors:
1. Shortage of qualified manpower in key areas;
3 Essien, E. Nigeria under SAP, 1990,p.20.
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2. Inadequate supply of agricultural inputs;
3. Inadequate extension services;
4. The poor condition of feeder roads and other transport facilities;
5. Lack of effective supporting services such as farm credit etc;
6. The problem of land ownership imposed by the land tenure system;
7. Problems of diseases and pests;
8. The problem of labour shortage in the rural areas as a result of rural- 
urban migration;
9. Inadequate technology;
10. Drudgery in farm work and low returns from agriculture which 
forces the workforce to migrate to urban areas instead of pursuing a 
career in farming; and finally
11. Labour shortages especially at peak periods of demand during the 
farming season.
The guidelines to the third plan included one m ore;1 failure to offer price incentives 
to food crop producers and the payment of low producer prices for export crops" , 
Moyart, M.G in ‘Approach to the problems of Nigerian agriculture’, in the 
development of Nigerian agriculture, pp. 12 - 14, included;
"Psychological resistance and the million naira mythology".
This implies that it is easier to make large and quick profits on trade than on 
agriculture. This becomes the first mental barrier termed the ‘Trade Spirit’ and has 
become worse since the 1973 oil boom, when quick profits could be made. The 
million naira mythology implies lack of recognition for the farmer, when during the 
boom period, no investment was respectable if it was not at least one million naira.
The over involvement of the government in agriculture is also part of the problem. No 
effort was made to solve the problem of rural transportation and infrastructure inspite 
of its mention in the second plan. The same applies to the problem of diverging rate 
of returns in the different sectors of the economy .The current reforms have led the 
way in addressing all these problems.
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5,1 INDUSTRY
The evaluation in this section is mainly of policies adopted to encourage 
manufacturing production, even though the policies turned out to be repressive in the 
long run. In the last two decades Nigeria has undergone a very substantial growth in 
the manufacturing sector, such as the production of soft drinks, brewing, cement, 
paints, flour, electronics (radios, television sets), detergents & soap, motor vehicles 
(mainly assembly plants for Peugeot cars, Toyota, Leyland Rovers etc) and refined 
petroleum products.
In 1974, the total value of gross output of the manufacturing industry was 1.5 million
naira, and in 1978 the value had risen to 5 million naira.
In 1958, according to the second development plan:
"the contribution of manufacturing activity to GDP at current factor cost 
amounted to N81.0 million or 4 per cent of the GDP and in 1963, the value 
added had risen to N157.8 million and the percentage contribution had gone 
up to 5.6 per cent. The annual rate of growth during the five year period (1958
- 63) was 17 per cent".
Despite these early encouraging signs industrial growth significantly slowed down 
throughout the 1980s. Between the period 1965 and 1980, the average annual growth 
rate of the manufacturing sector was 14.6 per cent but this fell drastically to 3 per cent 
between the period 1980 and 1985. While the 1965 - 80 period recorded a positive
13.4 per cent average growth, the 1980 - 85 period recorded a negative growth of 5.8 
per cent (World Bank Development Report, 1987, Statistical section).
According to the Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report, production in the 
manufacturing sub-sector was seriously hampered by the shortage of industrial inputs 
as a result of the continued acute scarcity of the foreign exchange needed to import 
them. Most manufacturing industries suffered considerable capacity under-utilisation 
and persistent postponement of production plans as raw materials orders became 
unfilled due to the inability of those industries to secure sufficient import licences 
backed up by foreign exchange.
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On an annual basis, the index of manufacturing production which stood at 454.7 (1972 
= 100) in 1983 declined to 371.8 in 1984, representing a decline of 18.2 per cent in 
1984 compared to the decline of 5 per cent in 1983 (CBN Annual report 1984, p.24). 
In effect this indicates the consequences of the repressive policies the country had 
followed during those periods; thus confirming the urgent need for economic 
liberalisation.
The industrial policy of the immediate post independence era was that of import 
substitution, supported by a number of fiscal and other incentives such as income tax 
relief granted under the pioneer status, the Approved User Scheme which allowed for 
the importation of raw materials either free of import duty or at very concessionary 
duty rates and the accelerated depreciation of capital.
The Second Development Plan included the following industrial policy objectives:
1. To promote an even development and fair distribution of industries in all
parts of the country;
2. To ensure a rapid expansion and diversification of industries in all parts of
the country;
3. To increase the incomes realised from manufacturing activity;
4. To create more employment opportunities;
5. To promote the establishment of industries which will cater for external
trade for revenue purposes;
6. The continuation of the import substitution policy;
7. To initiate schemes designed to promote internal manpower resource
development in the industrial sector and;
8. To raise the proportion of domestic ownership of industrial
investment.
Since the introduction of Structural Adjustment in 1986, the growth in manufacturing 
production began to rise, but at a much reduced rate, which according to the Central 
Bank Report (CBN), 1989, at 516,4 (1972 = 100) the index of manufacturing 
production rose only by 2.2 per cent in 1989, compared with the increases of 16.9 and 
33.7 per cent in 1988 and 1987, respectively.
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The marginal increase in the level of manufacturing production was confirmed by the 
CBN’s nation wide survey of six hundred and forty two businesses in which 56.8 per 
cent responded. Respondents attributed low manufacturing activities to the shortage 
of raw materials, the high cost of replacing obsolete machinery and materials and the 
sharp increases in interest rates. The high resulting costs led to high prices of finished 
goods, reduced demand and high levels of inventories. In addition, the average level 
of capacity utilisation rise only marginally by 0.9 to 42.4 per cent4.
In the mid 1970s, the Nigerian Enterprises promotion Decrees were promulgated5. 
The decrees reserved certain activities for Nigerians and enabled the government to 
enter into the business of managing the financial institutions. The indigenisation decree 
arguably had the effect of driving foreign private capital out of the country, while at 
the same time encouraging Nigerian entrepreneurship. Nigeria’s share of manufactured 
exports was less than 0.2 per cent in 1987 and 1 per cent in 19916.
5.2 FINANCING
The finance for development in the country has come mainly from the petroleum 
industry. The incorporation of the oil industry into the structure of the Nigerian 
economy has both merits and demerits. The merits were more significant after the 
Nigerian Civil war when there was a great demand for funds both internally and 
externally for reconstructing the damage and reviving the economy for growth and 
development.
The demerit of the oil industry arose from the view that oil revenue flowed into the 
treasury as if providence was compensating the nation for damages suffered in the war 
years and in the process the unexpected revenues were misappropriated.
In 1970 oil revenue was N509.6 million. It trebled to N l,893.5 million in 1973 and
4 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 1989,pp.28 - 30.
5 The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees 1974 and 1977,
6 World Bank Development Report 1987, p.47 and 1991, p.234.
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following the oil price rise in 1973 revenue quadrupled to N5,365.7 million in 1974, 
reached a peak of N13,523.0 million in 1980 and then started a downward slide7.
The huge petro - naira led to a massive influx of contractors and suppliers into the 
country. It was during this boom period that Nigeria entered into the net of the 
International Capital Market (ICM) and with it came the Nigerian external debts. With 
the exceptions of direct revenue and foreign exchange benefits, the oil industry had 
no direct developmental impact, mainly for the reasons stated above. The oil industry 
is highly capital intensive and as such, in terms of employment its contribution was 
minimal (25% of the GDP and 6% of the labour force). The extent of technological 
transfer is negligible hence the only gain was its fiscal redistribution effect.
While the oil industry was directly financing government expenditure, the financial 
system was taking care of the needs of the private sector under repressive terms. For 
example, banks operated strictly in accordance with government policies. Banks like 
any other businesses would seek to maximise their profits in areas where the demand 
for loans is high such as in traditional short term businesses such as financing exports 
and imports. As at December 1979, commercial banks were still having 80 per cent 
of their loans maturing in 180 days and only 2 per cent exceeded 5 years.
The- consequence of this was that commercial banks hardly ever financed industrial 
activities. Therefore, the government was obliged to establish the specialised banks.
During the period 1969 to March 1972, the method used was that of setting the rates 
of changes for aggregate and components of commercial banks loans and advances. 
This was reintroduced in 1976 and continued until the 1990s; but the aggregate and 
credit ceiling was dropped between the period 1972 and 1976; while the authorities 
concentrated on sectoral distribution of credits. The Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) 
in 1980 was 7.5 per cent with other rates ranging up to 11.5 per cent (refer back to 
table 4.1 chapter 4 for the MLR).
7 See Essien, E . Nigeria Under SAP, 1990, pp.27 - 33.
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Savings were low because with the existence of higher returns from other investments, 
according to Essien (1990, p.32), total savings since 1972 had consistently been on the 
increase but not because of the attractions of yields but on the fact that the boom 
period made the society generally excess liquid. The capital market can not be said 
to have provided sufficient autonomous development funds. In the indigenisation era, 
the stock exchange was boosted but that was because the companies that patronised 
it were forced to do so. None went to the exchange voluntarily for the purpose of 
raising funds for expansion or new projects. The reason being that low interest rates 
at the banks meant that companies would go for such loans instead of going through 
the ordeal of raising funds in the capital market.
5.3 THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY; THE NEED FOR REFORM
The best way to begin a study of the Nigerian economic instability is to note the 
country’s historical experience and the consequent distortion, disarticulation and 
underdevelopment of institutions and structures and forces of production and 
exchange.
Ihonvbere 1990, indicated that Nigeria’s historical experience meant that the
institutions, forces and factors of politics, production and exchange were severely
deformed and disarticulated to a point where they lacked the internal and relatively
autonomous stimulus for growth, development and accumulation. He argued that:
"Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the country has gone through 
novel developments which have consolidated and or influenced some 
shift in the country’s relations with capital and its historical determined 
location and role in the international division of labour; a civil war, an 
oil boom, several coups, attempted coups and counter coups, partial 
nationalisation and indigenization programmes. Experiments with the 
Westminster parliamentary and American executive presidential 
systems of government. Currency changes, a new anthem, new states, 
a new federal capital, new educational, agricultural, urban and 
industrial policies and currently a structural adjustment programme 
through the inspiration of the World Bank, IMF and the European 
Clubs8".
8 Julius O.'Ihonvbere, Structural adjustment, the coup and democratization in Nigeria; African Quarterly, vol.29, 
nos 3 - 4 1990 pp. 17 - 39.
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These changes and developments consequently influenced the nature of social classes, 
the power, and structures of the state, the content and direction of class contradictions 
and class struggles as well as class relations. Inspite of all these ‘influences’ the 
country remains debt-ridden, foreign dominated, unstable, dependent and 
underdeveloped. The frustration arising from the government inability and weaknesses 
to increase legitimacy and ensure stability has compelled it to become defensively 
radical and repressive. Export concentration leading to excessive dependence on a 
foreign dominated oil sector culminated in the neglect of agriculture and the rural 
areas, rising food imports, migration to the urban centres, waste and corruption (See 
section 5,0 to 5.2).
Ihonvbere’s postulation was that the inefficiency, corruption, decadence and confusion 
among the Nigerian bourgeoisie’s and the institutions of the state have militated 
against the development of a clear and sustainable ideological position, the promotion 
of industrialisation and rational accumulation. He argued that the crisis of dependent 
capitalist development, arising in the first instance from the historical disarticulation 
of the Nigerian economy and secondly from the colonial corruption, waste, mis­
management, indiscipline, decline in oil revenues and finally pressures from credit 
clubs and international finance institutions that forced the government to embrace the 
structural reform.
5.3.1 THE REFORM: BACKGROUND. AND CONSEQUENCES
Although the Babangida regime is the first Nigerian government to seriously consider 
and implement the Structural adjustment Programme, the policy responses to the 
economic crisis predated his administration. The General Olusegun Obasanjo regime 
in 1977 introduced some ‘belt-tightening’ measures at the start of the decline in 
foreign exchange receipts from oil exports. These measures included; restrictions on 
imports of certain goods,elimination of some benefits to public servants and some tax 
measures. The measures unfortunately failed to achieve the intended objective due to 
lack of adequate co-ordination. The civilian government that took over in 1979, once 
again, in the face of declining oil rents, massive corruption, misplaced priorities and 
gross mismanagement was expelled in April 1982 to introduce ‘Austerity Measures’
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through the Economic Stabilisation (Temporary Provisions) Act, as its response to the 
structural crisis. In January 1983, the Shehu Shagari government appointed an ‘Expert 
Committee’ on the Nigerian economy under the chairmanship of Dr J.S. Odama.
The committee recommended:
"a fundamental structural adjustment as the best hope for a virile and
responsive economy9".
The broad outline of Shagari’s austerity measures included, negotiations for an 
adjustment loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the payment of re­
scheduled short term debts, imposition of new user fees, taxes, levies and tolls, the 
general retrenchment of workers in the public services, funding for only core capital 
projects, reduction of public expenditures, incentives to foreign investors and the 
privatisation of public assets among other monetarist measures.
The Buhari regime which overthrew the Shagari administration, inherited a crisis 
ridden economy and desperate political environment with inflation averaging above 
45 per cent. The regime’s response to the repression were first; political repression 
through the promulgation of draconian decrees and proscription of unions. The second; 
economic; counter trade involving the battering of Nigeria’s oil for goods and services 
and the acceptance of structural adjustment as the only option to putting the economy 
on the path to early recovery and self-sustained growth10.
The life of the Fourth National Development Plan was extended in addition to rapid 
repayment of external debts, mass retrenchment of workers, reduction of budgetary 
allocation to ministries and public institutions, privatisation and commercialisation of 
public corporations and increased incentives to transnational corporations. The 
authorities at the same time refused to accept the IMF prescriptions on devaluation, 
trade liberalisation and the removal of subsidies from petroleum.
9 J.S. Odama, SFEM in the context of a developing economy; in J. Attah et al (eds) , The Nigerian Economy 
under (S)FEM ( Zaria: Dept of Economics Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria, 1985 p. 11).
10 Major General Buhari, M ; Address at the Nigerian Institute For Social and Economic Research (NISER), 
Ibadan, 26 Nov. 1984,
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When Babangida overthrew the Buhari administration in the coup of August 1985, his 
government accepted the structural adjustment and dispensed with all sentiments on 
the possible consequences of adjustment. The government immediately began to 
implement the conditionalities of the IMF. First, a 15 month economic emergency 
period was declared during which a stabilisation programme was introduced. This 
consisted of measures such as a 30 per cent levy on imports, 2 - 2 0  per cent economic 
recovery levy on workers, the removal of 80 per cent subsidy on petroleum and the 
extension of wage freeze. These policies enforced the alienation of the people from 
the state and increased the extent of poverty and other social vices.
The President in July 1986 admitted that the stabilisation programme had little impact 
on the economy and that the performance of the economy was mixed given the 
adverse effect of reduced oil receipts and slow non-oil exports. Nigerian creditors 
could not take the rejection of IMF loan and as a result the nations credit rating 
dropped from about 55 per cent in 1980 to 24 per cent by March 1986. All this 
resulted in Nigeria’s inability to reschedule its huge external debt, thus the stage for 
tougher economic measures (Newswatch (Lagos) SAP: what alternatives, vol. 10(4) 
July 24 1989,pp.l4 -15). Consequently, most importers who had import licences could 
not effectively use them for opening letters of credit and the flow of essential imports 
was seriously impeded [Odife 1989,p.5].
In July 1986, the government in pursuit of its reform policy had to introduced a new 
economic measure under the supervision of IMF and World Bank officials.
The programme had four objectives:
1. To find the real value of the naira;
2. Overcoming inefficiency in the public sector through rationalisation and improved 
public expenditure;
3. Relieving the debt burden through a comprehensive rescheduling of Nigeria’s 
medium and long-term debts;
4. Encouraging the net-inflow of foreign capital while keeping the lid on foreign 
loans.
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5.3.2 REFORM AND THE ECONOMY
The emergence of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1980’s was to 
enable developing countries primarily in Latin America and Africa to reduce their 
balance of payments11 deficits. It is a device for shifting from state to market led 
policies with emphasis on pricing as the major instrument for organising the economy. 
SAP’s other objective includes measures to revive agricultural production ie food and 
cash crops, through a combination of policies involving devaluation and reductions in 
state expenditure and subsidies.
Sumit Roy postulated that the root cause of the Nigerian and other LDC’s repression 
was due to the recession (1979 - 81) which emerged from a combination of factors. 
The factors are referred to here as" THE CRISIS CYCLE".
At the start was the sharp and steep rise in oil price which had a direct and indirect 
effects on the world economy. The price increase then accelerated inflation in the 
developed economies leading to their adoption of deflationary policies which led to 
unemployment and lower growth rate.
The LDCs facing problems of not only having to finance deficits in their balance of
payments because of the increase in oil import prices but also a fall in their exports
to the developed countries; hence a decline in their terms of trade and outflows of
capital. (The Nigerian trade policy and tariff is discussed in detail later in this Chapter
and Chapter 6). The LDCs problem was worsened by the increase in interest rates.
The Latin American economies in particular were able to borrow from Western
Commercial Banks which had recycled surplus oil revenues built up by OPEC
countries. As Roy (1990) put it:
"indeed, this was a major factor behind the accumulation of debts by 
the developing countries".
The other factors which motivated the Structural Adjustment Programme or Economic
Reform and the role of the major international institutions mainly, the IMF and the
World Bank are:
[a] Economic reform was needed in response to the debt crisis centred on measures
11 Sumit Roy, SAP, Economy and Rural Sector, African Quarterly, vol.30,1990,pp.l - 12.
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which could bring about economic recovery, repayment of external debts and 
restoration of balance of payments equilibrium12.
[b] Economic reform has been underpinned by a shift from state to market led 
ideology, centred on allowing the price mechanism to shape economic activities (see 
also Ihonvbere 1990), The objective of the strategy is to reduce domestic output and 
demand for imported materials and investment goods. This will in turn reduce incomes 
and slow down demand for consumer goods. In addition state expenditure has to be 
drastically curtailed.
To realise these measures, the currency has to be devalued; at least to boost exports 
and encourage domestic production of goods to replace imports which are made more 
expensive. Hood (1987), Roy (1990), "a mixture of devaluation and expenditure cuts 
form the basis for correcting the imbalance of international payments while 
maintaining full employment of resources".
5.3.3 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT
The grants from the IMF and World Bank, are conditional loans, which stipulated the 
adoption of specific policies by borrowing countries. The IMF stipulated the 
‘Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF)’ in March 1986, which became effective from 
December 1987.
The purpose of the IMF (SAF) was to provide credit facilities to low income countries
(of which Nigeria is now classified as, after been grouped as a medium oil exporting
country in the 1970’s and part of 1980’s); with a protracted balance of payments
problem. Moyo and Amin, 1989, noted that:
"the impetus was on assisting eligible member countries to undertake 
strong three year macro-economic and structural adjustment 
programmes to improve their balance of payments position and foster 
growth".
12 Sumit Roy, SAP and Rural Sector, 1990, pp.2 - 3.
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5.3.4 THE WORLD BANK’S ROLE
The’ World Bank in 1980 initiated a ‘Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL)’ to Sub- 
Saharan Africa which is usually expected to last for 3 to 5 years.
Following in the footpath of the IMF loans, the recipients must submit a letter of 
intent in which they undertake to comply with the conditions.
Unlike the IMF however, the World Bank do not insist on quantification of 
macroeconomic variables but do demand a restructuring of tariffs, abolition of price 
controls, increasing prices of public goods and services, promotion of exports and 
devaluation of currency. Institutional and government measures are expected to 
support specific economic sectors such as industry and agriculture. The World Bank’s 
SAL are often linked with the IMF stabilisation loans.
5.3.5 CRITIQUES OF THE IMF/WORLD BANK LOAN POLICIES.
Given the impact of the structural adjustment programme on Nigeria, there are now 
considerable debate among academics, politicians and ordinary citizens about the 
virtues of such policies. The critical argument against the fund and the bank is their 
over-emphasis on growth and reduction of balance of payments deficit and the neglect 
of social protection for the poor.
The IMF especially has been too concerned about repayment of external debts which 
brings into question the whole issue of adjustment and whether it is simply for 
repayment of debt or if a wider concept of development is needed to be incorporated 
into the analysis. The debt based definition of adjustment unfortunately failed to take 
into consideration the real concern of growth and equity which the proponents of 
international trade cited as the major cause of domestic instability.
The overall criticism of the IMF/World Bank SAP policy is that it produces adverse 
socio-economic effects with multinationals, banks, technocrats, importers and exporters 
and the ruling groups being the main beneficiaries13.
13 See: Roy, 1990;p.5, Ihonvbere, 1990;p.23, This Week(Lagos) - The New Rich: The Rising Cocaine Profile, 
The Booming Corruption, 1990, 2 April, No. 167.
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5.4 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SAP IN AFRICA
There are two dimensions of SAP in Africa; first the macro and second the sectoral. 
This view originates from the World Bank classification of the region into four 
groups.
1. Countries with strong structural adjustment program;
2. Countries with weak structural adjustment program;
3. Non-adjusting countries; and
4. North Africa,
Group 1 GDP was found to have negative average annual growth rate of about 1.5 per 
cent during the period 1980 - 87. Their performance also varies from year to year 
(refer back to chapter 3 table 1.3. for the Nigerian GDP).
The groups 2 and 3 achieved an overall average annual GDP growth rate of 1.2 and
3.1 percents respectively during the same period as group 1. Groups 2 and 3 achieved 
annual positive growth rates throughout the period except in 1983 -1984 for weak 
adjusting countries and 1986 - 87 for the non-adjusting countries.
Group 4 had an average annual GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent positive for the period 
1980/87 with a negative growth rate only in 1980/81. The overall annual growth rate 
for Africa as a whole was a relatively low 0.4 percent between 1980 and 1987 as a 
result of the poor performance of the group 1.
Table 5.0
Type of Program GDP Growth Rate
Grounings Strong SAP 1980 - 87
1 Weak -1.5
2 Non-Adjusting 1.2
3 N. Africa 3.2
4 1.5
Overall Average (All) 0.4
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Table 5.1 Sub-Saharan Africa
Ratios Pre - Adjustment Post Adjustmentm w
GDP Growth 2.7 1.8
Investment/GDP 20.6 17.1
Budget Deficit/GDP -6.5 -7.5
Debt/Service/ 17.5 23.4
Export Earning
Current A/c /GDP -9.4 -6.5
Source : Ibid: 23, World BanJk. 1988.45
According to the World Bank study in 1988 of Sub-Saharan African countries that 
adopted the SAP (see table 5.1 above), comparing the key economic indicators in the 
pre-adjustment with the post adjustment period, the GDP growth declined from 2.7 
percent to 1.8 percent while the investment/GDP ratio reduced from 20.6 percent to
17.1 percent. The budget deficit rose from -6.5 percent to -7.5 percent of GDP. The 
Debt Service/Export earning ratio rose from 17.5 percent to 23.4 percent while the 
Current account/GDP ratio improved slightly from -9.4 percent to -6.5 percent.
The second view takes into account the contribution to GDP by the rural sector. Ghai 
and Smith 1987, on the role of agricultural production in Africa showed that SAP has 
a significant effect for growth and poverty.
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) assumed that peasants can respond to 
changes in prices especially with the determination to produce sufficient food for the 
household. As farms expand the surplus is marketed, thus leading to export crops been 
produced by the household farm. The pricing mechanism has been affected by the use 
of devaluation and reductions in state expenditure which has a significant effect on the 
agricultural sector and the economy as a whole.
The hypothesis is that, reliance on the market mechanism and the dismantling of 
marketing boards have been a major instrument for stimulating agricultural exports.
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Mosley and Smith 198914, found that the impact of SAP in some African countries 
that had adopted it, for example, Ghana, Cameroon and Tanzania, created a big doubt 
as to its effectiveness. This is more so given the severe devaluation by inflation and 
reduction in overall development expenditure, including agriculture and related social 
welfare sectors.
Nigeria has the benefit to learn from these countries in that some of their reforms 
started first. Never-the-less, only far reaching structural adjustment, well thought out 
and effectively implemented can be anticipated to secure economic recovery, growth 
and development in Nigeria. The other crucial factor when considering Nigeria in 
relation to other Sub-Saharan African countries is that, as Laurence Harris15 
commented;
"Nigeria is very unique and different in nature and circumstances from 
the other economies that has implemented the structural adjustment 
programme".
This does not necessarily mean that the country should be treated fundamentally 
different from the rest of the region or any other country in the world undergoing 
similar process however, certain criteria have to be applied in evaluating the Nigerian 
system.
On the question of aid, it is one method of assisting to compensate for cuts in 
expenditure (Roy, 1990,p.7; Ibid,332 - 333) but aid flows to Africa were at best 
constant rather than increased in real terms during the early 1980s with aid been 
reversed from capital projects to conditional project loans mainly to finance 
consumption. As a result, the weight of such attempts at fiscal stabilisation has fallen 
on governments capital spending. It has added to the diminished virtues of adopting 
the IMF/World Bank guiding principles of adjustment with growth. Nigeria’s total 
debt stock at the end of 1990 was estimated at US$36 billion. Out of this amount, 
about 52 per cent is owed to the Paris Club of Official creditors, 18 per cent to the
14 Mosley, Paul and Smith, Lawrence, Structural Adjustment and Agricultural Performance in Sub - Saharan 
Africa 1980 - 87, Journal of International Development, vol.l; No.3 July,1989.
15 Prof. Laurence Harris comment during a discussion on my essay about the Nigerian economic reform.
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London Club of Commercial Bank Creditors, 11 per cent to Multilateral Institutions 
(ie World Bank), 5 per cent to East Europe governments and 14 per cent in 
Promissory note obligations. Between 1980 and 1990, the total debt stock of Nigeria 
quadrupled from US$9 billion to US$36 billion.
Nigeria however, has two very important factors working to its advantage.
First is a large domestic market and second is the potential to become along with 
South Africa, one of the continent’s two major growth poles. Assuming a growth rate 
of 3 percent, Nigeria will need to achieve a GDP growth of at least 55 per cent per 
annum for the rest of the decade to recoup some of the decline in living standards 
experienced since 1981. Gilbert da Costa (1992) indicated that such a growth rate can 
only be achieved if the country doubles its investment ratio from an average of 11 
percent of GDP in the 1980’s to 25 percent while simultaneously improve investment 
efficiency to a level more superior than that of the 1980’s16.
The government floated the national currency Naira on the 5th of March 1992. The 
short term objective of the floatation was to deregulate the amorphous foreign 
exchange market, thereby bridging the gap between the official and unofficial rates of 
the naira. The other aim was to use the prescription of SAP to calm the nervous 
economy17.
16 Gilbert da Costa, Looking for Clues , West Africa, 1992, pp.916 - 917.
17 Nigeria at the crossroads, West Africa l-7/6/1992,p.909.
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5.5 THE STRATEGIC POLICIES OF THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PROGRAMME (SAP)
The strategic policies of the structural adjustment can be categorised as18:
1. The strengthening of demand management policies and adoption of measures to 
stimulate domestic production and the supply base of the economy;
2. The implementation of realistic exchange rate policy through the establishment of 
the second-tier foreign exchange market (SFEM)19;
3. Rationalisation and restructuring of the tariff regime to assist the promotion of 
industrial diversification, trade and payments liberalisation20;
4. The determination to reduce complex administrative controls and to promote 
reliance on the market forces21;
5. The adoption of appropriate pricing policies for public utilities and privatisation 
of the public sector enterprises.
Structural adjustment was regarded by the authorities as a means for establishing the
appropriate financial environment for economic growth and promotion of policies that
can mobilise resources for development and ensuring its productive utilisation.
18 see also Robertson - Policy Adjustment in Africa 1992,pp. 183 - 85.
19 A device targeted at eliminating the over-valuadon of the Naira through the setting up of a viable Second Tier 
Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) assisted by adjustments to the official rate. This is with the hope that it will bring 
a convergence of the two rates.
20 As a means for relieving the debt burden and at the same time attract a net inflow of foreign capital, while 
keeping a lid on foreign loans .
21 As a measure to overcome the observed public sector inefficiencies through improved public expenditure 
control programmes and the rationalisation of national assets .
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5.5.1 ACTS. DECREES AND DIRECTIVES.
HOW THE FINANCIAL REPRESSION ORIGINATED.
The recession of 1982/83 forced the Government to introduce austerity measures in 
Nigeria. For the first noticeable time, the curb market rate exceeded the official 
exchange market (from N1.50 to £1, to N5 to £1, and now N30 to £1). A gross excess 
demand existed for all consumer goods in the country. Nigeria’s exports fell sharply 
with oil being the only principal export commodity and production quota by OPEC 
for Nigeria pegged at 1.3 million barrels per day. The recession in the industrialised 
economies forced the oil price to fall which led to the fall in Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings (see the Crisis Cycle section 5.3.2).
THE ECONOMIC STABILISATION (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT 1982
As a result of the fall in Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings the Economic 
Stabilisation Act was passed to assist the authorities in rationalising the limited foreign 
exchange resource22. The fiscal, exchange control, monetary and credit policies of 
the 1983 Federal Budget contained provisions for:
[1] Reduction of imports; and
[2] Conservation of foreign exchange.
From then onwards, several commodities were gradually placed under import licensing 
restrictions, while the imported ones were subjected to high custom tariffs.
In an attempt to conserve foreign exchange, compulsory advance deposits against 
imports was required on a scale ranging from 250 per cent for cars to 10 per cent for 
raw materials. In the area of credit, interest rates which had been increased in 1982 
were reduced by one percent across the board. In terms of the results of the 1983 
measures the critical question is why are the measures so different from their 
objectives. According to Odife (1989), the answer is that the government deceived or 
misled itself into seeking temporary provisions to solve what it perhaps termed a 
temporary problem which turned out to be a protracted one by emphasising on the oil 
glut as the main problem. The other explanation is that the analysis of the economic
22 Economic Stabilisation (Temporary Provisions) ACT 1982, Federal government printer Lagos.
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problem was incorrectly diagnosed. One identified problem was the excess demand 
which built up pressures in the economy and consequently overflowed into the foreign 
exchange market. In an attempt to reduce demand the government only succeeded in 
reducing supply. The 1984 budget proposed some major structural adjustments which 
included a reduction in government expenditure, privatisation, increase in interest rates 
and procurement of external loans. The major policy objectives of the budget include 
reduction in imports, foreign exchange and stimulation of domestic production. 
Despite the potential merits the repression continued. The government expenditure 
only fell 3 per cent from 1983, agriculture only got a proposal to set up a special fund 
for aid. The establishment of a National Loan Fund negates the proposal to make state 
owned enterprises more commercial23.
On the demand side, the economic and fiscal policies has been repressive.
The repressive policies include: low interest rates, underpricing of securities, price 
controls, subsidised petroleum products and foreign exchange rates control. With these 
measures, the producers had to deal with high cost of imported raw materials, high tax 
and tariffs, low rates of capital allowance, dividend restrictions and the Compulsory 
Advance Deposit Scheme introduced in 1982.
The effects of these repressive policies are:
[a] a reduction in production output;
[bj a wider gap between demand and supply; and
[c] a spiralling prices.
The demand side measures has over the years led to excess demand by the 
government and the private sector for housing, labour, consumer durable and non­
durable like foreign travel and medical facilities. Therefore, to determine whether the 
supply-side measures can be successful or not, the repressive policies (ie the demand 
side measures) has to be eliminated first (that is low interest rates, price controls, free 
housing, free education, high taxation, and foreign exchange controls).
23 Odife, D; Structural Adjustment and Economic Revolution in Nigeria, 1989,pp. 14 - 15.
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5.5.2 REMEDIES TO THE REPRESSIVE POLICIES
The remedies will include measures that will stimulate domestic investment, 
production and increase the supply of goods and services. Among the instruments that 
can be used are: Lower corporation tax to encourage investments in industries etc, 
Tax on dividends and elimination of restriction on the amount of profits payable as 
dividends. To introduce measures such as increased capital allowance to encourage 
investments in assets and a stop to state governments practice of deficit financing 
(given its effect of creating a rise in expectations which leads to higher demands) as 
well as the federal government budget deficit. And finally a stop to the building of 
white elephant projects (ie uneconomic capital intensive projects) such as the Ajaokuta 
Steel Complex, the Kaduna Refinery and the Steel Rolling Mills.
5.5.3 THE ISSUE OF TAXATION
The Nigerian taxation system is complex. If that is to simplistic, look at it as a 
spaghetti junction of motor free ways. On the income tax level a Pay As You Earn 
(PAYEE) system operates while on the corporation tax side confusion operates. 
Companies has to pay some tax to the government in the form of customs duties and 
when goods are produced, even as they are taken out of the factory gates, excise 
duties are paid to the federal government. When profits are realised a 45 percent 
corporation tax is paid to the federal government and 15 percent to the state 
government. This means that in reality more than 60 percent is being paid by 
companies in the form of corporation tax alone.
Foreign investors in turn have to apply to the Federal Ministry of Finance for 
permission to remit their own share of the dividends. Usually before this is processed 
by the Ministry it is time for the next financial year’s dividend to be declared. The 
system itself is an evidence as to why foreign investment was so negative in the 
country prior to the SAP. The system does not encourage voluntary compliance, nor 
does it distinguish between manufacturers and traders. It does not indicate the 
direction to which resources should be channelled. Corporation tax ought to be split 
into two different rates between public limited companies (pic’s) and non-public 
limited companies as in the United Kingdom Corporation Tax System.
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5.6 THE EXCHANGE RATE POLICY : OPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
"The importance of exchange rate policy as an instrument of macro- 
economic management is derived from the fact that exchange rates 
have significant implications for a country’s balance of payments 
position, its terms of trade, reserve use, rate of domestic price inflation 
and even its income distribution and growth24".
The sustained maintenance of disequilibrium exchange rates can cause serious damage
to the country’s economic performance and welfare. The influence of exchange rate
is very visible in Nigeria, especially as the country embarked on a course of rapid
economic growth throughout the 1970s to early part of 1980’s. Export expansion has
not .been able to match up with the import requirements which are vital for the
economy’s development. On the other hand, export activities are taxed whenever a
fixed exchange rate is combined with domestic inflation generated by deficit financed
development programmes.
The implication of this is that, foreign exchange reserves will be depleted and the 
country may resort to borrowing unless the necessary adjustments are made. The usual 
short term policy response by LDC’s is to restrict imports through exchange controls, 
higher tariffs, and pre-imports deposit. Failure to identify the role of exchange rate 
changes in the economic adjustment process will lead to a substantial resource mis- 
allocation. Thus, rationality in choosing an appropriate exchange rate policy becomes 
essential to macroeconomic management (H.Branson, IMF staff paper vol.30, no.7, 
March 1983, pp.33 - 66).
Nigeria has experimented with various forms of exchange rate policy. The need to 
adopt an appropriate mechanism not just Nigeria alone but by all LDC’s became 
necessary since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System in 
the early 1970’s. Before the industrialised economies adopted floating exchange rate 
in 1973, most of these economies had maintained a par value against an intervention
24 T. Ademola Oyejide; Exchange rate policy for Nigeria. Some options and their consequences, in the hook - 
Management of Nigeria’s Foreign exchange resources. A proceedings of the 1985 One - Day Workshop, Published 
by the Nigerian Economic Society .p. 17.
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currency such as the dollar, franc or the pound sterling25
The studies by D. Brodsky, G. Helleiner and G. Sampson, on the impact of the current 
exchange rate system (1981,pp.31 - 53) showed that, the generalised floating of the 
industrialised nations currency renders this practice inappropriate given the level of 
uncertainty which is introduced by fluctuations in effective exchange rates which are 
the product of instability of the foreign currencies.
The variations on the exchange rate induces greater unpredictability of import prices 
and export receipts. One can now begin to understand why exchange rate policies have 
been a topical issue in Nigeria. The country’s attempt to find the right or suitable path 
way have been dogged by consistently repressive policies. The next five sub sections 
examine some of the guiding general principles of the exchange rate policy and 
examines the Nigerian exchange rate policy.
25 See R. M. Bantista, Exchange rate flexibility and the less developed countries: A survey of empirical research 
and policy issues,Philippine Economic Journal, Vol.xx, N o.l, 1981, pp. 1 - 30.
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5.6.1 THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EXCHANGE RATE
A Simple Definition:
Exchange rate can be defined as the price of one currency in terms of 
another. That is, the unit rate at which the domestic currency is 
measured in relation to a basket of foreign currencies or a single 
foreign currency or simply, the price of one currency in terms of 
another.
The Nigerian naira’s foreign value may be measured in terms of the US dollar or the 
British pound sterling. There is a distinction between the ‘spot’ rate of exchange and 
the ‘forward’ rate.
The spot rate is the rate at which one currency can currently exchange for another 
while the forward rate is an agreed rate at which one currency can be exchanged for 
another at some pre-determined date in the future (usually 90 days). Forward exchange 
market enables traders to hedge against the foreign exchange risk and it gives rise to 
certain types of speculative activity and Interest Arbitrage26.
HEDGING:
An importer may incur a debt which has to be paid for at a future date. The foreign 
exchange risk is the risk that the exchange rate will change in the meantime involving 
the importer in a possible loss. The trader can hedge against this risk by buying 
"Forward" foreign exchange. This means that the trader can enter into a contract with 
a bank to purchase an amount of foreign exchange at the appropriate future date at a 
rate of exchange agreed upon at present (the‘forward’ rate). Banks levy a small charge 
for this service.
SPECULATION:
Some speculators attempts to take advantage of the difference between the ‘forward’ 
rate for some given time period and the ‘spot’ rate which they expect to prevail at the 
end of that time period.
26 Philip Hardwick et al, An introduction to Modem Economics, 1984, pp.436 - 7.
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INTEREST ARBITRAGE:
The objective of interest arbitrage is to allocate funds between financial centres in 
response to interest rate differentials in order to realise the highest possible rate of 
return. If for example, 90-day interest rates are higher in London than in Lagos it may 
be worthwhile for investors to transfer their short term funds from Lagos to London. 
To do so, they will need to convert naira into pound at the spot rate and at the same 
time they can avoid the foreign exchange risk by arranging to convert the proceeds 
of the arbitrage back into naira at the forward rate. Therefore, whether or not this 
transaction is worthwhile depends on the interest rate differential between the two 
financial centres and the difference between the 90-day forward rate and the spot rate.
The concept of an ‘effective exchange rate’ indicates that, given the emergence of 
many bilateral rates under the framework of floating rates, there is a potential need 
to design a different measure which would reflect the average movement in a 
country’s exchange rate. The effective exchange rate (EER) is calculated as the trade - 
weighted average of bilateral exchange rates. There are three different methods which 
can be used:
[1] Weighted imports;
[2] Exports; and
[3] Total trade.
The real effective rates are derived by adjusting the component bilateral nominal 
exchange rates for changes in the relative price levels in the trading partner and home 
countries (Brodsky et al, 1981).
The real effective rates however, do fluctuate between currencies and between 
intervals on a regular basis. This is usually influenced by the activities within the 
financial markets, industry, and the economic and political outlook. The primary focus 
of the policy is the real exchange rate because it provides the signal for inter and 
intra-sectoral resource movements (D. Cavallo and Y. Mundlak, 1982, Oyejide,1985). 
This refers to the measure of the terms of trade between the traded and non-traded
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sectors27 of the economy. A fall in the real exchange rate would divert resources 
away from the traded sectors. The real rate however, is not controlled directly by the 
authorities instead, they utilise the policy instrument of nominal rate. Its variations can 
be used to maintain a specified real exchange rate target.
5.6.2 THE OBJECTIVES FOR A STABLE EXCHANGE RATE
The first aim is to improve the balance of payments position which is expected to be 
realised by enhancing the external competitiveness of a country’s traded goods sector. 
The second objective is to use the changes in exchange rates to regulate domestic 
costs and prices. That is towards achieving domestic price stabilisation policy.
The third is exchange rate protection. The aim here is to prevent the tradable and non 
tradable price ratios from continuing to fall for example, the oil export proceeds. 
These three objectives highlight the reasons why a country may choose as a policy 
strategy to maintain a constant or target equilibrium real effective exchange rate 
(REER) or to minimise short term fluctuations.
The main advantage of a system of exchange control is that, it exerts a prompt, direct 
and predictable effect on imports and it may be used selectively to discriminate 
between imports. The disadvantages are; it suppresses rather than solves the basic 
underlying problems. It involves a complex and costly administrative structure and 
encourages corruption.
5.6.3 THE MAIN DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
AND CONTROL
Exchange rate policy works through the intermediation of price changes and price 
elasticities response. Exchange control works through the mechanisms of an 
administrative system which bureaucrats prefer. This preference is mainly because of 
the powers and privileges that goes with the exercise of discretion than the actual 
problem of market imperfections.
27 Traded products - agriculture and import - substituting manufacturing goods.
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5.6.4 THE DOMINANT FORMS OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rate in the early 
1970’s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted the Second Amendment to the 
Fund’s Articles of Agreement which allows each member country to freely determine 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility that is consistent with its economic structure 
and domestic policy objectives (Oyejide 1985).
FIXED EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
Under the fixed exchange rate mechanism, the government can determine the par 
value of the country’s currency. The country’s Central Bank takes an active role in the 
foreign exchange market, selling or buying the domestic currency when its rate starts 
to deviate from the fixed value. The demand and supply are reconciled through 
fluctuations in the central bank’s holdings of foreign exchange reserves rather than 
through changes in the exchange rate.
There are two variants of the fixed exchange rates:
[1] The Rigidly Fixed Exchange Rates System;
[2] The Crawling Peg System.
Under a rigidly fixed exchange rates, the exchange values of currencies are fixed in 
terms of some common unit such as Gold or other currencies. A fixed exchange rate 
arises when the exchange rate of a currency is fixed in terms of some units of gold 
or any other foreign currency. The maintenance of a fixed rate requires each 
government to keep a foreign exchange reserve, typically maintained in gold or in a 
major currency such as US dollar or the British pound sterling.
This reserve is drawn upon whenever the country’s total imports exceeds its total
exports in value. An import surplus means that the demand for foreign currencies (to
pay for imports) exceeds the supply of foreign currencies (earned through exports).
180
PEGGING.
The value of a country’s currency is maintained within a well defined range relative 
to some other currency or group of currencies. The aim of pegging to a basket of 
currencies is to moderate changes in the prices of imports and exports. Those countries 
unable to construct their own currency baskets use the Special Drawing Right 
(SDR)28.
CRAWLING PEG (THE ADJUSTABLE PEG SYSTEM)
At the Bretton Wood conference in 1944, the allies came together in an attempt to 
design an International Monetary System that could operate in the post-war* period. 
The Bretton Wood Conference resulted in the formation of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).
Members of the IMF have the right to adjust their rates of exchange from time to time 
in the event of a fundamental disequilibrium. With the Crawling Peg, there should be 
a parity of exchange, but the parity itself would be allowed to move from day to day, 
that is, not allowing it to move by a large amount.
The problem with the crawling peg is that if reliance is placed on small exchange rate 
movements to get adjustment from a system of fundamental disequilibrium, the 
remedy would take a considerable length of time to solve the cause of the 
disequilibrium. Therefore, to succeed with this method, the monetary authorities would 
require reserves larger than that under a system with quicker adjustments mechanism. 
Without a large reserve base, events might be abandoned and devaluation resorted to; 
which will in turn lead to a greater need for adjustments.
The view taken by most IMF members was that the system of fixed parities and 
intervention points made a major contribution to the peaceful development of 
international trade and a greater flexibility ought to be achieved.
28 The IMF has defined the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as a basket of Sixteen currencies to which such 
countries can peg their currencies .
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The suggested solution was that when a currency is under pressure (in either direction) 
the intervention point could be moved either way in the appropriate direction at the 
end of a quarter or shorter period. This process of slow devaluation or revaluation 
became known as the Crawling Peg System.
FREE FLOATING SYSTEM
This is a system of market determined rates. That is, the evaluation of a currency in 
a free market like any other commodity. Its worth is determined by the interaction of 
supply and demand. Hence, the rate of exchange of a currency is determined by the 
supply of and the demand for it in foreign exchange markets.
The rates at which currencies exchange for one another are free to move up or down 
without limit in response to the dictates of supply and demand. There is neither an 
upper limit or a lower limit (except zero) to the fluctuations. In a free market, the 
naira-price of say dollar or pound sterling is free to move up or down without limit 
as is the dollar or pound sterling price of naira.
The only qualification is that the naira price of dollar in Lagos, whatever is the level, 
must be the reciprocal of the dollar-price of naira in New York. For example, when 
N1.00 = $0.8000 in New York, $1.00 must be equal to N1.2500 in Lagos. Where the 
compatibility does not hold, (ie; different rates), then arbitrage tends to occur. The 
consequence of the incompatibility is that dealers sell naira for dollars in Lagos, resell 
the dollar so obtained for naira in New York realising a profit in the process, purchase 
more dollar in Lagos with the proceeds and so on. This movement continues until no 
further profit can be made by arbitrageurs. The 1978 amendment to the statute
of the IMF accepted and permitted the floating exchange rates.
FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
Under this regime the central bank does not participate in the foreign exchange 
market. The forces of demand and supply are allowed to determine the exchange rate 
of the currency in relation to all foreign currencies. In reality, governments do not 
leave the determination of their exchange rate entirely to the market forces instead,
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they follow a Managed Floating System. Under the Managed Floating System, the 
central bank intervenes to reduce day to day variability of market rates while the 
market forces are allowed to determine exchange rate trends over the long run.
Before the full deregulation of the financial system in Nigeria, the floating system was 
considered unsuitable for the economy. Oyejide (1985), argued that Nigeria is a highly 
open developing economy and does not have an internationally integrated capital 
market to benefit from such a system.
One of the main concerns of the governments and their monetary authorities is a 
fluctuating exchange rates inherent in flexible exchange rates system. Seasonal 
fluctuations are predictable, but fluctuations due to sudden shifts in international 
demand or to erratic shifts of capital especially of short term capital are not 
predictable. The ensuing exchange instability is viewed as a risk which calls for the 
intervention of the government.
The idea of free-floating rates implies that the government will not intervene in the 
market. However, the fact is that no government will abrogate its freedom to intervene 
when its judgement intervention is expedient. Governments are expected to confine 
interventions to off-setting temporary items and not to interfere with long-term trends 
as determined by underlying forces.
Attempts to off-set temporary items often produce rub-off effects on long term trends. 
The possibility of rub-off effects is not sufficient to prevent the need for official 
intervention. The essence of official intervention is that, should there be a downward 
movement that the government knows to have been caused by some random event 
beyond the knowledge of the participants in the market, the government will not want 
to let the exchange rate fall when it knows quite well that the cause of weakness is 
temporary.
The alternative is to buy the domestic currency with foreign currency in order to 
prevent a depreciation of domestic currency. By offering foreign currency in exchange
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for a given amount of domestic currency, the price of the foreign currency is 
prevented from rising relative to the domestic currency. A stabilisation fund consists 
of a pool of various currencies to which the central authority adds or from which it 
subtracts as conditions warrant; thus the stabilisation fund can act to stabilise the 
international value of a currency.
The success of a stabilisation fund is dependent largely upon the magnitude of its 
resources, if large-scale or prolonged operations prove necessary. Relying on exchange 
rate adjustment may complicate the task of using domestic instruments of adjustment 
to achieve a viable balance of payments position. Therefore, monetary and fiscal 
measures might be undertaken to ensure consistence with long-term trend.
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5.6,5 THE HISTORY OF NIGERIAN MONETARY SYSTEM AND
EXCHANGE RATE EXPERIENCE BEFORE THE SAP
Over half a century ago, Nigeria use to import the British currency, pound sterling. 
When the West African Currency Board was created in 1912, it started to issue the 
West African Pound for the then Four British colonies, namely, Nigeria, Ghana 
(formerly Gold Coast), Sierra Leone and the Gambia29. Prior to 1912 period various 
medium of exchange were used as money for example, Cowries and Manilla.
The essence of the currency reform of 1912 was to create a unified currency in the 
four British colonies especially in Nigeria where different regions uses different 
medium of exchange.
The next stage of the Nigerian monetary history came with the establishment of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria and the issue of the first Nigerian pound in July 1959, which 
effectively replaced the West African Currency Board notes and coins30.
The Nigerian pound external value was then fixed at par with the British pound 
sterling which resulted in the Nigerian pound been valued in US dollar at $2.80. After 
gaining independence in 1960 Nigeria became a member of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).
In June 1962 the Nigerian pound had its parity defined in terms of gold, at One 
Nigerian pound equal to 2,48828 grams of fine gold. Since the US dollar had a fixed 
value under Bretton Woods system at that period, the Nigerian pound also had a fixed 
value in relation to the US dollar, as well as the British pound gold value.
The Nigerian authorities felt content with the fixed exchange rate regime and no 
attempt was made to change it even though the British pound was later devalued by 
14.3 percent against its gold parity in November 1967, Despite the worsening balance 
of payments position during the 1960 - 70 period, other measures such as exchange 
control and import restrictions were preferred to nominal exchange rate changes in
29 CBN Economic and Financial Review, June 1972.
30 CBN - Economic and Financial Review, Vol.2, N o.l, June, 1973.p.5.
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dealing with the emerging problems. However, in August 1971 when the US 
unilaterally suspended the convertibility31 of its currency to gold, the Nigerian 
position of "no action required" immediately changed. Since the US dollar was used 
as a reserve currency by most countries, it also meant a change to floating exchange 
rate system. This change posed a big problem for the unsuspecting LDC’s who were 
ill-equipped for this new phenomenon.
After experimenting with a version of the Dual Exchange rate system for a couple of 
months Nigeria abandoned it by the end of 1971 but still maintained the parity of the 
Nigerian pound at 2.80 US dollar. The parity with the dollar meant that Nigeria’s 
pound is automatically floated along with the US dollar against other currencies. 
When the US dollar was devalued against gold after the New Smithsonian Agreement 
in December 1971 Nigeria still ties its currency to the dollar and refused to devalue. 
Following the devaluation of the US dollar, the new par value of the Nigerian pound 
rose from US$2.80 to US$3.04, meaning appreciation for the Nigerian pound.
In January 2, 1973, the naira went into circulation, thus replacing the Nigerian pound. 
It’s par value was set at half the pound. Therefore, the exchange rate with the dollar 
became US$1.52 to the naira. Shortly after the introduction of the naira the US dollar 
was devalued again by 10 percent. The devaluation was due to worsening US balance 
of payments position which triggered off a massive speculative pressure on the dollar. 
The Nigerian monetary authorities immediately devalued the naira by 10 percent32. 
According to the then Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, the devaluation was 
necessary in order to maintain first, an efficient allocation of resources in the 
economy and Second, to improve performance of the deteriorating non-oil export 
sector and thirdly, the need to rationalise the demand for imports from Nigeria’s major 
trading partners.
The implication of the change in policy stance signifies that perhaps a fixed
31 World Bank Report, 1991,p. 17. on US foreign exchange.
32 CBN, Economic and Financial Review, June, 1973,p. 10.
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relationship between the naira and any other currency could not be sustained 
especially if Nigeria wanted to be able to respond independently to economic changes 
in the light of it’s own objectives and peculiar circumstances.
The effect of this was the termination in April 1974 of the rigid relationship between 
the US dollar and the naira. The naira and pound sterling fixed rate had earlier been 
broken in June 1972 when the pound sterling started to float officially. As from April 
1974, the monetary authorities adopted the policy of progressively appreciating the 
external value of the naira, especially against the dollar and sterling with the aim of 
producing naira exchange rates that would adequately reflect the country’s balance of 
payments position. The inflow of oil revenue undoubtedly allowed the naira to be 
overvalued, which helped to improve Nigeria’s balance of payments position (CBN 
1974, pp. 13 - 14).
To justify this policy measure, the authorities maintained that depreciating the naira 
would be helping to intensify inflationary pressures in the domestic economy thus 
counteracting the effects of the government’s anti-inflationary policy. The appreciation 
of naira during the last three quarters of 1974 was aimed at moderating the extent of 
imported inflation. Between the period 1974 and 1978 the Nigerian exchange rate was 
managed independently of any single foreign currency.
In February 1978, Nigeria adopted a system of determining the naira exchange rate 
against a basket of currencies of Nigeria’s main trading partners. The policy assisted 
the process of promoting a fairly independent exchange rate policy and the 
minimisation of exchange rate induced fluctuations in the prices of imports and 
exports.
At this stage there seems to be a realisation that the naira is overvalued and that this 
has some undesirable effects especially on the non-oil tradable goods sector. However, 
instead of adjusting frequently the nominal exchange rate appreciations the main 
priority of the authorities was to sustain the existing nominal exchange rates while at 
the same time attempting to protect the non-oil sectors and the balance of payments
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position by imposing a higher import duties and establishing a regime of direct 
exchange control and import licensing.
Robertson (1992, pp. 179 - 181) noted that the overvalued exchange rate also affected 
the authorities trade policy. The exchange rate was overvalued because the demand 
for foreign exchange exceeded the supply (at the official rate) hence, requiring tight 
controls on foreign exchange flows including restrictions on imports.
Keesing (1989), stated that Nigeria maintained what has been characterised as ‘a low 
growth, high cost, disequilibrium exchange rate’. Oyejide (1975) and Robertson 
estimated the exchange rates distortion in the 1970’s and early 1980’s to be between 
30 and 80 percent. The extent of the exchange rate overvaluation increased during the 
1970s because of the increased nominal rate and the high rates of domestic inflation 
relative to increases in international prices. For example, the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) increased by 320 per cent between 1970 and 1980 while in the USA the 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) increased by 143.3 percent. This means a decline in the 
real exchange rate.
The. missed opportunity of what the government should have done, was to establish 
an equilibrium real effective exchange rate which once established should be 
systematically adjusted so that the selected equilibrium real exchange rate can be 
maintained. This does not necessarily mean that a point estimate of the equilibrium 
real rate must be found. A real rate around which there is a narrow band will be 
sufficient. Edwards (1989) using data from the IMF and World Bank (various years) 
estimated the real exchange rates by using the Nigerian CPI and the US GDP Deflator. 
For the period 1970 to 1980 the real exchange rate appreciated by 63.0 percent of 
which about 23.3 per cent was due to appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. For 
the period 1975 to 1980 the real exchange rate appreciated by 53.5 percent as the 
nominal rate increased by 11.1 percent. The nominal exchange rate began to depreciate 
after 1980 mainly because of the authorities realisation of the need to confront the 
deteriorating balance of payments as oil revenues began to fall.
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Table 5.2
Nominal Exchange Rates [Against Nairal Before The Liberalisation.
(Quarterly 1974 - 1984 )
PERIOD US DOLLAR ($) BRITISH POUND (£)
1974 II 1.5855 0.6616
IV 1.6228 0.6836
1975 II 1.6263 0.6847
IV 1.5980 0.7448
1976 II 1,6011 0.7977
IV 1.5914 0.8746
1977 II 1.5789 0.8504
IV 1.5352 0.8612
1978 II 1.5826 0.8390
IV 1.5548 0.7877
1979 II 1.5679 0.7851
IV 1.7442 0.8043
1980 II 1.7776 0.7912
IV 1.8628 0.7850
1981 II 1.6566 0.7850
IV 1.5404 0.8220
1982 II 1.4847 8.8331
IV 1.4530 0.8725
May 1984 1.5560 0.7470
Source: CBN various years
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Table 5.3
Balance of Payment ( Balance on Current and Capital Accounts) 
 tin Millions of Nairal Before The Liberalisation Program
Year Oil Non - Oil Total
1974 5192.9 -2136.3 +3056.5
1975 4190.4 -4006.7 +183.7
1976 5224.2 -5431.6 -206.5
1977 6611.1 (2) -7033.2 (2) -422.1 (2)
1978 5561.7 -6926.5 -1364.8
1979 8983.5 -7160.8 +1822.7
1980 11657.7 -9290.1 +2367.6
1981 10216.2 -13285.1 -3068.9
1982 (1) 8243,6 -9690.9 -1447.3
1983 (1) 6876.3 -7070.0 -193.7
1984 (1) 7761.4 -7605.8 +155.6
1985 (3) 9495.7 -8589.1 +906.6
Source : CBN: Annual Report and Statement ol Account (Various years)
Bracket index: (1) Revised
(2) Provisional
(3) Estimated
Between the period 1980 and 1985 the nominal exchange rate dropped from US$1.83 
to US$1.11; a 38.9 percent decline. The depreciation of the real exchange rate during 
this period was limited by the increasing inflation rate. There was a depreciation of
10.5 percent in 1980 - 82, as inflation fell to an average of 12.8 percent. In 1983 - 84, 
inflation increased sharply to an average of 31,4 percent thus reversing the previous 
period. The real exchange rate appreciated by 28.7 percent. In 1985 when the rate of 
inflation dropped to 5.5 per cent the real exchange rate depreciated by 13.8 percent 
as the nominal rate depreciated by 14.2 percent.
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5.7 THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
BEFORE THE LIBERALISATION
Financial resources is one of the key elements in any economic development. In the 
case of the Developing Countries, mobilisation of resources has been identified as the 
most essential factor in attaining a rapid economic take off. In which case there is a 
fundamental need for capital formation. This requires the release of domestic goods 
and services for real investment and or the importation of resources from abroad plus 
an encouragement for domestic savings.
"This requires an institutional arrangement which encourages and
mobilises savings (Agu, 1988)".
Developments on the Nigerian financial system concentrated on changes in structure, 
growth and the emerging challenges. This is reflected in the number of institutions 
participating in the system and their various impacts on employment, income and 
prices in the economy (Orji, 1989). Therefore, there is a need for adequate financial 
intermediation in the country. The financial mobilisation problem is very closely 
linked with the savings problem and developing countries are generally characterised 
by a low rate of domestic savings.
Khatkhate and Riechel (1980) found that, what is really lacking in LDC’s is the 
efficiency in the process by which savings being accumulated in the economy are 
translated into savings usable for productive investment. This is of course given the 
fact that Gross Domestic Savings rate has been found to be fairly high in a large 
number of developing countries including Nigeria.
Many LDC’s relied on the inflow of financial resources from outside in various forms 
such as: ‘official and private’ capital inflows and ‘direct foreign investments’ as a 
means of speeding up their economic development. Dependence on internal sources 
of finance facilitates the successful implementation of any planned economic 
development. This requires a wide range of independent and well organised financial 
institutions, which has to mobilise internal resources for the purpose of capital 
formation and allow the capital to be invested conveniently and freely in desired 
development projects (Agu, 1988).
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Some empirical studies have been carried out to support some of the differences of 
opinions regarding how the exogenous and endogenous factors affecting the banking 
system actually impact on the savings - investment process. This has resulted to the 
emergence of two main schools of thought. The first is the Financial Repression 
Hypothesis while the second is the Structuralist Hypothesis.
The proponents of financial repression hypothesis postulates that financial 
intermediation through the banking system induces economic growth by assuming that 
there are no government policies and legislation working towards distorting its growth 
- oriented effects. This means that government intervention in the organised domestic 
financial market through interest rate regulations among others factors hinders banks 
in their savings mobilisation role in the economy.
The Structuralist postulation was that, the ‘relative backwardness’ of the economic 
state of a country determines both the impact of banks on the economy and the 
subsequent trend in industrial expansion and growth.
Some of the advocates of the first school include Mckinnon and Shaw. Their work has 
been extensively reviewed in chapters 2 and 3. Others are Schumpeter 1934, Gurley 
1969, Shaw and Gurley 1955, Patrick 1966, Goldsmith 1969 and Cameron 1972. The 
Structuralist include: Taylor, Van Wejinbergen, Fry and Saracoglu whose work has 
been reviewed in chapter 4.
The next stage attempts to evaluate the growth and structure of banking in Nigeria. 
The first section deals with the banking history in Nigeria up to 1960. The second 
section examines the trend from 1960 to 1986 and the third from 1986 onwards.
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5.7.1 THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN
NIGERIA
The banking system started in Nigeria in the 1890s. Commodity currencies had been 
in use in Nigeria for a long time in the form of cotton, gin and rum and supplemented 
by various metal currencies such as the Spanish doubloon, the American half eagle 
and double eagle, Austrian Maria Theresa dollar, French Napoleon, Mexican dollar 
and the British Sovereign33.
The most commonly used medium of exchange in the Sixteenth century Nigeria was 
the cowry shell because the metal currencies had their own intrinsic value and were 
often melted down for ornaments. Given the various currencies in circulation, the 
British colonial government decided to introduce the shilling at about the end of the 
nineteenth century with the purpose of harmonising the currencies in circulation in the 
country. In 1825 the British Treasury directed that the silver coins were to be used 
throughout the whole of British Empire but there was a considerable resistance to its 
introduction and acceptance in Nigeria. The British Governor General for Nigeria; 
Governor Usher, issued the Ordinance No.2 of 11 May 1880 demonetising all these 
currencies with only ten days notice. From the 21 of May 1880 the British silver coins 
were introduced as the only legal tender in Nigeria. The colonial government having 
succeeded in replacing the foreign monies with British coins in Lagos Island, their 
next target was to replace the metal currencies used in the Delta and Creek areas. The 
rates of exchange of these currencies against the British coins were fixed34.
The Native Currency Proclamation No. 14 of 1902 formally fixed the exchange rate 
of different grades of manillas35 (still in use in the country, in addition to the official 
currency) in terms of shillings. In 1908, new British coins were introduced (the 
pennies and tenths) following the ban of copper wires and rods. In 1911, manilla and
33 P.N.C. Okigbo, The Nigerian Financial System, 1982, p.75,
34 The fixed rates were manipulated by the native courts working within the framework of the Native Courts 
Proclamation of 1901 or by the Native Market Proclamation in areas where the courts did not exist.
35 The metal currencies are in the form of manilla rods etc Okigbo 1982,p.76.
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metal currencies were demonetised by the Native Currency Repeal Ordinance and by 
legislation in 1948. The importation of the cowries used in the Ibo hinterland was 
banned by the Cowries Prohibition Proclamation No.6 of 1904, with a fine of £50,00 
or three months imprisonment against its violation. Alternative metal currencies were 
minted in aluminium. Nickel was later used in place of aluminium under the Nigeria 
Coinage Ordinance 190636.
The British coins were by 1912 the official medium of exchange. This was 
strengthened by the annexation of the northern provinces which led to a greater 
demand for coins for the payment of troops, public officials and local labour. The 
effect of this was a rise in the quantity of silver coins imported into the country from 
£24,426 in 1886 to £874,850 in 1911, that is, a 35 percent rise. In view of this trend, 
the establishment of a bank became highly necessary in the country.
5.7.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
Through the influence of Elder Dempster and Company in Nigeria (a British trading 
and shipping company), the African Banking Coiporation opened a branch in Nigeria 
in August 1891 (the bank at that time was already operating in South Africa). The 
bank was later taken over in March 1893 by Elder Dempster and Co. at a cost of 
£1000.00. The purpose at this stage for acquiring the bank by the Elder Dempster & 
Co was to support their trading activities along the Nigerian coast in the late 
nineteenth century37. The takeover of the bank enabled the company to acquire the 
monopoly of importing silver coins from Britain for use in Nigeria and their shipping 
business.
By December of 1893 at the request of the Colonial Government in Lagos through the 
Crown Agents, a joint stock bank was incorporated as the Bank of British West Africa 
(BBWA). The bank had an authorised capital of £100,000 of which £30,000 was 
called up and £12,000 paid up. The BBWA later became the First Bank of Nigeria
36 Okigbo 1982, p.77, J. Mars 1946, p.183.
37 CBN: Bullion April/June, 1991,p.8.
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Limited in 1979. Between the period 1894 and 1910 the bank had opened three 
branches and by 1919 despite the World War 1, it had opened five more branches in 
Nigeria and one in Cameroons.
The next bank to follow BBWA was the Anglo - African Bank 1899 -1912 which 
later became The Bank of Nigeria in 1905. The two banks merged in 1912 and as a 
result ending banking competition in Nigeria for three years.
The Colonial Bank was established in 1916 through Act of Parliament to operate 
anywhere in the British empire. This was later taken over in 1925 by Barclays Bank 
DCO (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) as an integrated overseas bank, to become 
Barclays Bank Nigeria Limited and is now known as The Union Bank of Nigeria 
Limited. The bank became a major competitor of the BBWA.
In 1948 the British and French Bank for Commerce and Industry based in London 
opened a branch in Nigeria. The Bank is now called The United Bank for Africa 
Limited (UBA). The establishment of the UBA Limited in Nigeria was as a result of 
a mission to Nigeria in 1947 which reported favourably on the possibilities for 
establishing a bank in the country. It had a catchment area from the French speaking 
population38 and by 1961 it had ten branches in Nigeria.
In 1948, the first commission of enquiry was appointed known as the Paton 
Commission39. At the time the commission reported, there were two foreign banks 
and three domestic banks with a total of forty branches. The second commission 
reported in 1976 and by then there were eighteen commercial banks with a total of 
four hundred and fifty six branches in the country. In 1952 the first Banking 
legislation was enacted. Prior to 1952 there were no banking laws and banks could be 
set up freely under the Companies Ordinance. It was this absence of banking 
legislation which earned that period the name "The Free Banking Era" (Nwankwo, 
1980, p.45).
38 That is, the French enterprises and nationals, Indian traders who came to Nigeria via Hong Kong (Okigbo, 
1982,p,82).
39 Nwankwo, G.O, The Nigerian Financial System, 1980, p.45.
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5.7.3 THE DOMESTIC BANKS ERA (1929 - 52)
A large number of domestic banks were established between 1929 and 1952 obviously 
taking the advantage of the free banking boom. Unfortunately, all of the banks that 
opened in this period failed except the National Bank of Nigeria Limited40, which 
was founded in 1933. The Industrial and Commercial Bank Limited was established 
in 1929 and liquidated in 1930. In addition the Nigerian Mercantile Bank 1931 - 36 
and the Nigerian Penny Bank 1945 - 46 both also went into liquidation, prompting the 
introduction to the economy of Banking regulation.
In 1948 regulatory provisions were recommended known as "the Paton Report41". 
The acceptance of the report by the government induced a great rush to open new 
more banks as the report provided a 3 year period of grace to allow the banks to 
comply with the required guidelines. In between the period February 1951 and May 
1952, eighteen domestic banks were registered and without exception, all of them 
collapsed.
The failure of these banks could be attributed to lack of banking expertise, non 
prudent lending policies and the great depression which according to Okigbo, saw the 
Nigerian import and trade fell by more than 59 and 50 per cent respectively. 
Newlyn and Rowan42, postulated that the cause of the large number of banks can be 
attributed to the timing of the rush of the registrations to the uncertainty of the 
government’s intentions based on the Paton Report of 1948. Thus, the spate of beat- 
the-law registrations of domestic commercial banks led to the abortive domestic 
banking boom of 1951 - 52.
The Second World War provided Nigeria with an opportunity to expand its banking 
system given that, the country provided Britain with soldiers, the take-off bases and
40 CBN: Bullion,April/June,1991,p.9; Okigbo, 1982, p.86; Nwankwo, 1980,p.46.
41 The commission was set on the 7th of September, 1948 and submitted its findings on the 25th of October, 
1948.
42 W.T. Newlyn and D.C. Rowan, Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa, (Oxford), 1954, pp.230 - 2.
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the vitally scarce products such as vegetable oils, cocoa and timbers. These endowed 
the indigenous population with funds which were invested in banking during this 
period43.
5.7.4 THE WEST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD (WACB) AND THE 
FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (CBN)
Prior to the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria, the West African Currency 
Board (WACB) which was formed in 1912, had the responsibility for issuing legal 
tenders (see sections 5.7.1 & 5.7.2). The role of WACB was to promote the financing 
of export trade, issue of a West African Currency, the exchange of existing currencies, 
the repatriation of existing currencies and investment of reserves among the Four 
British West African colonies. There was a fixed parity of the local currency with the 
British pound. Reserves were invested in Britain thus, facilitating Nigeria’s 
international payments. The WACB being linked with the British system could not 
engage in monetary management and there was a lack of a trained indigenous 
population to engage in monetary management.
To promote the growth of the domestic money and capital markets, the Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) was formed in 1958 and it commenced operation on the 1st of July, 
1959. The Ordinance of 1958 firmly established the Central Bank of Nigeria. It was 
not possible to establish the central bank earlier since the Federal government was still 
under the colonial control. The financial and economic structure began to change 
tremendously after the country gained internal autonomy in 1957.
The formation of CBN constituted a basis for other financial developments in the 
country. Apart from the eight banks established between 1959 and 1962, no new bank 
was established in the country between 1962 and 1970, The main reason was that a 
period of consolidation was needed to allow the new banks to establish themselves. 
The other major reason was the dislocations, disruptions and political uncertainties and 
insecurity brought about by the civil war of 1967 -1970.
43 Nwankwo, G.O; Indigenisation of Nigerian banking, Bankers Magazine July 1972,p.l6, 1980,p.47.
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The banks minimum paid up capital for foreign incorporated banks were increased 
from N200,000 under the 1952 Ordinance to N400,000 in 1978 and subsequently 
increased to N1.5 million. The other fundamental aspect to development was trade. 
The bulk of external trade was with the United Kingdom (U.K) prior to independence. 
In 1950, 60 percent of total imports came from the U.K, while in 1960 it was still as 
high as 44 per cent.
The Nigerian Mineral Ordinance restricted trade with countries outside the Non- 
Sterling area countries. Nwankwo (1980) argued that this restriction was responsible 
for the paucity of non British investment in general and the absence of foreign banks 
other than British up to 1959 in Nigeria. Independence in 1960 transformed the entire 
Nigerian economic structure. The exclusion of non - UK investors in mineral oil 
prospecting and the general restrictions on transactions with non - sterling area 
countries lapsed with independence in 1960. Nigeria was from then able to negotiate 
business with any country in the world it so wishes to.
The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the late 1950s added to an apparent 
political stability and the general freedom then to repatriate profit and capital to 
improve the investment climate in the country. This led to a lot of countries trying to 
gain a foothold in Nigeria’s expanding market and with it came the foreign banks to 
service these enterprises and to share in the subsequent boom.
5.7.5 THE COMPOSITION AND GROWTH OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The financial industry in Nigeria comprises of:
[1] The Central Bank of Nigeria :
This is wholly owned by the Federal Government of Nigeria and has among its 
numerous duties, the following functions;
(a) the issue of legal tender;
(b) the maintenance of external reserve for safeguarding the international value of 
naira;
(c) the promotion of monetary stability and regulation of the financial system;
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(d) to serve as the banker to other Central banks;
(e) to serve as the banker and adviser to the government and its agencies.
[2] Commercial and Merchant Banks:
The awareness for making institutionalised saving was primarily induced by the 
commercial banks and as such forms the nucleus of the banking system.
Two main functions are performed by the commercial banks:
(1) the creation, distribution and transfer of deposits and the provision of commercial 
credits;
(2) the saving function which include the mobilisation of savings from the surplus 
units of the economy and the channelling of such funds towards the funding of 
consumer items and capital projects.
The Merchant banks bridges the gap in terms of structure of credit provided by the 
commercial banks which tends to be short term. The first merchant bank Philip Hill 
Nigeria Limited was founded in 1960. This was later merged with the Nigerian 
Acceptances Limited (NAL) to become NAL Merchant Bank Limited. The forty eight 
merchant banks as at the end of 1990 were mainly wholesale bankers. They engaged 
in "made to measure" banking while the commercial banks dealt in "off-the-peg" or 
"retail" banking.
The merchant banks accept large deposits usually not less than N50,000. Only a small 
proportion of their loans and advances are of the overdraft form. The merchant banks 
apart from their own paid - up capital rely on other banks and institutional investors 
for their source of fund and then apply the funds mainly for loans and advances.
The area of specialisation of the merchant banks includes:
(a) the provision of term loans;
(b) Equipment leasing and debt factoring;
(c) Investment management;
(d) Loan syndication for capital intensive projects;
(e) Advisory and other services on mergers and acquisition;
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(f) Privatisation of state owned enterprises; and
(g) Capital reconstruction.
The merchant banks assets and liabilities as at the end of 1990 totalled N28.59 billion 
while the commercial banks was N82.3 billion.
[3] The development banks comprises of the following:
The Nigerian Industrial Bank (NIDB);
The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI); and 
The Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB).
They provide medium to long term funds to the agricultural, industrial, commercial 
and other sectors of the economy. They also provide financial and advisory services 
to enterprises and act as an agent of the government in disbursing funds to industrial 
enterprises.
[4] The Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) was established by Decree 
No.7 of 1977 to take over the assets and liabilities of the Nigerian Building Society 
(NBS). The NBS carried out the function of mortgage administration in Nigeria since 
inception in 1956 until its abolition.
The FMBN provided banking and advisory services, supervision and control of
mortgage institutions in Nigeria and provision of guarantees for loans from private 
investment sources for building purposes. The bank performs the function of research 
and development relating to architecture, mortgage finance and housing in rural and 
urban centres. The FMBN is financed by the Federal Government, the Central Bank, 
the banks and private sources. The assets and liabilities of the bank as at December 
1990 stood at N837.1 million.
[5] The FSB International Bank Limited formerly known as the Federal Savings 
Bank (FSB) replaced in 1974, the Post Office Savings Bank established in 1889. 
The FSB was formed by Decree 33 of 1972 with the aim of encouraging savings
especially among the low income groups in the country.
Its function include: the provision of easy to facilities for the deposit of savings and
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the promotion of "thrift" and mobilisation of savings. As a result of the advancement 
in commercial and merchant banking in the country, the FSB lost a large number of 
its customers hence, the government privatisation of it in 1990. The FSB is now a 
limited liability company.
[6] The People’s Bank of Nigeria (PBN) is a special bank.
It first started as a pilot scheme on the 3rd of October 1989 but later received a legal 
status by Decree No.22 of 1990. The reason for the formation of the bank was due to 
the realisation that low income earners normally lacked access to institutional credit 
because of their inability to provide suitable collateral demanded by banks before 
credit worthiness is ascertained. Thus, the bank was to provide easy credit, curb mass 
unemployment and encourage economic self-reliance.
The bank started by granting credit facilities of N50 to N5,000 with Zero interest. An 
administrative fee of 15 per cent (formerly 5%) is charged but no collateral is 
required. An interest of 17 per cent is paid on deposits placed with the bank.
To induce loan repayments, loans are usually granted on the basis of group 
membership of cooperatives and trade associations. A borrower is expected to be a 
member of a group of at least fifteen people with a repayment period of fifty weeks. 
The People’s Bank is financed through loans and grants from the Federal Government, 
the Central Bank, low interest bearing loans from international financial organisations 
and from charitable organisations. The bank received N150 million capital allocation 
in the budget of 1991, as its equity base.
[7] The Community Banks.
These are established to provide financial and banking services to all sectors.The first 
licensed community bank commenced operation in December 1990. The bank is a self 
sustaining institution, owned and managed by a community or group of communities 
and financial services at local level. Community banks may be owned by Community 
Development Associations (CDAs) or by Cooperative Societies. A minimum equity 
share capital of N250.000 is required and applications are received and processed by 
the Community Bank Implementation Committee.
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[8] The Stock Exchange.
One- of the most important developments in the Nigerian financial system was the 
establishment of the Lagos Stock Exchange on the 5th of June 1961. This was 
established as a result of the "Barback Committee44" which was appointed in 1958 
and reported its findings in 1959. The Lagos Stock Exchange is now known as the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange.
The Lagos Stock Exchange was incorporated as a limited liability company under 
section 21 of the Companies Ordinance of September 15, 1960. The aim was to 
promote commerce in Nigeria as a non profit making organisation limited by 
guarantee45. The Stock Exchange itself is a continuous auction market, but is not yet 
developed to the extent that exchange of ownership can be effected with the same 
speed as in the developed capital markets of the industrialised countries46.
[9] The Rural Banking Scheme.
In June 1977, the Central Bank and the Government launched the Rural Banking 
Scheme. The objective was to encourage:
(a) banking in the rural areas;
(b) mobilisation of savings for development in the rural areas;
(c) Transformation of the agro-economy of the rural areas through provisions of 
investment finance; and
(d) creation of employment in the rural areas, hence preventing the rural - urban 
migration. The ratio of the person-to-bank branch in Nigeria prior to the Rural
Banking Scheme was 1:170,000. A report issued by the central bank noted that, two 
hundred branches were selected for opening among the eighteen various commercial 
banks in the country during the first phase of 1977 - 8847.
44 Barback was the Minister for Industry and was appointed Chairman of the committee.
45 Areago, R.B, (1990), ‘Genesis o f the Stock Exchange in Nigeria’, Nigerian Stock Exchange: Genesis, 
Organisation, and Operations, Heinemann Educational Books, 1990, p.3 -6.
460dife, D.O. (1984), ‘The Nigerian Financial System’, Understanding The Nigerian Stock Market.
Vantage Press, New York, 1984, pp.41 - 44.
47 The CBN: Annual Report, 1987, p...
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The Central Bank of Nigeria granted the commercial banks numerous concessions 
such as:
Monopoly provisions for a rural branch for three years in its area of operation. Thus, 
a 100 per cent compliance level was attained for the first phase. The second phase was 
1980 - 85 and out of two hundred and sixty six allocations to twenty banks only two 
hundred and sixty branches was opened, indicating a 98 percent compliance.
The third phase of the Rural Banking Scheme was from the 1st of August 1985 and 
officially ended on the 31st July 1989. Only seventy two of the three hundred 
allocated branches to twenty eight banks were opened (See table.5.3(b)).
The estimated population per bank branch office showed a declining trend as a result 
of the Rural Banking Scheme. From one bank to 115,281 person’s (1:115,281) in 1980 
to one bank is to 72,177 person’s (1:72,177) in 1987, Total number of commercial 
banks rose from twenty nine with seven hundred and forty branches in 1980 to thirty 
three with one thousand four hundred and eighty three branches in 1987. The total 
number of Merchant Banks rose from six with twelve branches in 1980 to sixteen with 
thirty three branches in 1987.
As postulated by Orji, the downward trend do not seem to have had any positive 
impact on banking efficiency in the country, which dropped from 68 percent in 1982 
to 58.5 percent in 1985 while population per bank branch improved from 91,219 to 
77,087 for the same period.
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Table :5,3(b)
BANK EXPANSION IN NIGERIA (1980 - 87)
COMMERCIAL 
Yr Banks Bran
MERCHANT 
Banks Branches
TOTAL C + M 
Banks Branches
Nat* Poo/Bank 
PoduI Branch
1980 29 740 6 12 35 752
(Mill.) (Pers) 
86 115,281
1981 20 869 6 15 26 884 89.01 100,690
1982 22 991 8 19 30 1010 92.13 91,219
1983 25 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 95.35
1984 27 1242 11 25 38 1267 98.69 77,893
1985 28 1297 12 26 40 1323 102.14 77,087
1986 29 1367 12 27 41 1394 105.72 75,839
1987 33 1483 16 33 49 1516 109.42 72,177
Nat. Popul represents National Population (A 3.5% compound growth rate was 
assumed for population), n/a represents Not Available.
Nat* Estimated National Population
The third phase failed partly because of the high cost of establishing an infrastructural 
base in the Structural Adjustment Programme era plus the lack of basic amenities in 
these rural areas. This is more apparent given the fact that banks are profit oriented 
and would be better off operating with fewer branches in profitable areas.
It can be postulated that the stage of national economic development does not 
encourage savings mobilisation in the rural areas (which is one of the objectives of 
the scheme). The income levels are too low in these areas and the banking habit is far 
from being developed. The risk aversion in granting credit to rural based economic 
activities such as agriculture is too high for the banks to handle without any 
meaningful insurance against non repayment.
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[10] THE INSURANCE AND PROVIDENT FUND
(a) Insurance Companies;
The insurance business in Nigeria is still in its preliminary stages of development. 
This is mainly because it is only recently that significant importance has been attached 
to this side of financial services in the country. The total income of all insurance 
businesses in the country in 1960 amounted to N7 million and their aggregate 
premium from all forms of insurance business in 1974 was 54.8 million naira.
Most of the business is concentrated in the motor vehicle and other properties, with 
life insurance accounting for only a small percentage. For example, in 1977 out of 195 
million naira income of these companies, only 46 million naira was from life 
insurance business.
(b) National Provident Fund:
The'National Provident Fund is a social security scheme meant to provide protection 
to contributors in their old age, invalidity or temporary loss of earning. Where a 
member dies prematurely, the scheme provides for payment of benefits to the 
benefactors, within the limits of the contributions made.
The aim of the fund was to make saving compulsory but in principle, it is insurance. 
It differs from the insurance scheme to the extent that insurance is a voluntary 
contractual arrangement whereas the National Provident is compulsory.
The fund’s share of institutional savings started to rise from the period 1962 - 67. It’s 
share in 1962 was 2.4 percent, reaching 24 percent in 1967. It’s investments are 
mainly in gilt - edged securities and government development stocks which in 1970 
amounted to 82.7 million naira and by 1975 it has risen to 200 million naira and 
reached 340 million naira in 1978.
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5.7.6 THE INDIGENISATION PROGRAMME
Definition:
This is a process by which the citizens of the country are able to acquire ownership, 
control and management of key economic activities in the country, formerly occupied 
by expatriates.
This implies that it is foreign ownership, control and management that is the target of 
indigenisation especially commerce and industry. As a result of the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977, popularly known as the Indigenisation Decree 
(Phase II) or NEPD 1977, the Nigerian capital market was expected to change very 
significantly. The first indigenisation Decree was in 1972. The NEPD 1977 was 
promulgated in 1977 to implement the decisions of the government as contained in the 
white paper on the report of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Panel.
The report described the NEPD 1972 as a failure, due to the weakness of the 
implementation mechanism than the actual provisions of the decree. The NEPD 1977 
therefore, recommended that all enterprises operating in Nigeria should have Nigerian 
equity participation, ranging from 40 per cent in those enterprises considered to be 
difficult to run, to 100 per cent in those enterprises which Nigerians are considered 
capable of managing by themselves.
The decree provided for an implementation authority known as the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Board (NEPB). The board was empowered to decide in what 
schedule or category of Nigerian equity participation any enterprise belonged and what 
constitutes compliance with the decree when compliance has been effected. Pricing of 
the shares and determination of the terms and conditions of the offer remains with the 
Capital Issues Commission (C.I.C), as contained in the CIC Decree 1973 (Capital 
Issues Decree 1973: Decree No. 14 ‘ Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division 
Lagos). The 1977 Federal Budget contained some provisions geared to facilitate this 
transformation in the capital market as well as attaining the objectives of the NEPD 
1977.
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5,7.6[1] THE INDIGENISATION OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY
The indigenisation programme enabled the monetary authorities to ensure that the 
ownership, control and management of the Nigerian Financial System are controlled 
by Nigerians. The Federal Government owns 60 percent equity interest in the foreign 
banks while the state governments predominantly own the domestic banks.
In 1977, many new industrial shares were sold to the Nigerian public following the 
implementation of the second phase of the indigenisation scheme and thus increasing 
the number of companies and securities listed on the Lagos Stock Exchange48. Until 
the end of 1979, activities in the capital market continued to be buoyant which reflects 
the effect of the extended second phase of the Indigenisation Decree, as firms which 
could not meet the December 1978 deadline actually came into the market with issues 
in 1979(49).
5.7.7 THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE
In an attempt by the government to induce banks to participate in agricultural 
development in the country, the Central Bank of Nigeria introduced T he Agricultural 
Credit Guarantee Scheme’ (ACGS) in 1977. A total of 34,518 loans valued at 129.3 
million naira were guaranteed under the ACGS in 1989. Small scale farmers 
borrowing up to N5,000 and below comprised the largest proportion (96% in number 
and 68% in value) of the beneficiaries of the ACGS.
48 CBN, Annual Report 1977, p.31.
49 The Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Account, 1979, December, p.31.
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Table 5.4
COMMERCIAL AND MERCHANT BANKS IN NIGERIA FROM 1893-90
Year Number of 
Commercial 
Banks (1)
Number of 
Merchant 
Banks (2)
Total
Number of
(1) + (2)
1893 1 1
1917 2 2
1933 3 3
1937 4 4
1945 5 5
1953 6 6
1959 8 8
1960 9 1 10
1961 13 1 14
1962 17 1 18
1971 17 1 18
1972 17 1 18
1973 17 2 19
1974 17 3 20
1975 17 5 22
1976 18 5 23
1977 19 5 24
1979 20 6 26
1982 22 8 30
1983 25 10 35
1984 27 11 38
1985 28 12 40
1986 29 12 41
1987 33 16 49
1988 41 24 65
1989 47 34 81
1990 56 48 104
Source : The Central Bank; ol Nigeria
5.8 THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM THE 1980s
AN OUTLINE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY
The financial and economic structure of Nigeria has undergone a substantial 
transformation since the country’s attainment of independence in 1960. This is 
reflected in the changing sectoral contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
between 1960 and 1985 (see table 5.5 below).
Table 5.5
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY: Shares of Non - Oil GDP 
By Sector 1960 - 1985 ( % )
Per­
iod
Agricult
ure
Manufa
cture
constru
ction
Utili­
ties
Serv­
ices
Govt Min­
ing**
1960 58.1 2.2 3.0 0.1 34.3 2.2 (4.0)
1965 57.1 2.4 4.4 0.2 33.5 2.4 (18.3)
1970 49.5 5.1 5.0 0.2 33.5 6.8 (28.8)
1975 36.6 5.7 9.3 0.4 40.5 7.6 (30.0)
1980 29.2 9.2 12.5 0.6 42.2 6.4 (31.2)
1985* 47.2 11.1 1.9 0.6 39.2 n/a (17.8)
Source: The Federal Office of Statistics and The World Bank 
* The 1985 Figures are provisional estimates
** Estimates after 1965 includes all petroleum, as a percentage of non-oil 
GDP.
The economy was dominated by agriculture in 1960. With the rapid increase in 
government revenues from oil exports, the relative size of the public sector almost 
tripled between the period 1960 and 1980 as construction and utilities spurred by 
increasing public expenditures increased from 3 per cent to 12 percent and from 1 
percent to 6 per cent respectively. The manufacturing sector although still very small, 
increased its share of non-oil GDP by more than 400 percent.
The-extent of the swings in oil market conditions are shown in table 5.6. Prior to the 
1973 price increases, oil revenue accounted for 79.6 percent of total exports.
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Table 5.6
NIGERIAN OIL EXPORTS AND REVENUES : 1971 - 1985
Period Average Value Exports Average Growth Rates (%) of
Naira Dollar Naira Dollar Price Total (m)
(m) (m) (m) Exports
1971 - 73 1341 1887 57.1 60.7 29.3 79.6
1974 - 78 5787 9169 39.6 41.7 41.3 92.1
1979 - 81 11340 19482 30.0 35.0 42.5 95.4
1982 - 85 8734 11404 2.7 -6.6 -8.2 96.4
1971 - 85 6794 10371 31.3 31.3 26.5 91.6
Source: IMF [1986, 198/J. ”
Growth Rate of Oil Prices are based on an index of prices in dollar (1980 = 100).
The government’s share in total revenue increased from 26.3 percent to 81.4 percent 
(data from the FOS), with an average annual oil export rate of 55.6 percent (ie, from
166.4 million to 8880.9 million naira). According to the World Bank report (1987d) 
government consumption rose by 13.5 per cent on average per annum, while that of 
the private sector was 7.0 per cent.
5.8.1 PRE - STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT TRADE POLICY
Trade policy in Nigeria prior to the structural adjustment programme consisted largely 
of measures aimed at influencing the level and composition of imports, and the 
maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate. The authorities therefore had a problem 
of maintaining the prices of imported consumer goods and provision of protection to 
domestic industries. The policy adopted meant that the country was pursuing an 
inward-looking strategy toward its economic development. The economic policies 
pursued by the authorities significantly influenced the structure of the economy and 
contributed to the unsustainable position when oil revenues declined substantially in 
the early 1980s.
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5.8.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PROGRAMME AND POLICIES FROM 1986 
Table 5.7
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY DURING THE PERIOD 1965 - 85
(Average Real Growth Rates, Percentages)
1965 - 80 1980 - 85
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 7.9 -3.4
1. Agriculture 1.7 1.0
2. Industry 13.4 -5.8
3. Manufacturing 14.6 3.0
4. Services 8.8 -3.5
CONSUMPTION & INVESTMENT
Private 7.0 -1.5
Government 13.5 1.3
Gross Investment 14.7 -18.0
MERCHANDISE TRADE
Exports 11.5 -9.9
Imports 15.1 -11.5
Source: World Bank (1987c).
Table 5.7 showed the disappointing performance of the Nigerian economy between the 
period 1980 and 1985. The General Buhari administration which overthrew the civilian 
administration of President Shagari in December 1983 responded by introducing a 
series of stringent austerity measures. The measures failed in its objectives because 
economic policies were changed accordingly, instead, the economic repression 
continued. The government intervention in resource allocations increased substantially.
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The Structural Adjustment Programme was formally launched with the official
document ‘Structural Adjustment for Nigeria: July 1986 - 1988’. The focus of the
structural adjustment was on the nature of policy reforms that would transform the
economy and achieve the following objectives:
[1] Further rationalization of import tariffs and excise duties;
[2] Replacement of direct administrative controls with greater reliance on market 
forces;
[3] Adoption of appropriate pricing policy, especially for assets like petroleum 
products and rationalization of state owned enterprises (Phillips and Ndekwe 1987, 
Robertson 1992, p. 184).
Other objectives are:
a. The institution of market determined exchange rate;
b. The simplification and rationalization of the tariff structure (aimed at reducing 
variations in effective protection of local industries);
c. Elimination of import licence requirements (only agricultural products and 
luxury goods still remain);
d. Closure of agricultural commodity marketing boards (now fully implemented);
e. Privatisation of state owned industries (also implemented and still going on).
5.8.3 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND CONDITIONALITIES FOR 
NIGERIA
Following Nigeria request for a US$2 - 3 billion extended facility repayable over three 
years after a three year moratorium. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) insisted 
that, the granting of the request will be subject to an adoption by Nigeria of the 
following conditions:
1. A reduction in the aggregate public expenditure, particularly in the size of the 
budget deficit;
2. Introduction of greater budgetary discipline;
3. Review of an on - going projects with a view to determining their priorities;
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4. Reduction in grants, subventions and loans to state owned enterprises;
5. Classification of state owned industries into ‘social’ and ‘economic’ activities for 
the purpose of restructuring them to achieve cost - effectiveness, accountability 
and profitability;
6. Stoppage of non-statutory transfers to state governments;
7. Simplification and rationalisation of custom tariffs;
8. Upward review of interest rates and reduction in the sectoral allocation of credit;
9. Phase removal of subsidies on fertilizer;
10. A vigorous export drive to broaden the export base;
11. A review of industrial incentives and policy including the abolition of the 
Approved User Scheme;
12. Adjustment of producer prices of agricultural commodities;
13. Strict external debt control and management;***
14. Improvement in the operational efficiency of revenue collection agencies such as 
the department of customs and excise and the inland revenue;
15. Trade liberalisation;**
16. Removal of petroleum subsidy; ** and
17. Adjustment of the rate of exchange of the naira ( devaluation of the 
currency).**50
50 ** the government considered these 3 factors to be very critical and consequently, rejected the IMF conditions.
*** were pursued vigorous by the Nigerian authorities.
213
5.8.4 THE NEW SYSTEM OF EXCHANGE PRIOR TO THE FLOATATION
OF NAIRA
There are two main issues regarding exchange rates; first, the real exchange rate 
fluctuations and secondly, the effectiveness of nominal devaluations as policy tools 
(see also Williamson 1983b, Marston 1988 and Edwards 1989). The real exchange 
rates (RERS) became increasingly volatile, especially as Nigeria maintained a fixed 
nominal exchange rate regime after the collapse of the Bretton Woods System (refer 
to page section 5.6.4 on page 176 and section 6.1.2 to 6.1.5 pages 230 to 239).
A fundamental principle in the macroeconomics of an open economy is that, in order 
to have a sustainable macroeconomic equilibrium, monetary and fiscal policies must 
be consistent with the chosen nominal exchange rate regime. Therefore, the selection 
of an exchange rate system imposes certain limitations on macroeconomic policies. 
If these limitations are violated, the result will be severe economic disequilibrium 
which is usually reflected in the misalignment of the real exchange rate51.
Until 1978, the naira continued to be administratively managed while maintaining the 
broad policy stance of a strong naira. This was achieved by fixing the naira rate in 
terms of the major currencies, to reflect the relative strength of these currencies.
From February 1978 to the commencement of SFEM in 1986, the naira exchange rate 
was based on external factors such as:
[1] The perceived relative strengths of various currencies of Nigeria’s major 
trading partners;
[2] The economic indicators such as the level of reserves;
[3] The trend of the balance of payments position;
[4] The movement of the two intervention currencies;
[5] Arbitrage as well as the rates derived from Nigerian imports.
51Edwards, S. ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment in Developing Countries’. The World Bank Occasional paper no.2 
/  new series, 1988, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, p. 10, 1988.
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Between January and December 1980, the naira appreciated by about 2.9 percent 
against the dollar from $1.7841 to $1.8367 but depreciated by about 3 percent against 
the pound sterling from £0.8089 to £0.7850. Between January and June 1981, the naira 
was fixed at N1.00 = £0.7850 or £1.00 = N1.2739.
REASON FOR FLOATING
Given the severe balance of payments difficulties reflected in sizable external 
payments arrears, a move from the fixed exchange rate system became necessary. 
The IMF encourage the government to float with a view of providing technical 
assistance. The fund’s stance for this view was because of the protracted balance of 
payments problems that included arrears. However, after a series of discussions with 
the IMF, as well as the continued existence of arrears to the Fund which precluded 
discussions on the use of Fund resources, the floating system was not implemented52.
Nigeria then adopted a unified floating arrangements. This is because of the desire to 
bring into the open sector a large illegal or unofficial market in which the local 
currency was substantially depreciated, coupled with smuggled goods and capital flight 
associated with that market. The initial depreciation when floating began and 
subsequent movements to maintain continuously a realistic exchange rate were seen 
as major factors in encouraging market participants to repatriate earnings.
In Nigeria, just as in Sierra Leone, and Zambia, the primary factors leading to 
adoption of the foreign exchange market arrangements were a perception that the 
previous administrative system for allocating foreign exchange had broken down and 
that the system would lead to a more efficient allocation, including more effective 
provision of foreign exchange for critical spare parts.
The other essential reason was the desire on the part of the authorities to shed political 
responsibility for the adjustment of the exchange rate. Discrete adjustments to a 
managed or fixed exchange rate usually involved unpopular political connotations.
52P.J. Quirk, et al; 1987, ‘Floating Exchange Rates in IDeveloping Countries experience with Auction and Inter­
bank Markets', IMF, Washington D.C, Occasional Paper no.53, pp.3 - 18 May 1987.
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With the rate determined in the open market, the authorities were better able to deflect 
political criticism and focus their attention on other areas of economic management.
FLOATING MARKET ARRANGEMENT
Under Floating Exchange Rates the authorities are faced with essentially two forms 
of market arrangements. The first is to opt for a market that is operated within the 
private sector by commercial banks and licensed foreign exchange dealers. The second 
is to use an auction system to ensure a sufficiently competitive market.
In an auction market, the central bank conducts the market and serves as the channel 
for auction process. Nigeria instituted a composite of both options, as an auction is 
used by the authorities to price and distribute foreign exchange receipts from oil to an 
inter-bank market.
INTER BANK SYSTEM
Under this system in Nigeria, the exchange rate is determined in negotiations between 
banks and their clients and in transactions between the banks. The exchange rate is 
free to vary from hour to hour and day to day. To ensure the competitive operation 
of the market, in all instances there are maximum or minimum limits imposed on 
commercial bank holdings of foreign exchange.
The purpose of such regulations is twofold:
[1] To prevent major dealers from cornering the market or from using inside 
information to speculate on their foreign exchange operations;
[2] To prevent imprudently large exposure of banks to exchange risk.
Such limits on stocks was important particularly in the initial stages of the market 
when a minimum volume of trading is necessary to establish confidence. The size of 
the limits are established initially by reference to the previous behaviour of the 
commercial bank’s working balances and then adjusted in the light of experience with 
the market. Such limits are also seen as assisting the responsibility of the central bank 
for managing accumulation of international reserves from the low initial levels
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generally prevailing.
A second type of regulation on the market involved an upper limit on the volume of 
foreign exchange surrendered to each commercial bank, to prevent any bank from 
cornering the market in a flow sense. There are official requirements for surrender of 
exchange to the official market. In Nigeria, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone, all 
receipts from exports of goods and services are required to be surrendered to 
commercial banks. All oil receipts in Nigeria are surrendered to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria.
Demand for foreign exchange by the public sector, including public enterprises, is met 
at the prevailing exchange rates either through the commercial banks or through the 
central bank. In Nigeria, the Central Bank acts as an agent when it is requested by the 
government to purchase on its behalf foreign exchange from commercial banks or at 
the auction market. An important question in setting up a competitive market is the 
degree of freedom of access to the market. Nigeria has a large number of commercial 
banks and other licensed dealers. Thus, the easier are entry requirements into the 
market, the more competitive and stable it will be.
THE AUCTION MARKETS
The role of the authorities in an auction system is a more central one than in an inter­
bank market. The central bank decides the amount of exchange to be auctioned and 
the minimum reserve price below which it will not accept bids for example, 
US$50,000. The minimum amount of the sales may be predetermined as part of a 
macroeconomic program. Where licensing requirements are retained, all bidders with 
a valid with a valid imports license are required to lodge an advance deposit, either 
partial or equivalent to 100 percent of the foreign exchange they intend to purchase, 
before the submission of bids.
The bids submitted to the auction are then examined and all bids in excess of the 
highest bid which fully exhausts the available supply of foreign exchange, that is the 
market clearing price, are accepted provided they exceed any reserve price established
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by the central bank.
Table 5.7.1
Independently Floatim Unitary Exchange Rate Arrangements in Nigeria: 
Summary Characteristics 1988
number of commercial banks 41
Form of Arrangement Inter-bank (Auction for Oil Receipts)
Regulation of Commercial Bank’s 
Position
Net Foreign Position, both Spot and 
Forward
Rate Determination Negotiable between dealers and their 
clients; marginal price for successful 
bidders at auction
Role of Central Bank of Nigeria 
Intervention
None in Inter-bank System; Possible 
by adjusting amount of foreign 
exchange supplied to the auction
Foreign Exchange Surrender 
Requirements
100 percent of all receipts to 
commercial banks
Forward Exchange Market: 
Development and Plans
Organised Market exists but very few 
transactions
Source: The "International Monetary bund (IMF).
The market-clearing marginal rate becomes the market exchange rate. After the 
auction, the market exchange rate, the total number of bids received and the number 
of successful bidders are announced. The auction-determined exchange rate applies 
until the next auction date to all exchange transactions, including surrenders for the 
next auction and any transactions that may not be required to be channelled through 
the auction market, except in Nigeria’s composite auction / inter-bank arrangements, 
under which the inter-bank market exchange rate immediately supersedes the auction 
rate, for all purposes other than customs valuation.
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Advance deposits lodged by unsuccessful or partly successful bidders are returned in 
whole or in part, respectively, but bids are not normally allowed to be withdrawn.
The main difference between inter-bank and auction system arrangements are the 
treatment of the supply of foreign exchange to the market and the frequency or 
continuity of adjustment of the rate. The auction market arrangement requires the 
surrender of foreign exchange to a central unit ie; central bank. In contrast, in an inter­
bank arrangement the ownership of foreign exchange may remain diffused in the 
private sector. The Nigerian auctions took place weekly.
On the demand side of the market, authorised Nigerian foreign exchange dealers are 
free to participate in the auction for a portion of foreign exchange receipts. Without 
provision of documentation regarding end-use of exchange; for the purpose of capital 
controls they act as agents of the government in their sales in the inter-bank market.
Another aspect of auctions is the choice of arrangements for determination of the 
exchange rate between a "Dutch Auction" and a "Marginal Pricing" approach. Under 
the Dutch auction system, each bidder whose bid is accepted must pay his bid price 
for foreign exchange. The adverse effect of this system is that participants may pay 
a price higher than the market clearing price if they assess demand conditions in the 
market incorrectly but their bid is successful.
Nigeria operated marginal price auctions. Under the marginal price system, a single 
rate, the most appreciated bid price at which the available foreign exchange is 
exhausted, which is the market clearing price, is applied to all successful bidders. 
Bidders who have offered rates more depreciated than the market - clearing rate will 
receive all the foreign exchange they bid for at the clearing rate. Those who have 
offered a rate more appreciated than the clearing rate will not receive foreign 
exchange. Those who have offered the marginal rate will receive only part of what 
they have bid for, on the basis of an allocation rule.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHOICE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FLOATING 
ARRANGEMENTS
The main objective of auction and inter-bank market systems is to establish an 
exchange rate that will move flexibly to equilibrate the supply of and demand for 
foreign and thus to reduce dependence on exchange and trade restrictions. The choice 
between the two forms of arrangement must take into account the institutional and 
economic structure of the country.
With sufficient number of capable commercial banks or pre-existence of network of 
operators dealing in the parallel market, the inter-bank arrangement is likely to be the 
more efficient, and will require less resources at an official level to ensure its success. 
As for the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in floating arrangements, the 
need for exchange rate flexibility has been an important element in the design of 
member’s financial programs supported by the use of fund resources, see table below. 
Table 5.7.2 Independently Floating Exchange Rate Arrangements in Nigeria, 
Including Elements of in Fund-Supported Economic Programs, January 1983 - 
December 1986.
Date of Date of 
Program Adoption of
Independent Float
Floating Arrangements Linked 
To Program
Performance Other 
CriteriaDecember 1986 September 1986
Yes1 Yes1
Prior Use of Official Multiple 
Exchange Rate System (Introduced as 
Part of Program)2
Yes (Yes)
Length of Time Multiple Rates 
Maintained
Unified 1987
Source: IMF. [T] Program was tentative at time ot introduction; [2J The reference 
here is to a dual exchange market other than illegal parallel market which was present 
in most cases at the time of institution of the floating rates.
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Between the period January 1983 to December 1986, most programs included 
elements to ensure greater flexibility in exchange rate policy, either by managing the 
rate or by permitting it to adjust in response to market forces.
The dual exchange rate system, Known as the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market 
(SFEM) was introduced with the first weekly bidding commencing on September 29, 
1986; that is two months after the adoption of SAP by the authorities. The First-Tier 
Rate is the Government determined exchange rate of the naira against other foreign 
currencies, whereas the Second-Tier Rate is the market determined rate.
THE SECOND-TIER FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET (SFEM)
The Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) is a strategy designed by the 
Federal Military Government to prepare the economy in readiness for structural reform 
(S.O. Ogundipe, SFEM in Nigeria, 1986.p.l). It is a nation-wide market established 
for buying and selling foreign exchange through Authorised Dealers at Market 
Determined Rates (MDRs).
The. rationale for setting up the SFEM is based on the need to adjust the naira to a 
realistic market determined rate rather than the fixed adjustable Peg System of 
exchange rates. The Peg System was seen as encouraging indiscriminate importation 
of goods which the country’s foreign exchange earnings could not afford.
The highest powers are reserved for the Finance Minister; who then delegates the 
function of supervising the market to the Central Bank of Nigeria. Before the 
Commercial and Merchant banks can operate in the market, they are required to obtain 
‘Authorised Dealership Licence’ either from the Minister of Finance or from the 
Central Bank of Nigeria.
The Nigerian Exchange Control Act of 1962 as amended by the SFEM Decree of 
1986, Section 5(1) stipulates that ‘The Minister of Finance appoints Commercial and 
Merchant Banks to Act as Authorised Dealers’.
The' authorised dealers are required to carry out their appointed duties in accordance 
with instructions and directions as are issued by the Central Bank.
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Given the seriousness of Nigeria’s disequilibrium in the balance of payments position, 
radical solution was necessary. Central to the IMF/World Bank initiated SAP was the 
policy to allow the market forces of demand and supply to determine the rate at which 
the naira is exchanged against other foreign currencies therefore leading to the 
determination of a ‘realistic value’ of the naira and ensuring a more optimal use and 
allocation of foreign exchange to the various sectors of the economy than could be 
achieved through the import licensing policy53.
A major policy recommendation by the National Economic Council (NEC), ‘Expert
Report on the State of the Economy’, February 1983, was the need to restructure the
economic base and systems for the correction of external imbalance, domestic inflation
and unemployment.
"In view of the proponents of the free-market in Nigeria, 
the root of the Nigerian economic crisis and the 
increasing decline witnessed since it started can be 
attributed to the state controls and interventionism. The 
best option would be to roll back the frontiers of the 
state54".
Thus, the state entered into negotiations with the IMF for a supporting loan to finance 
current imports, capital and interest payments on short and medium term loans. At the 
same time a belt - tightening policy (through fiscal and monetary measures) was 
adopted to check the external imbalance, internal and external indebtedness, and the 
problems of depression/staginflation (Attah et al 1987,p.2).
In July 1987, the two tiers were merged to form the Foreign Exchange Market (FEM). 
In effect, it was the First-Tier that was abolished leaving the Second-Tier Market as 
the foreign exchange market for the country. Under the new system, foreign exchange 
was auctioned weekly and later bi - weekly through the banking system. The market 
based second tier foreign exchange market led to the devaluation of the naira by 179 
per cent against the dollar during the second half of 1986.
53 J. Attah; M, Kwanashie, O. Ojowu; The Nigerian economy under (STEM : The economics of foreign exchange 
market in a developing economy, 1987,p.3.
54 Adebayo Olukoshi, The performance of Nigerian industry under the SAP: a critical assessment, in the book 
Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy, 1991,p.94.
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The two changes had an immediate effect on the economy. The effects included 
raising significantly the prices of and reducing the rents on imported goods. The 
removal of import license restriction allowed industries to import raw materials and 
spare parts more freely than in previous years. It also led to an increase in incentive 
to export.
At the first stage of the reform, the tariff and excise tax rate schedules were revised 
and the resulting interim tariff introduced in October 1986. The tariff rates were set 
according to government guidelines. The resulting interim tariff rates ranged between 
0 and 100 percent, with 91 percent of the rates falling between 10 and 30 percent 
threshold. This implies a reduction in the trade weighted average tariff from 34.7 
percent to 25.9 percent and a further reduction in the variation of rates. The average 
tax rates for goods subject to excise fell by 60 percent from 9.8 to 5.9 percent.
James Robertson (1992) analysis of the structure of incentives argued that the 
depreciation of the exchange rate and reductions in excise tax rates served to increase 
protection levels, while the reductions in the variation and levels of tariff rates worked 
in the opposite direction.
Estimation of the effects of tariffs, excise rates and exchange rate changes on the 
structure of effective protection was not possible given the considerable changes the 
economy was under going, plus non - existence of any meaningful data before the 
reforms.
Robertson and Cleron (1987), developed a model to stimulate the impact that policy 
changes had on the price distortions and the resulting structures of incentives.
The results are shown on table 5.8 below:
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Table 5.8
PRE AND POST REFORM (INDICATIVE) RATES OF EFFECTIVE 
PROTECTION IN NIGERIA (PERCENTAGES)
Industrial Sectors 1986 (NET) 1987
Consumer Goods 24.5 (-37.7) 19.5
Intermediate & Capital Goods 12.4 (-43.8) 7.4
Average 19.2 (-40.4) 14.2
In their estimation for manufacturing activities, they concentrated on the effects on 
incentives of changes in the exchange rate, import restrictions, tariffs and excise tax 
rates. Their firm level input coefficients were obtained from the 1984 industrial census 
returns. The indicative and net effective rates of protection was based on the Pre-SAP 
(1986) and the interim (ie, February 1987, the post interim tariff) policies covering 
one hundred firms in forty one industrial activities at firm level were later aggregated.
Table 5.8 indicated the distortions between the production of final goods and inputs 
which were high and may have possibly increased. The result means that the level of 
effective protection declined from the level that prevailed during the past fifteen years.
INSTRUMENTS EMPLOYED IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 
EXCHANGE CONTROLS.
Before the Exchange Control Act of 1962, Nigeria as a British colony applied the 
Exchange Control Ordinance of 1950. Under the Ordinance residents of Nigeria were 
free to earn and invest their foreign exchange in the United Kingdom because the 
Nigerian pound was convertible to the British pound (ie; the market was practically 
free).
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Nigeria gained independence in 1960. As a sovereign state, a new exchange control 
act was promulgated in 1962 with the following objectives:
[1] To maximise foreign exchange receipt;
[2] To ensure favourable balance of payments position;
[3] To stabilise the external value of the naira;
[4] To ensure that allocation of foreign exchange resources is in line with the
valuation nation’s objectives;
[5] Application of exchange controls to enhance confidence in the external 
payments system55.
An approved form ‘M ’ serves as an authority for opening a letter of credit. In addition 
to this, a scheme for Mandatory Pre-shipment Inspection of all imports not so 
exempted either on the basis of value or type was introduced. At the end of the 
inspection exercise, inspection agent (SGS) issues a Clean Report of Findings. If the 
inspection revealed discrepancies in relation to quantity, quality and price, a Non- 
Negotiable Clean Report of Findings will be issued56.
5.8.5 THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF S(FEM)
As already mentioned earlier, the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market S(FEM) 
constituted to the devaluation of the naira. The inelasticity of Nigeria’s demand for 
imports due to the high import content of the domestic production processes implies 
a commitment of higher amount of the nation’s foreign exchange resources to almost 
an unchanging quantity of imports. The inflationary impact of S(FEM) policy thus had 
serious ramifications on the welfare and development of the general public. The 
general price increase attendant to the implementation of this policy led to a reduction 
of the real value of wages and salaries, hence causing welfare loss to workers and the
55With the application of Exchange Control as a monetary tool, application for purchase of foreign currencies had 
to be supported with satisfactory documentations. The foreign exchange market became no longer free. For example, 
the introduction of form ‘M ’ in 1979 in respect of all visible imports, irrespective of their value and type.
56 G. Ovwielefuoma (1988), ‘The Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market and Finance of International Trade’, Mike- 
Win Publishers Nigeria Limited, Lagos, p. 15, 1988.
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aggregate effective demand to fall resulting in reduced investment, real output and 
employment.
The.combined effects of the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market S(FEM) on imports 
and exports appeared to have worsened the problem of external imbalance than 
assisting to solve it in the short run. In the long run, the policy is likely to have a 
positive impact on the development of the economy. As a result of the high cost of 
imported inputs, producers are forced to search for local raw materials and develop 
new products as well as new methods of production requiring the use of local inputs. 
Attah et al 1987 expressed the view that, to achieve the long term objectives would 
require the adoption of the appropriate strategies necessary for attaining local 
technological know - how.
Therefore, it may be necessary to reduce the degree of openness of the economy in 
the short run. The effect of this will be, a reduction in the economy’s dependence on 
external raw materials, technology and capital, leading to an improvement in the 
external balance. Therefore, the objective of the dual exchange rate is to eliminate the 
repressive system of import licensing approach to the allocation of foreign exchange 
which was characterised by fraudulent and corrupt practices that the procurement of 
foreign exchange became dependent on whom one knows, rather than on the forces 
of demand and supply. The new system allowed the market forces to determine the 
rate and the sectoral allocation of foreign exchange.
5.8.6 A CRITIQUE OF THE SECOND-TIER FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
MARKET S(FEM)
Kwanashie (1978)57 raised a number of questions designed to investigate the 
capability of the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market S(FEM) policy to bring about 
the desirable structural adjustment that will put the economy onto the path of recovery. 
He concluded from the ensuing analysis that this single policy is incapable of lending 
to the desired fundamental changes necessary to meet the expectations.
57 M.Kwanashie , In the paper SFEM: prospects for Nigeria’s economic recovery.
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The devaluation of the naira implicit in the SFEM policy lies between 200 and 300 
percent. The agricultural sector small and medium scale industries which formed the 
bulk of the economic activities in Nigeria was unable to accommodate the sudden and 
unregulated increases in the cost of production. Attah (1987) argued that the good 
intentions of the government as stipulated in the 1987 budget to bail the economy out 
of disequilibrium may not be realised. The efforts of stimulating the economy is thus 
seen to be in direct conflict with the operation of the S(FEM) policy.
The authorities in an attempt to achieve the goals, introduced the Second-tier Foreign 
Exchange Market S(FEM) and later to the Inter Bank Foreign Exchange Market 
(IFEM) and shortly before the floatation of the currency, the authorities changed to 
Foreign Exchange Market (FEM) for the weekly auctioning of the naira. The last 
change was followed by a devaluation of naira by 40 percent. Import licensing, 
Current Exchange Transactions, and some Capital Transactions were effectively 
abolished.
Trade was liberalised through the removal of controls on investments, the review of 
the indigenisation programme and the industrial policy. The government then 
embarked on the promotion of ‘export - all - exportable’ policy in the drive for 
foreign exchange earnings as well pursuing vigorously policies of commercialisation 
of state owned enterprises, privatisation and Debt Equity Swap.
A ban on importation of maize, rice, wheat and malt was imposed in an attempt to 
encourage local production and the use of substitutes. Interest rates were deregulated, 
monetary and fiscal policies were tightened, allocation to social services were reduced 
and subsidies removed or drastically curtailed. Most of these implementations were 
an attempt to satisfy the World Bank and the IMF, the Credit Clubs in Europe and 
Some Western Governments, of the country’s total commitment to economic recovery.
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5.8.7 ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS
Some progress has obviously been made by Nigeria since the inception of the 
structural adjustment programme, especially in addressing a number of the 
key economic issues and the repressive financial policies pursued by the authorities 
throughout the 1970s and part of the 1980 which to a large extent appear to have 
undermined efficient economic growth. The overvalued exchange rate was probably 
the most significant distortion affecting trade during the late 1970s and 1980s. The 
reform has began to reduce the anti export bias inherent in Nigeria’s trade policies.
Agricultural export has started to respond as well as limited developments in the 
exports of manufactured goods (see World Bank 1987d). Some types of production 
for domestic consumption has also increased in response to the changing internal 
terms of trade despite the fall in aggregate demand.
Critically, the ‘official’ usually unreliable data showed that little has been achieved.
This view is supported by the United Bank for Africa’s (UBA) report58:
"As part of the manipulation of data to create the impression that the economy 
was being diversified, the CBN in April 1990 re-classified the exports of 
petroleum products as non - oil exports as against the traditional practice. 
Therefore, the first quarter of 1989 (January - April) only $150 million was 
realised from non oil exports, while in the first quarter of 1990 when 
agricultural exports actually declined the reclassification increased the figures 
to $546,413 million, that is an increase of over 200 percent".
The devaluation of the naira has been blamed for the massive decline of domestic
businesses, especially those in small scale businesses who can not obtain or are
severely restricted access to bank loans due to high floating interest rates and unable
to compete with companies cushioned by huge foreign exchange accounts. The policy
of auctioning the naira weekly increase the cost of importing raw materials thus,
encouraging the ever-increasing factory rate prices of finished products (Julius
Ihonvbere,1990,p,24). The removal of petroleum subsidy led to a rise in transport fares
and food prices simultaneously and as such led to riots in Lagos and in some other
major cities in 1991 and 1992.
58 UBA’s Monthly Business and Economic Digest Vol.l3(6) (June) 1990, p.3.
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The other argument against SAP is that it seems to have worsened the Nigerian 
balance of payments position and the terms of trade. This is given the fact that more 
is being paid for imported inputs than is received for exports. The much expected 
inflow of foreign participation has not really materialised. Only multilateral and 
bilateral assistance has trickled into the country while private investment is yet to 
materialise.
The deregulation of the banking system in the country has aided to the high interest 
rates and generally high cost of capital, which in turn stagnates economic growth. 
According to Pita O. Agbese59 1989, factory capacity utilisation in many industries 
is less than 10 percent. Millions of workers have been retrenched or are unable to find 
employment. However, Nigeria has only just began full liberalisation. On the country’s 
past partial reforms, the tools for its assessment are limited and therefore, the 
expressed views must remain to some extent conjectural.
The process of implementing the Structural Adjustment Programme contributed 
substantially to these problems. Lessons can be learned from the Nigeria experience 
that would be of use to other countries embarking on similar efforts. As observed by 
Robertson, (1992):
"One of the major factors underlying the failure of economically efficient trade 
policies was the absence of clearly stated objectives and a well defined 
guidelines for those responsible with the implementation of these policies".
The other major concern relates to the speed and method of liberalising trade
restrictions. According to Krueger (1986):
"Rapid removal of all controls may be the least painful way of proceeding. 
New signals in place will prevent resource misallocation in response to altered 
signals before the transition is completed. Instantaneous adjustment may 
prevent political opposition from diluting it. Therefore, an immediate 
transformation of the economic environment may reduce the uncertainties".
This seems to be relevant in view of Nigeria’s experience with the attempted phase
introduction of policy changes and moreover the eminent transition to civilian regime
and the inhibiting effects of uncertainty over the sustainibility of the programme.
59 Pita O. Agbese, State, Media and the Imperatives of Repression: an analysis of the ban on Newswatch ; 
International Third World Studies Journal and Review, Vol.2, 1989, p.328.
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The fact is, there is little prospect that the domestic producers would be able or more 
motivated to make the necessary adjustments if removal were delayed. Delays would 
only lead to additional costs without the corresponding benefits.
Robertson’s view also seems to advocate for an immediate implementation of a 
relatively low and uniform tariff rate structure and the removal of most import 
prohibitions. The other feature of Structural Adjustment is derived from the belief that 
the economy has been over-regulated; consequently, the reform aim’s at simplifying 
the complex administrative controls while placing greater reliance on market forces60.
60 Kayode, The Role of the Finance Industry, 1987, p. 13.
230
5.9 THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
ECONOMY
The unexpected growth in oil earnings in the mid 1970s was not fully internalised into 
the economic system61; hence the consumption - production pattern became largely 
import-oriented. A growing debt burden also surfaced in the early 1980s as a result 
of loans contracted from the international capital market. External debt outstanding 
went up from $593.6 million in 1976 to $18.6 billion in 1986 and to $30 billion in 
1990.
The repressive policies pursued by the authorities included:
An overvalued exchange rate policy, low interest rate on deposits, heavy public sector 
spending, relegation of the agricultural sector to the background, plus the debt burden 
combined to create distortions in the production, consumption and payments patterns. 
The precipitous decline in oil earnings in the 1980s necessitated a policy re-direction 
aimed at re-aligning the domestic production pattern with the local resource base.
As outlined in section 5.5 of this chapter, the major features of SAP included the re­
alignment of the naira exchange rate to reflect market forces, trade liberalization, 
privatisation and commercialisation of state owned enterprises, the promotion of 
locally source raw materials and de - regulation of the economy. The banking system 
formed an integral part of the on-going structural reforms and has played a leading 
role in the management of policy making. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) played 
an active role in the management of the economy through its traditional and 
development functions.
5.9.1 TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL BANK
First is the issue, safe custody of stocks and distribution of currency. Economic 
transactions in the Nigerian economy is still largely cash - oriented. The value of 
currency in circulation as at end of December 1990 was 16.3 billion naira, an increase
61 See also the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP): features, dimensions and some assessment by Prof. 
M.O.Kayode, in the book - The role of the finance industry in the successful implementation of the SAP; Papers and 
Proceedings of the 1987 Bank Directors Seminar, [June 9 - 10, 1987, p. 10].
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of 29 percent over its level in December 1989.
Second is the role of banker to other banks. This enables it to promote confidence in 
the system. It’s supervisory activities include the monitoring of monthly and quarterly 
performances of the commercial and merchant banks.
It undertakes ad-hoc and on the spot examination of the statement of accounts of the 
banks. Thus facilitating effective monitoring to assess quality of loans, fraud, 
compliance with monetary policy guidelines and the pursuit of prudent banking 
practices. The CBN also consolidates public sector accounts especially since the 
directive of May 1989 "that all Government accounts be maintained with the CBN".
Third, the promotion of monetary stability . This function is performed through the 
regulation of money supply and the control of other monetary aggregates. For 
example, when inflation in 1988 reached 38.3 percent, the CBN adopted monetary 
policy measures to moderate the rate of inflation. A slower growth in the stock of 
narrow money Mx was induced62. Mx increased by 30.8 percent over the level at the 
end of 1988. This represented a substantial deceleration from growth rate of 43.6 
percent recorded in 1988. Both and M2 (the broader money) rose by 40.7 and 34.8 
percent respectively (N30.6bn and N27.7bn) at the end of 1990.
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) attributed to the substantial increase as a result 
of the monetisation of governments foreign exchange earnings and the rise in 
aggregate banking system credit. The other measure taken by the CBN in August 1990 
was the introduction of Stabilisation Securities to mop up excess liquidity in the 
system. To carry out these functions the CBN used the instruments of monetary policy 
such as direct controls of credit, variable discount rate, special deposit and stabilisation 
securities, reserve requirements and moral suasion.
62 Definition of M(: Notes and coins in circulation with the public plus naira current accounts held by the private 
sector less transit items (ie public sector and external sector holdings).
M2 is a broader definition. This included M, but with the addition of private sector naira deposit accounts with the 
deposit banks and the discount houses.
(Applied Economics in Banking and Finance, H. Carter and I. Partington, 1982,pp.30-31, Oxford University Press 
UK).
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Fourth, direct control of credit. The imposition of credit ceilings had been used by the 
CBN as a major policy tool to promote economic stability. This ensures that the 
growth in money supply is restricted to the amount perceived to be needed to support 
a reasonable growth rate without over extending the economy. As a measure to induce 
adequate growth rate in the non-oil sector in line with the objectives of the reform, 
the CBN under the 1991 Guidelines to Banks, directed the Commercial and Merchant 
Banks to accord priority to agricultural and industrial sectors ( see table 5.9 below).
Table 5.9
SECTORIAL ALLOCATIONS OF CREDIT ( % )
SECTOR COMMERCIAL BANKS MERCHANT BANKS
A. High Priority Sectors 50.0 50.0
i Agricultural Production 15.0 10.0
ii Manufacturing 35.0 40.0
B. Others 50.0 50.0
Total A + B 
--------------------------
100.0 100.0
Source: CBN Bullion April/June 1991.
The structure of the Nigerian economy as an influential factor in the process of 
monetary management can be viewed from three perceptive:
[1] The underlying ideology which is ‘Mixed Economy’;
[2] Sectoral shares in economic activities; and
[3] Level of economic development.
Nigeria has never explicitly declared its ideological leaning except in the 1979 Federal 
Constitution in which the Mixed Economy is implicitly stated - Section 16, 1(a), (b), 
(c)63. The prolonged use of direct control and credit ceiling created distortions 
leading the CBN to state in the 1991 Monetary Guidelines that the Monetary Policy
63 See Ndekwu , Monetary Development and Management in Nigeria; 1990, pp. 174 - 175.
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will shift towards Market - Oriented Approach in line with the structural adjustment 
programme. The three main instruments of the Indirect Monetary Management 
Approach are :
[1] Cash Reserve Requirements;
[2] Liquidity Ratio ;and
[3] Open Market Operations (OMO).
The CBN also used selective credit control to focus bank’s attention to the priority 
sectors of the economy, which includes the agricultural and manufacturing enterprises 
(See table 5.9) rural borrowers, indigenous businesses and small and medium scale 
enterprises (SMEs).
5.9.1[1] INTEREST RATE POLICY
Interest rate in Nigeria was severely repressed through intensive control and regulation 
until 1986 when SAP was introduced. The rates were gradually deregulated from 1986 
and decontrolled from August 1987. It is now left almost entirely to market forces. In 
response to the high inflation rate in 1989 the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) was 
revised upwards from 13.25 to 18.50 percent. As the inflation rate declined, the rates 
charged by the banks remained sticky downwards making it very difficult for 
manufacturers to borrow from the banking sector. In January 1991 the MRR was cut 
to 15.5 percent to enable the banks lower the interest rates charged to their cost of 
funds (Banks Lending Rate = Maximum of 21% p/a). The Central Bank of Nigeria 
objective was to ensure positive returns on savings, promote industrial expansion and 
encourage competition among the banks.
5.9.2 DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS OF THE CBN
Unlike most central banks, the CBN is totally relied upon for the introduction and 
implementation of fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria. Success or failure of any 
financial policy lies solely on the bank. The bank plays a dominant role in other areas 
of economic development such as; promotion of agricultural activities through 
agricultural finance, industrial development, development of financial market, rural 
banking, export finance and management of external reserves.
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5.9.3 PROMOTION OF A COHERENT FINANCIAL SYSTEM
With the introduction of the structural adjustment programme and the consequent 
deregulation of the financial system, the number of banks and other financial 
institutions grew rapidly. Therefore, to ensure that the expanded financial system is 
sound and to curtail the incidence of illiquidity and capital erosion in banks, increased 
enforcement of prudential standards in line with what is practised in developed 
financial markets became essential. In 1990 the risk-weigh ted approach to capital 
adequacy was introduced. Guidelines on provision for loan losses and asset 
classification was also introduced.
(i) CAPITAL ADEQUACY
It is essential that the commercial and merchant banks have sufficient capital to absorb 
unusual losses (bad debts). Therefore, the CBN’s prudential requirement for banks to 
maintain adequate capital to assets ratio imposed a discipline on bank’s lending 
activities.
Note: The guidelines are set in compliance with the recommendations 
of the Basle Committee of the Bank For International Settlement (BIS), 
which set out common standard of measurement of capital adequacy by 
all member countries.
The Central Bank of Nigeria circular BSD/FE/48/Vol.6/303, 30th March 1990; issued 
a directive that all licensed bank’s Chief Executives must comply with the following:
[1] A maintenance of a minimum of 7.25 percent of risk weighted assets as capital.
[2] At least 50 percent of the total components of capital of all banks should be made 
up of CORE or TIER CAPITAL (that is paid up capital plus reserves and retained 
earnings less intangible assets and published losses).
[3] The ratio of capital to total risk - weighted assets should be at least 8 percent with 
effect from 1st January 1992.
(ii) ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND PROVISION
Banks are expected to suspend interest on non-performing loans and to write off 
uncollectible assets after a specified period of time. This ensures prudence of financial 
monitoring and compliance with the monetary policy regulations. The most important
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role of the commercial and merchant banks is intermediation in the savings and 
investment process. Table 5.10 below shows the aggregate credit to the economy in 
the period 1980 to 1990. The aggregate credit to the economy increased steadily over 
the years from 10.7 billion naira in 1980 to 49.2 billion naira in 1989 and 66.0 billion 
at the end of 1990. Commercial Banks credit to the Government and the Private sector 
totalled 3.0 and 22.3 billion naira respectively at the end of 1989. The Merchant 
Banks credit to the Government and the Private sector amounted to 90.7 and 7.1 
billion naira, respectively at the end of 1989. Table 5.10
AGGREGATE CREDIT TO THE ECONOMY FOR THE PERIOD 1980 TO 
1984 (MILLION NAIRA)
TOTAL
CREDIT
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Economy 10787.5 16268.5 21906.8 28128.1 33879.4
Govt 3596.6 6614.3 10535.3 15828.2 19094.9
CBN 956.8 4580.9 7557.0 10528.2 9409.2
Com Bank 2632.4 2026.3 2971.2 5296.3 8719.3
Merchant - - - - 895.4
FSB 7.4 7.1 7.1 3.7 -
PRIVATE
SECTOR 7190.9 9654.2 11371.5 12353.9 14784.5
CBN 756.4 910.4 918.0 1062.8 1302.2
Com Bank 6434.5 8743.8 10453.5 11291.1 11639.8
Merchant - - - - 1842.5
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TABLE 5.10(1) AGGREGATE CREDIT TO THE ECONOMY FROM 1985 TO
1990 (Naira in Millions)
TOTAL
CREDIT
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Economy 35301.8 39314.1 46926.4 57326.3 49259.1 66011
Govt 19623.5 18907.3 21450.3 27552.7 18316.3 29380
CBN 8841.8 14293.5 14293.5 21767.2 15189.8 22028
Comm.
Banks 9614.4 6866.3 6866.3 5728.9 3035.8 7037
Merch. 1167.3 290.5 290.5 56.6 90.7 315.5
Priv.
Sector 15678.3 25476.1 25476.1 29773.6 30942.8 36631
CBN 1423.6 1917.3 1917.3 2418.5 1502.2 1400.1
Comm
Banks 12276.6 17899.7 17899.7 20828.9 22325.8 26365
Merch
Banks 1978.1 5659.1 5659.1 6526.2 7114.8 8866.4
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
Keys: Comm -indicates Commercial Banks
Merch For Merchant Banks 
FSB is Federal Savings Bank 
Note: The total credit to the Economy is Net.
Many of the banks participated in some of the special programme schemes such as the 
National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND), The African Development 
Bank Export Stimulation Loan Scheme (ESL) and the Small - Scale Loan Scheme. 
Additional loanable funds were made available to the banks through the special 
schemes for the purpose of promoting industrial development.
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5.9.4 SUMMARY
The various Nigerian National development plans attempted to provide a structured 
programmes and objectives toward achieving long term economic growth.
The Nigerian economy was significantly transformed from one dependent on 
agriculture to one heavily dependent on oil. Hence the systematic decline in the 
growth of agricultural production.
Industrial growth also slowed down significantly throughout the 1980s. Production in 
the manufacturing sub-sector was constrained by the shortage of industrial inputs as 
a result of the foreign exchange problems. The industrial policy of the immediate post 
independence was that of import substitution. This was supported by a number of 
limited fiscal policies.
Financing for development was mainly from the oil industry, that is financing directly 
the government’s expenditures. The financial system catered for the private sector 
under repressive terms. The effect of this was that commercial banks hardly ever 
finance industrial activities, therefore the government was obliged to establish the 
specialised banks.
On the political economy front, Nigeria’s historical experience as demonstrated by 
Ihonvbere (1990) meant that, the institutions, forces and factors of politics, production 
and exchange were severely deformed and disarticulated to a point where they lacked 
the internal and relatively autonomous stimulus for growth, development and 
accumulation.
The problem of inefficiency, corruption, decadence and confusion among the Nigerian 
bourgeoisie and the institutions of the state have militated against the development of 
a clear and sustainable ideological position, the promotion of industrialisation and 
rational accumulation. Hence the need for a structural adjustment. In July 1986, the 
government in pursuit of its reform policy had to introduce a new economic measure 
under the supervision of IMF and World Bank.
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The initiation of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) by the IMF and World 
Bank during the 1980s was to assist the developing economies to reduce their balance 
of payments deficits. Therefore forcing a shift from state to market led policies with 
emphasis on pricing as the major instrument for organising the economy and reviving 
agricultural production through a combination of policies involving devaluation and 
reductions in state expenditure and subsidies.
A major criticism of the Fund and the bank is their over-emphasis on growth and 
reduction of balance of payments deficits and the neglect of social protection for the 
less well off in society. The Fund’s excessive concern about repayment of external 
debts, which brings into question the whole issue of adjustment, and or if a wider 
concept of development is needed to be incorporated into the analysis. The debt based 
definition of adjustment unfortunately failed to take into consideration the real concern 
of growth and equity which the proponents of international trade argued are the main 
cause of domestic instability.
As for the remedies to the repressive policies, it will include measures that will 
stimulate domestic investment, production and increase the supply of goods and 
services. Among the instruments that can be used are lower corporation tax, tax on 
dividends and removal of restriction on the amount of profits payable as dividends, 
capital allowance, removal of state practice of deficit financing and a stop to 
construction of uneconomic capital projects.
The need to adopt an appropriate exchange rate mechanism is vital. The usual short 
term policy response of restricting imports through exchange controls, higher tariffs 
and pre-imports deposits has failed to achieve the desired results. The choice of fixed 
and managed exchange rate policies resulted to gross macroeconomic mis­
management, hence the adoption of SFEM, and later the Floatation of the naira.
Developments on the Nigerian financial system concentrated on changes in structure, 
growth and the emerging challenges. This is reflected in the number of institutions 
participating in the system and the various impacts on employment, income and prices
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in the economy. Financial mobilisation is very closely linked with the savings 
problem. Financial intermediation through the banking system induces economic 
growth. This is by assuming that there are no government policies and legislation 
working towards distorting its growth - oriented effects. Therefore, government 
intervention in the organised domestic financial market through interest rate 
regulations among other factors hinders banks in their savings mobilisation role in the 
economy.
The economic history of the financial system in Nigeria sketches from the start of 
banking in Nigeria in the late 1890s to 1992. Providing an insight into the 
development of the medium of exchange in the country, currency constituents and the 
financial laws and decrees. The need for bank expansion in the country as well as the 
development of special and merchant banks, and the role of the banks in the 
management of the economy.
The chapter provides analysis of the Nigerian indigenisation programme. A process 
by which Nigerians are able to acquire ownership, control and management of key 
economic activities in the country formerly occupied by expatriates.
Finally, a thorough analysis of the economic development and policy outline, pre - 
structural adjustment trade policy and the implementation of the structural adjustment 
programme are provided.
Analysis of the economic liberalisation was provided in great depth, especially the 
exchange rate management policy.
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Chapter 6
LIBERALISATION OF FINANCIAL CONTROL.
MCKINNON’S ORDER OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION.
This chapter is a consolidation of the ideas and propositions expressed from chapter 
one to five of this study; whilst, at the same time reviews Mckinnon’s ‘Order of 
Economic Liberalisation: Financial Control in the Transition to a Market 
Economy’(1992). Mckinnon in the ‘Order of Economic Liberalisation’, concentrated 
mainly on developments in the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and Asia, since 
the introduction of Perestrokia; that is, Economic Restructuring in the former Soviet 
Union. The analysis focused essentially on securing financial control and 
macroeconomic stability and less on redefining property rights or on some crash 
program to rapidly privatise state - owned industrial assets and the banking system. 
The order of economic liberalisation did not take the place of the analytical framework 
laid out in Money and Capital (1973) which was reviewed in chapter 2.
The previous chapter looked into detail the various distortions operating in the 
Nigerian economy and the objectives giving rise to it. By the mid 1980s, short of any 
ideological underpinning or general economic rationale with regards to 
interventionism, most LDCs have lost confidence in the efficacy of their policies in 
terms of state ownership or control of the means of production in industry and 
agriculture.
Given the problem of external debt in LDCs, especially in Africa and Latin America, 
the advocacy for financial liberalisation has been called into question1. Diaz Alejandro 
analyzed why financial reforms carried out in several Latin American countries such 
as Chile, Argentina and Uruguay during the 1970s aimed at ending ‘financial 
repression’, as defined by Mckinnon (1973), and free the domestic capital market 
from usury laws and government induced distortions failed.
1 See Carlos Diaz-Alejandro; "Good - bye Financial Repression, Hello 
Financial Crash”, Journal of Development Economics, 19, 1985, pp. 1 - 24.
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argued that how fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies are sequenced are of 
critical importance and that governments cannot and perhaps should not, undertake all 
liberalising measures simultaneously.
The ‘optimal’ order of economic liberalisation may vary for different liberalising 
economies depending on their initial conditions (Mckinnon, 1992,p.4).
Mckinnon postulation is that before price inflation can be feasibly phased out, and 
before the capital market is opened for free borrowing and lending, governments must 
balance the central governments finances. Fiscal control should precede financial 
liberalisation as well as low tax rates for successful liberalising governments.
6.1 FINANCIAL REPRESSION AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF CAPITAL.
Definition:
Financial repression is the distortion of domestic capital market of an 
economy caused by the government.
Government distortions can be in the form of taxation, usury restrictions on interest 
rates and heavy reserve requirements on bank deposits. It causes uncertainty when 
inflation is high and unstable.
As hypothesized by Mckinnon and Shaw (1973), repressed monetary system fragments
the domestic capital market (see chapters 2 and 3), with regards to the quality and
quantity of real capital accumulation which includes:
"The flow of loanable funds, interest rates cut off of bank lending 
variations, the process of self - finance within firms and households, 
illiquidity of firms due to financial deepening outside the repressed 
banking system and inflows of foreign financial capital which may be 
unproductive due to distortions in the domestic capital markets and
unpredictability of foreign exchange rates2".
To overcome these fragmentation, Mckinnon and Shaw advocated for a positive and
uniformly high real rates of interest within comparable categories of bank deposits and
loans and removal of onerous reserve requirements, interest ceilings and mandated
allocations of cheap credit, thus encouraging domestic savers and investors.
2 Mckinnon, R. 1992, pp. 11 - 12.
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The Mckinnon-Shaw view was that by stabilising the domestic price level while 
keeping real interest rates "close to" market clearing levels, financial flows through 
the foreign exchange rates would be less volatile, with fewer fluctuations in the 
nominal and real exchange rate. There should be also a consideration on the 
acceptance that, flows of saving and investments should be voluntary and significantly 
decentralized in an open capital market at close to equilibrium interest rates (refer 
back to chapter 5, section 5.6, on the discussion of exchange rate in Nigeria).
Mckinnon (1992), now postulates that "the optimal order of liberalisation may require 
major fiscal reforms such as increases in tax revenues and cuts in government 
expenditures, before the inflation tax and other repressive financial policies may be 
safely phased out. He argued that countries that have sustained higher real rates of 
interest and more stable prices have generally had better financial growth by using 
ratios on private holdings of "broad" money3 (M3) to Gross National Product GNP 
(with the ratio of M3 to GNP averaging about 0.227 for the groups of slowly growing 
economies).
This implies that they had fairly low levels of domestically held financial assets.
A high or rising M3/GNP ratio indicates a large real flow of domestic loanable funds 
for new investments (M3/GNP ratio of 0.75 for Japan, Germany, Singapore and 
Taiwan. Also refer back to chapters 1 and 4, on discussions on interest rates).
The World Bank study analyzed by Alan Gelb (1989), incorporated other monetary 
and' investment-saving variables in the estimations used as well as using point 
estimates for interest rate effects to undertake further quantitative analysis. From this 
continuous measure of the Real Deposit Rate of Interest (RR), Gelb found a strong 
positive correlation with output growth over the time period 1965 - 85 :
DYY4 = C + 0.256RR5 [6.0]
3 Broad money supply (M3) consists of: Coin and Currency, Savings 
Deposits and shorter term time deposits in banks or other quasi - monetary 
institutions { such as Postal savings).
4 DYY is defined as the real rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) .
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(5.72)
Maxwell J.Fry’s (1988,152) estimate of Gelb’s single equation point estimate yielded 
a higher coefficient. The implication of this equation is that, for Gelb, every one 
percent increase in the real deposit rate, output growth increases by 0.2 - 0.25 percent. 
For Fry, a one percentage point increase in the real deposit rate of interest toward its 
competitive free - market equilibrium level is associated with a rise in the rate of 
economic growth of about one half a percentage point.
On the Productivity of capital and the Saving-Investment Rate, in the Money and 
Capital, 1973, Mckinnon was concerned about the relative importance of higher social 
savings (as a share of GDP) as against the improved productivity of capital.
Alan Gelb (1989) estimated the Incremental Output Capital Ratio, IOCR and the ratio 
of Investment (domestic plus foreign saving) to GDP, denoted as IGDP, for Thirty - 
Four countries (see table 6.0).
5 RR is the real deposit rate of interest.
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Table 6.Q :
Growth Rates and Other Economic Indicators for Country Groups with Positive, 
Moderately Negative and Strongly Negative Real Interest Rates.
1965 - 73 1974 - 85
Negative Negative
Indicators
Positive Moderate Strongly Posi Moderate Strongly
Real Int.
Rate6 3.7 -1.7 -13.7 3.0 -2.4 -13.0
GDP Growth
Rate 7.3 5.5 4.6 5.6 3.8 1.9
M3/GDP 28.9 27.0 29.1 40.3 34.0 30.5
Investment/
GDP 21.4 19.7 21.4 26.9 23.2 23.0
Change in
GDP/I 36.7 31.1 21.7 22.7 17.3 6.2
Change in Real
M3/real saving718.7 12.7 6.4 16.6 8,2 -0.9
Inflation Rate 22.2 7.1 40.2 20.8 23.9 50.3
Volatility of
Inflation8 17.1 5.3 27.2 12.2 9.1 23.5
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1989,31. 
(Classification covering 34 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America).
6 Calculated from nominal rates according to the formula:
[(1 + r)/(l + p) - 1] * 100. Where r = the deposit rate,
p = inflation rate . Inflation is the percentage change in the CPI.
7 M3 is currency plus the sum of non-bank deposits of the public at 
all identified deposit taking institutions.
Real saving is the Gross Domestic Savings deflated by the average annual 
consumer price index (CPI) rate.
8 Volatility of inflation is the absolute deviation of inflation rate 
from its level of the year before.
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From the pooled observations (1965 - 85) Gelb found the varying investment 
efficiency across countries strongly and positively correlated with the average real 
deposit rate.
Referring back to chapter 4, Fry9 also found the analysis to be robust well as Gelb, 
that is IOCR = C + 0.989RR - 0.139Shift (Rsq Adj = 0.563)
(5.90) (- 5.39)
They also found that the effect of the real interest rate on measured social saving - 
domestic and foreign, much less of the variance. The rate of growth for a single 
country is simply the propensity to save times the average (marginal) productivity of 
capital (Mckinnon 1992,p.21). Mckinnon reproduced Alan Gelb’s (1989) partitioning 
of the sources of output growth from increases in the real deposit rate of interest.
By differentiating:
Y*/Y = DYY = a(l/Y ) = a(IGDP) = as [1]
Where s = S/Y = IGDP
Thus, differentiating [1] with respect to RR, yielded:
5(DYY) = 5(IOCR) IGDP + 5(IGDP) IOCR [2]
S(RR) 5(RR) 5(RR)
Where the underlined IGDP and IOCR variables are cross - country averages.
Note: equation [1] was obtained by assuming that the second term on the right hand 
of y = aK* + Ka* is 0, then dividing through by Y.
By weighting the last two ie 8(IOCR)/S(RR) and 5(IGDP)/5(RR), with IGDP and 
IOCR, Mckinnon found that the efficiency effect was almost four times as important
9 Maxwell J. Fry 1988.
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as the investment effect in explaining differences in real GDP growth across the 
sample of 34 countries. Therefore, "higher real deposit rates of interest had their major 
impact through increased investment efficiency (as measured by IOCRs) rather than 
through increased investment or aggregate saving as a share of GDP".
In an inflationary economy, real rates of interest on financial assets are usually 
negative and less attractive to savers. The inflation tax extracted by the government 
is classified in the GDP accounts as if it was private saving, whereas, real personal 
financial assets are not accumulating and the flow of loanable funds may be low even 
though the flow of private savings as measured in the GNP accounts might be high.
Mckinnon argued that, because this forced saving effect offsets the negative 
substitution effect of inflation on accumulating liquid financial assets, systematic 
relationships between the flow of social saving and real rates of interest or between 
aggregate saving and inflation are weak or ambiguous. Therefore, cross country studies 
as shown by Gelb and Fry, tend to have a positive correlation between real interest 
rates and real growth seems to be strong and unambiguous.
6.1.1 THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION AND 
PRODUCTIVITY OF CAPITAL ON DOMESTIC FINANCE
In reviewing the empirical analysis by Gelb for the period 1965-85, and his finding 
that the high-growth half of the countries sampled grew by 3 percent per year faster 
than the low - growth half; thus concluding that it is due to the greater financialisation 
of the domestic economy and the stabilisation of the foreign exchanges.
Mckinnon (1992), argued that the results from the empirical studies were so because 
it relied heavily on the real deposit rate of interest as the main indicator of the success 
of a monetary stabilisation program. In which case, stabilising the price level apart 
from raising real interest rates serves to limit the financial risk and lengthen the term 
structure of borrowing and lending. In addition, the M3/GDP ratio might also be 
increased by bank branches in the rural areas or taking other steps to increase the 
convenience and liquidity of holding bank deposits.
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Domestic Financialisation can be defined as "marginally, associated with the extent 
new investment appeal's to be intermediated by the banking system or intra-marginally, 
by considering cross country variation in the M3/GDP ratio". In terms of marginally, 
it will be important when assessing the pay off to new investment, whereas, the latter, 
could be important for the efficiency of the existing capital stock. In this case, the best 
method for determining how interest rates operates through the financial system to 
influence real growth is still inconclusive.
Domestic financialisation operates mainly to increase the quality of the capital stock, 
both by raising the incremental output/capital ratio and by increasing the productivity 
with which the existing capital stock is distributed. In terms of incremental 
output/capital ratio, the effect may be associated with new investment reaching a more 
stringent market test when firms borrow from banks at a positive real interest rate. 
Higher deposit rates of interest increase the flow of bank funds available for new 
investment, even as lower-productivity investments are foreclosed if lending rates of 
interest are also increased from ‘repressed’ levels where loans had been tightly 
rationed.
Loans could actually fall when inflation or bank reserve requirements are reduced, 
while the flow of loanable funds intermediated by banks still remains high. Required 
reserve ratios against bank’s liabilities feature in both the Mckinnon-Shaw and the 
Neo-Structuralist models. The Neo-Structuralist view of the reserve requirement 
constitutes a leakage in the intermediation process. The existence of required reserves 
may therefore reduce the intended effects of financial liberalisation or even produce 
adverse results (Fry 1988, pp. 108 - 109).
Both the Mckinnon-Shaw school and the Neo-Structuralist expect higher reserve 
requirements to reduce funds available for investment by reducing the demand for 
deposits or reducing the fraction of a given volume of deposits that are available for 
investment. The reserve requirement implications is discussed in greater detail later 
on in this study. In most LDCs such as Nigeria, there exists a large fringe of smaller 
firms, farms and investing households, without access to credit from the organised
248
banking sector. One major reason for this is the cost of servicing such small scale 
loans which are normally very high. Lack of adequate collateral or high risk is another 
reason for denying most firms access to loanable funds.
In chapter 5 ,1 discussed extensively the various methods the Nigerian authorities had 
attempted to stimulate the domestic financialisation, through various decrees and 
special programs. In contrast to the views expressed by Mckinnon and Shaw as 
regards to the Neo-Structuralist views on inflation, interest rate and bank’s 
intermediation, refer back to chapter 4 (pp. 1-3). Also in chapter 4 of this thesis, table
4.1 provided the Nigerian GDP (at constant factor cost), the savings rate and the 
minimum-lending rate from 1970 - 89.
Drawing conclusions from table 4.1, it can be postulated that, by reducing the rate of 
price inflation, firms in industry and agriculture are deterred from undertaking 
relatively low yield internal investments or from holding non productive inflation 
hedges. Instead firms can hold cash balances as measured by the M3/GNP ratio.
The effects of holding various forms of stable valued money, from coin and currency 
to demand deposits, to saving and time deposits with attractive yields, according to 
Mckinnon is "complementarity" with investment in more productive physical capital 
(1992,pp.25 - 26).
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6.1.2 FOREIGN EXCHANGE IMPACT ON THE QUALITY OF 
INVESTMENT
Repressive domestic financial policies can reduce the quality of investment by 
inducing instability in the foreign exchanges as well as reducing the depth and flow 
of loanable funds for new investments. Chapter (5), showed how repressive domestic 
financial policies caused ‘in part’ economic decline in the Nigerian economy. It also 
showed the instability of the naira exchange rate promoted by the general breakdown 
in the commitment to ‘Fixed Exchange Rates’ after 1973 (see sections 5.6 and 5.6.5 
of ch5).
The severe terms of trade shocks, although the rise in the price of oil in the early 
1970s cushioned off the effects to a certain extent, higher domestic financial 
repression led to higher inflation and lower deposit rates of interest ( refer to table 4.1 
of chapter 4). The difficulties of many economies have been related in one way or 
another to inappropriate exchange rate policies10. The move to floating rates in 1973 
has a varying degrees of enthusiasm and many economies had been arguing the 
desirability of greater flexibility for years, for example, Harry G. Johnson (1973, p. 198 
- 222):
‘The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates’, 1969, in his book, A further 
Essay in Monetary Economics (Harvard University Press, 1973). 
Consolidating the views so far with the analysis in chapter 5, by assessing the 
implications of the observed variability in floating exchange rates. Starting with the 
distinction between short term Volatility and Persistent rate misalignments. 
VOLATILITY: The term implies: the amount of short-run variability in the exchange 
rate from hour to hour, day to day or week to week etc.
MISALIGNMENT: This means a persistent departure of the exchange rate from its 
long run equilibrium level11.
Edwards, Sebastian - The World Bank, Occasional Paper Number 2 /New 
Series ; "Exchange Rate Misalignment in Developing Countries”, 1988,p.vii.
11 John Williamson; 'The Exchange Rate System', Institute for 
International Economics .Policy Analysis in International Economics, 
September 1983 Revised June 1985, pp. 9 - 10.
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These two dimensions of variability are distinct. Rates can be volatile around an 
equilibrium level of competitiveness or stable over long periods while being 
misaligned.
6.1.3 VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE
To measure the volatility, two options are available. The first would be to seek the
typical change in the rate from one period to the next. According to Williamson
(1985) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prefers this approach, stating the funds
findings (1983) that:
"The increased flexibility of member’s exchange arrangements in the 
1970s as compared with the Bretton Woods system is evident from a 
comparison of the average magnitudes of exchange rate changes in the 
period January 1948 - August 1971, and in the subsequent period 
through the end of 1981. For the fund membership as a whole, the 
average monthly change rose four folds, from 0.3 percent in the former 
period to 1.4 percent in the later. The increase in flexibility was more 
marked for the group of industrial countries, for which average monthly 
changes increased almost ten fold, from 0.2 percent to 1.9 percent".
The second approach is to seek the typical deviation of the rate from its short run 
moving average. Usually the measure of volatility is the coefficient of variations 
(standard deviation divided by mean) of exchange rates quoted at frequent intervals 
around a moving average. In terms of policy implications, there are some difficulties 
with rates quoted at frequent intervals, in that, they can not be corrected for inflation, 
since price indices are published relatively infrequent. Hence, the calculation is done 
in terms of nominal exchange rates.
Short term decisions on which volatility impinges are Bilateral rates against a 
particular currency, especially the US dollar (which is the major vehicle currency), 
rather than average; that is, Effective Exchange Rates. See table 5.2 in chapter 5 for 
the naira exchange rates against the dollar and pound for the period 1974 to 1984. 
Table 6.1 below compares the coefficient of variation of the other major currencies 
around a six - month moving average in the final years of the Bretton Wood System 
and the first year of floating.
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Table 6.1:
Exchange Rate Volatility under Pegged and Floating Exchange Rates. 
__________________ 1968 1969 1975 1982
Deutschemark 0.3 1.2a 1.7 1.6
French Franc 0.1 2,3a 1.6 2.2
Japanese Yen n/a n/a 0.7 2.5
Pound Sterling 0.7a 0.2 1.0 1.1
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Note: a. Figure was influenced by a par value change.
According to Williamson (1985), the exchange rate volatility in the Bretton Woods 
period was very sensitive to par value as can be seen from the table above. The 
volatility led to the devaluation of the French franc and revaluation of the 
Deutschemark in 1969. As mentioned in chapter 5, the Sterling was devalued in 1967 
and its measure of volatility during the period when there was no par value change 
was 0.2 percent and under floating, it was as high as 2 percent.
Williamson concluded that the increase in volatility is not sensitive to the particular 
measures chosen and that volatility has increased since the mid - 1970s. He further 
supported the postulation by stating that it is consistent with the findings by Kenen 
and Rodrik (1983) and Shafer and Loopesko (1983).
Technological advancements in telecommunications has led to far closer links between 
the main markets which enabled news to have an instantaneous worldwide effect on 
financial markets. Most of these advances occurred at the same time as the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system; thus making it more difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which technological progress rather than floating may have been responsible for the 
increase in volatility as indicated in table 6.1. The liberalisation of capital controls in 
the US in 1974, in UK in 1979 and in Japan in 1980, has led in part to increased 
capital mobility.
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6.1.4 MISALIGNMENT OF EXCHANGE RATE
Real disturbances such as the sharp increases in the relative price of oil in 1973 - 74 
and 1978 - 79 have been responsible for some of the changes in real exchange rates. 
Movements in relative prices led to sharp changes in exports and imports, disruption 
of normal trading relations and causing shifts in employment and output in the export 
and import competing sectors of the economy.
Many of the largest changes in real exchange rate experienced recently do not 
represent the equilibrium adjustments of relative prices to real disturbances. Instead, 
these changes represent the temporary but sustained departure of real rates from their 
long-run equilibrium levels. It is these departures of real exchange rates from 
equilibrium that is referred to as "Misalignment",
Misalignment may be associated with shifts in monetary policy or financial 
disturbances which change real exchange rates only because wages and prices are 
imperfectly flexible in the short-run. It may be associated with shifts in fiscal policy, 
which can change real exchange rates even when wages and prices are flexible, if 
those shifts are unsustainable in the long-run12.
Exchange rate problems have become a dominant theme in policy discussions in 
Nigeria and many developing countries. The debt crisis (Cline, 1983), the 
disappointing outcome of the Southern cone experiments with free market policies 
(Corbo et al, 1986) and the dismissal performance of Africa’s agriculture sector 
(World Bank, 1984, Essien, 1990 and refer to chapter 5, section 5.0), have been the 
result of inappropriate exchange rate policies.
Real Exchange Rates (RERs) have become increasing volatile especially for those 
LDCs that after the collapse of the Bretton Wood System maintained a fixed nominal 
exchange rate regime.
As noted by Sebastian Edwards (1989,p.2),
12 Richard C. Marston, "Misalignment of Exchange Rates: Effects on 
Trade and Industry"; 1988, pp.l -2.
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"it is now well accepted at the theoretical level that excess volatility in 
RERs and in particular situations of real exchange rate misalignment, 
will be translated into important welfare costs".
Maintaining the RERs at the "wrong" level generates incorrect signals and greatly 
hurts the degree of competitiveness of the tradable sectors13. Among the traditional 
policy measures to face exchange rate misalignment and external sector disequilibrium, 
devaluation is the most important. As we shall see later in this chapter, domestic 
capital markets are highly repressed in Nigeria as well as in most developing 
countries. This results in a reduced capacity for engaging in traditional monetary and 
fiscal policies.
Why Should a rate be regarded as misaligned even though it may clear the market; 
that is equate demand and supply? The best way to answer this question is to 
distinguish the three concepts of equilibrium.
[1] Market Equilibrium:
This is the exchange rate that balances demand and supply in the absence of official 
intervention. Market equilibrium refers to the nominal rather than the real exchange 
rate and tends to change rapidly whenever some relevant "news" changes. As noted 
by J, Williamson (1983), "absence of equilibrium is signified by heavy intervention 
and perhaps reserve borrowing intended to sustain the rate".
[2] Fundamental Equilibrium:
Is that which is expected to generate a current account surplus or deficit equal to the 
underlying capital flow over the cycle, given that the country is pursuing internal 
balance as best as it and not restricting trade for balance of payments reasons. This 
is what is usually referred to when rates are described as "overvalued " or 
"undervalued".
13 Willet, T; "Exchange Rate Volatility, International Trade and 
Resource Allocation". Journal of International Money and Finance, 
Supplement March 1986.
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The fact that rates can become overvalued when a country inflates faster than its 
partners makes it obvious that this concept of an equilibrium rate relates not to the 
nominal exchange rate but rather to the real rate. That is, exchange rate adjust for 
inflation at home and in competitor countries. The fundamental equilibrium exchange 
rate (FEER) may change either because the underlying capital flow changes or because 
of changes in the pattern of demand for or conditions of supply of traded goods.
[3] Current Equilibrium:
This term is intended to indicate the rate that would be obtained if markets had full 
knowledge of all relevant facts and reacted rationally to that knowledge.
The current equilibrium rate would depend upon such temporary factors as the path 
of interest rates, which will depend on the stance of macroeconomic policy and the 
state of the business cycle given risk aversion, on net asset position vis-a-vis the rest 
of the world.
The current equilibrium rate will deviate from fundamental equilibrium when policy 
variables are set at levels which drive the exchange rate away from its FEER.
As noted by Rudiger Dornbusch (1976)14 for example, a high interest rate relative 
to other countries will appreciate the currency involved, so as to create expectations 
of a yield-equalising depreciation over the period that the high interest rate is expected 
to persist.
Like the market equilibrium rate, the current equilibrium rate adjusts in response to 
relevant news. It also refers to a nominal rather than a real rate. Unlike the market 
equilibrium rate, identification of the current equilibrium rate requires subjective 
judgement.
14 Dornbusch, R. (1976). " Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics". 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.84, No.6, (December).
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6.1.5 REAL EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Definition:
Real exchange rate misalignment is a sustained deviation of the actual real exchange 
rate from its long-run equilibrium level.
When the actual real exchange rate is below the equilibrium RER value, it is said to 
be real exchange rate overvaluation. If on the contrary, the actual RER exceeds the 
equilibrium RER, it is then said to be undervaluation. Traditional policy analyses have 
tended to follow the purchasing power parity (PPP) doctrine of equilibrium real 
exchange rates in understanding this phenomenon from the definition of misalignment.
As stated by Dornbusch (1982, "Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Exchange Rates"), 
the theory assumed that the equilibrium real exchange rate is constant, its equilibrium 
level is found by looking at the value of the RER in some distant period that exhibited 
external equilibrium. Edwards, S. (1989, p.8), adopted a different approach from the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) view. The equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) is 
defined as:
"that relative price of tradable to non-tradable that, for a given 
sustainable (equilibrium) values of other relevant variables, such as 
taxes, international prices, and technology, results in the simultaneous 
attainment of internal equilibrium".
Internal equilibrium means that, the non-tradable goods market clears in the current 
period and is expected to be in equilibrium in future periods. External equilibrium is 
attained when the inter-temporal budget constraint that states that the discounted sum 
of a country’s current account has to be equal to zero is satisfied. That is, the current 
account balances (current and Future) are compatible with long-run sustainable capital 
flows. Unlike Fry and Gelb, Edward’s analysis of twenty three Asian, Latin American 
and African LDCs over the period 1965 - 85, focused on the behaviour of real
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exchange rates15 under alternative definitions.
He defined the bilateral real exchange rate against the dollar as :
BRER = EP*
P [3]
Where E = domestic currency / dollar,
P = domestic CPI (consumer price index)
P* = the American wholesale price index (WPI).
Edwards intention was to define the ‘real exchange rate’ as the relative price of
tradable to non-tradable goods, where the foreign WPI is a proxy for domestic tradable
and the domestic CPI is a proxy for the price of non-tradable.
Mckinnon termed the proxies as crude, arguing that if the WPI had been used for each 
country, fluctuations in BRER would have corresponded to the deviations from 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Therefore, the BRER as defined in equation [3] are 
similar whether the domestic WPI or CPI were used.
As observed in chapter 5, the US dollar began to fluctuate sharply against other major 
currencies after 1973. As a result of these fluctuations, Edwards defined each LDC’s 
real exchange rate on a multilateral trade - weighted basis as the ‘real effective 
exchange rate’, expressed as :
REER = XooiEiP*i (i = 1, 2 ...,K), [4]
P
Where K is the number of partner countries over which the summation proceeds, a i 
is trade weight assigned to each and Ei is an index nominal exchange rate between the
15 The real exchange rate (RER) is defined as the relative price of 
tradable with respect to non-tradable goods (or vice versa):
RER = Price of tradable goods
Price of non-tradable goods 
RER is a proxy for a country's degree of competitiveness in international 
markets . It measures the cost of domestically producing the tradable 
goods. See Edwards, S. 1988, p.3.
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country concerned and its ith trading partner. The implication of this, is that, the 
potential for variation in the real exchange rate increases when inflation in P, the 
domestic level and denominator of [3] and [4], is high and unstable.
Variability in the LDC’s terms of trade did not systematically affect growth in his 
sample periods, however, a sustained fall in the price of a key primary export can be 
very damaging in an individual LDC whose export mix is undiversified. While the 
terms of trade are outside the control of the LDC’s authorities, fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate are very much influenced by its domestic financial policy.
The. empirical study by Edwards showed a sharp decline in the productivity of 
investment (IGDP) after 1973, similar to that found by Gelb, (from 0.310 in 1965 to 
1971,to 0.157 in 1978 to 1985). One possible explanation for this is the increased 
domestic financial repression in the period 1978 - 85; which according to Mckinnon, 
Edwards did not take into consideration.
In view of the difficulties Nigeria encountered in its exchange rate management in the 
mid 1970s; it can be postulated that ‘stable prices permit greater domestic financial 
deepening and higher real deposit rates while limiting risk and the liberalizing 
government’s task of stabilising its real exchange rate’. Without any agreement among 
the advanced industrial countries to maintain a stable exchange parities among 
themselves, the authorities in other countries will continue to experience more 
difficulty in stabilising their real exchange rates and their domestic price levels 
(Mckinnon, 1992,p.30).
Mckinnon analysis of the country studies discussed so far, was to demonstrate that 
achieving financial liberalisation while retaining monetary control has a real pay off, 
even when the international monetary system remains in some disarray. For a 
successful economic development to occur, there must be a stable domestic direct 
price controls. The deposit and lending rates of interest will have to be kept 
sustainable positive in real terms while limiting variance in the real exchange rate.
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6.2 INSTRUMENTS OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION
Mckinnon used Colombia and Nicaragua to illustrate his discussion on the instruments 
of financial repression. The authorities in almost all the LDC’s are usually constrained 
in raising revenue and as a consequence tends to rely on tariffs and other restrictions 
on foreign trade. Government interventionism in Nigeria and other LDCs are well 
discussed in 2, through to Chapter 5. The commonly used instrument by the 
authorities included, high reserve requirements, specialise credit agencies and interest 
ceilings on deposit and loans (Mckinnon 1992,pp.43 - 46).
6.2.1 INTERACTION BETWEEN INFLATION AND THE RESERVE 
REQUIREMENTS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS: A PARTIAL 
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS.
The analysis by Mckinnon was to show that the relationship between the real lending 
rate of interest and the nominal rate of inflation is strong and positive and that the 
relationship between inflation and the real deposit rate of interest is negative. 
Assuming n to be the actual and expected rate of price inflation, ie p*/p, where p is 
the relevant general price index that depositors and borrowers use in determining their 
real returns.
If id is the average nominal deposit rate of interest offered by the banking system on 
all deposits and il is the nominal loan rate charged on borrowers, the real deposit rate 
rd and the real loan rate, rl will therefore be:
rd = id - it, and r, = q - n [5]
If an average reserve requirement of k percent, where 0 < k < 1, is imposed on all 
deposits, D, such that private loans, L, are only (1 - k) percent of the deposit base:
L = (1 - k)D [6]
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Assuming this reserve requirement is non - interest bearing for the commercial banks, 
and with no official interest ceilings or other usury restrictions, the reserve 
requirement would force the commercial banks to reduce the deposit rate of interest 
and raise the loan rates, thus contracting the flow of loanable funds.
Further more, let’s assume that banks operate with zero - profits, that is current 
earnings from loans are fully paid out to depositors:
i = id [7]
1 - k
where the nominal interest paid out to depositors is (1 - k) of that received from 
borrowers per dollar lent. In terms of real interest rates, subtracting % from each side 
of equation [7] and substituting (rd + 7c) for id to obtain :
r, = __Id— + [8]
1 - k 1 - k
Equation [8] implies that the amount by which the real loan rate exceeds the real 
deposit rate is an increasing function of k, rc, and rd. It also means that the real loan 
rate must increase with the rate of inflation. Therefore, the burden of a given reserve 
requirement k on the flow of loanable funds depends directly on the rate of price 
inflation even when no other interest restrictions exists. Other forms of distortions 
include: direct ceilings or usury restrictions on deposit and loan rates of interest and 
how. they interact with reserve requirements when inflation is present.
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6.2.2 DILEMMA’S IN FINANCIAL POLICY IN THE LIBERALISING
ECONOMY
The developing countries’ governments are constantly faced with the difficult choice 
between best and second best policies in their determination to eliminate financial 
repression and promote rapid growth in the flow of loanable funds. Various ad hoc 
decisions are made by the planning authorities to divert funds from the constipated 
financial system to support this or that enterprise, which may have some chance of 
improving resource allocation when considered one at a time. However, savers in the 
deposit banks would be left with low or negative real yields.
The best policy, as presented by Mckinnon is to stabilise the price level and eliminate 
reserve ‘taxes ’ on the commercial banks. It could involve substantial improvement 
in fiscal policies, including the phasing out of all credit subsidises.
At the institutional level, it is essential that the government withdraw the various 
subventions, interest regulations and special credit facilities or foreign exchange 
allotments that already influence the microeconomic allocation of investment resources 
in the economy.
This involves: dismantling old government bureaucracies, the relinquishing seats on 
the board of the Central Bank by old government ministers, allow for discount policy 
and foreign exchange policy; thus, allowing the independent board with a mandate to 
stabilise the domestic price level to operate effectively.
The implication of this is that, for such a successful reform, the commercial banks and 
related institutions would have to be aggressively swift to providing high interest loans 
to well diversified segments of industry and agriculture whose special credit lines and 
other interest subsidies have been phased out. The other implication in the transition 
to a more competitive banking system is with regards to increases in interest rates on 
deposits and loans and the allowance of new commercial banks to operate, hence 
making the older commercial banks face serious bankruptcy threats.
Caution about licensing a host of new domestic or foreign banks to enter the newly 
opened domestic capital market in the initial stages of liberalisation is necessary.
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The need for caution can be justified looking at the financial deregulation and the 
effectiveness of bank supervision in Nigeria. In a survey by the Nigerian Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (NDIC) of Nigerian banks in 1989, it was found that the 
banking industry had many firms operating below solvency levels with negative 
shareholder’s funds amounting to N763 million. The survey also found that a total of 
twenty - three banks did not meet the statutory paid-up capital of N20 million for 
commercial banks and N12 million for Merchant banks. In May 1991, capital for 
commercial banks was raised to N50 million and N40 million for Merchant banks16.
The uneasiness arose from the recognition that the ongoing financial deregulation has 
changed the industry a lot in Nigeria. Banking has diversified considerably, investment 
options have been broadened and liability management is now prevalent.
Regulations have been relaxed in a number of ways. Banks can now hold stocks in 
non-financial companies, deal freely in foreign exchange and engage in equipment 
leasing. Entry barriers into the industry have been softened with the number of banks 
as at August 1992 standing at 124, compared to only 40 in 1986 when deregulation 
commenced, (see chapter 5, sections 5.7.1 - 5.8)
16 A.A. Alawode, "Financial Deregulation and the Effectiveness of Bank 
Supervision in Nigeria", Savings and Development, No.l ,1992, pp.101 - 
1 1 0 .
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6.3 THE INFLATION TAX. MONETARY CONTROL AND RESERVE
REQUIREMENTS ON COMMERCIAL BANKS.
The aim here is to analyze the problem of macroeconomic control when an uncovered 
fiscal deficit exists that makes some financial repression inevitable, that is, government 
expenditures including credit subsidies, exceeding revenues.
Since there is no major open market in primary securities, the government can not sell 
treasury bonds or bills directly to the public, instead the government extracts 
seigniorage - implicit tax revenue from the financial system through the issue of base 
money17.
Referring to the seminal analysis18 by Friedman (1971), Mckinnon (1992) postulated 
that by assuming a single homogeneous demand function for non - interest - bearing 
base money ( ie, Coin, Currency or Official Reserves held by the banking system), the 
flow of loanable funds through the commercial banking system is not explicitly 
considered in the Friedman’s analysis. He then proceeded to distinguish two forms of 
demand for base money. The first method is the "demand for Currency held by 
households (and firms)". The second is the "commercial (and savings) bank reserves 
held with the central bank".
6.3.1 THE MODEL
Given the financing problem facing the government of a repressed economy, expressed 
as follows:
. Z = G - T [1]
where Z denotes the consolidated government deficit that must be financed by 
extracting revenue (seigniorage) from the domestic banking system, G represents the 
measure of government expenditures and T is the flow of ordinary taxes collected.
17 That is, reserve requirements on the banks and inflation interact 
to tax the holders of money and near monies. It also tax borrowers from 
the domestic banks through higher real loan rates.
18 The conventional models of the inflation tax and the extraction of 
non-inflationary seigniorage.
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The deficit term Z is taken to be stated in nominal terms and will vary with the price 
level. Assuming the government’s known need for real finance from the domestic 
monetary system be given exogenous such that:
Z/P = aY  + v [2]
where P is the general price deflator
Y is exogenously given real income (GNP) used here as a scale factor, v is a 
random stochastic disturbance reflecting some lack of official control over the fiscal 
system, a  could be taken as a policy parameter; of which a reduction in it could lead 
to an increase in ordinary tax collections or a decrease in official credit subsidies to 
preferred borrowers. For a steady - state financial repression, Mckinnon assumed the 
parameter a  to be a positive constant and v to have a significant variance with mean 
zero.
Let’s assume the objective is to minimise the rate of expected price inflation (in the 
steady state) subject to the constraint that the fiscal deficit must be financed by the 
domestic banking system. Apart from maintaining the interest - rate subsidies on 
credits to officially designated borrowers that are part of the government deficit in 
equation [2], the central bank are not constrained to maintain general interest rate 
controls (usury laws), unless they prove useful in reducing the rate of price inflation. 
The central bank remains free to manipulate reserve requirements on all classes of 
deposits without any direct concern for the "Crowding Out" of private borrowers.
The other instrument of financial policy available is for the government to effectively 
tax the financial system by establishing non - interest bearing reserve requirements. 
On the central banks Balance Sheet, all narrow money usable for making payments 
to third parties is aggregated into the variable C. All reserves against term deposits are 
denoted by R. The accumulated sum of past government deficits L(Zt), is the central 
bank’s only asset in this closed economy.
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Table 6.2
CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET
Government debt 2(2^) Currency + Reserves against demand
deposits C
Reserves against time deposits R
Monetary Base M
The real revenue flow accruing to the government from the issue of base money can 
be expressed as:
Z/P = M7P = (M/MXM/P) = p(M/P) [3]
Where M ‘ is the absolute rate of change in base money and p is its proportional rate 
of change. The above equation [3], implies that real revenue from the banking system 
is the percentage in nominal money supply times the real monetary base19.
An additional important feature here is the demand for un-subsidized loans in the free 
part of the capital market. Based on resources accumulated through the issue of term 
deposits. Commercial banks may lend at whatever interest rate denoted by ij they can 
get. The demand function for real loan can be expressed as:
L/P = h(X y  [4]
where L is the nominal quantity of loans.
It is important to note that, the non - interest bearing reserve requirement on term 
deposits drives a wedge between the open - market interest rate on deposits and that 
on loans. The inflation tax on reserves is shared between depositors, whose yields are 
driven down and borrowers whose costs are driven up. If the nominal interest rates on 
deposits are scaled upwards to reflect it, then the wedge between deposit and loan
19 In a steady state, this would depend on the level of real income 
Y . ( Mckinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalisation, 1992,p.60).
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rates of interest will increase with n. This means that, as inflation increases, banks are 
forced to pay a higher nominal interest rate on deposits in order to maintain their real 
deposit base. Because of the non interest bearing reserve requirement, the loan rate 
must increase for the banks to continue to break even.
Therefore, when these nominal interest rates are free to adjust, inflation increases the 
wedge between deposit and lending rates of interest.
This can be represented in equation form as:
h ~  rd =.Idk + j t k .  = i, - id [5]
1 - k  1 - k
For any given rd, the wedge between deposit and loan rates increases with k and n. 
The higher the reserve tax k, the greater the effect of inflation in increasing the wedge 
between deposit and loan rates. Therefore, how much q increases absolutely and rd 
falls absolutely depends on the elasticity of demand for loans equation [5], compared 
with the elasticity of supply of deposits that is the demand for term deposits:
D/P = q(jc, id)Y [6].
6.3.2 RESERVE REQUIREMENT FOR MINIMISING INFLATION
Now, lets consider the minimization of the inflation rate, n, with respect to k subject 
to the market clearing conditions below.
Condition [1] Private loanable funds are (1 - k) percentage of deposits, which can be 
expressed as follows:
L/P = (1 - k)D/P = h(jt, i,) = (1 - k)q(ft,id) [7]
At this point it is worth noting that the demand function for the base money is defined 
as:
M/P = KD/P + C/P [8]
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Condition [2] The government deficit is equal to the rate of change in base money, 
which can be expressed as :
Z/P = (kq + f)(jr + x) [9]20
Condition [3] : Competition drives bank profits to zero:
1,(1 - k) - id = 0 [10]
This optimization procedure based on the above three equilibrium conditions 
determines the endogenous variables i„ id, and n.
Condition [2], that is, the exogenously given government deficit Z/P, must be financed 
by issuing currency and reserves against term deposits.
This is derived by assuming an exogenously given steady growth in 
real income, x , to which there corresponds a steady state inflation that 
depends on |l such that: n = ji - x. [a]
Where k is the rate of price inflation, P*/P. That is, given x ,  minimising 
7E will correspond to minimising p, the percentage rate of issue of base 
money. Therefore, combining eqn[a] with eqn[8] yielded the expression for 
equation [9].
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Figure 6.1:
Inflation, Fiscal Deficit and Optimal Required Reserves (the Mckinnon version).
From the diagram, z represents various levels of the fiscal deficit. The decision 
variable, the reserve requirement, k, ranges between 0 and 1. When set at 0, the 
government gets no revenue from the term deposit part of the system.
When it is at 1, so that the nominal yield on term deposits falls to zero, everyone 
abandons term deposits in favour of more liquid demand deposits and currency, thus 
government revenue falls to zero. For z = 10, the optimal solution is at point C, where 
the reserve requirement is set at a fairly high level to minimize the relatively high 
inflation rate and high rate of issue of base money.
As k, increases, the relative tax burden is shifted toward the term - deposit part of the 
market. The extent of the shift will depend on the elasticity of response of depositors 
and borrowers. The more inelastic is the demand for term deposits and for real loans 
with respect to a fall in id and a rise in ilt the greater will be the optimal reserve 
requirement to minimize the inflation rate k .
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Alternatively, the more inelastic is the demand for currency, the lower will be the 
optimal reserve requirement as more of the inflation tax burden is shifted towards 
currency holders. Figure 6.1 is used by Mckinnon in his analysis to illustrate the ways 
in which the optimal reserve requirement, the inflation rate and different levels of the 
exogenous fiscal deficit are likely to interact.
In conclusion, the higher the natural real rate of growth and the flow of non- 
inflationary seigniorage in the economy, the lower will be the minimum necessary 
inflation rate to finance the given fiscal deficit.
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6.4 PROTECTIONISM IN FOREIGN TRADE; QUOTAS AND TARIFFS.
"Bhagwati and Kruger (1965) defined trade liberalisation as a process 
of moving away from quota restrictions at, possibly, disequilibrium 
exchange rates to arrive at a system where only tariffs are used at an 
equilibrium exchange rate".
Nigeria which has had quite a number of exchange controls, licensing and import
quotas, by applying the above definition will mean that the country has been
absolutely illiberal.
On the conditions for perfect equivalence to hold, Bhagwati (1965, 1978), it is 
essential to state how the additional import licenses are allocated. If they are auctioned 
off or simply given to a single person or firm, like a trading house or agency house 
with a history of importing that product, then a potential monopoly is created. The 
exclusive license could generate a further rise in price by restricting supply.
Where licenses are apportioned to users by some economic criterion such as ‘capacity’ 
for utilising imported industrial materials, this will immediately sets off a scramble by 
potential demanders to satisfy this criteria. Only in the unlikely event that licenses are 
distributed widely and by economic criteria extraneous to the industry in question will 
one avoid some endogenous shift in the domestic supply or demand curve that distorts 
resource allocation beyond that occasioned by a simple tariff.
6.4.1 THE FIVE PHASES OF QUOTA RESTRICTIONS AND OTHER 
EXCHANGE CONTROLS.
Phase 1. Is characterised by the imposition or sharp intensification of relatively in­
differentiated or across the board import controls, usually undertaken to influence the 
balance of international payments. This could result from a sharp drop in price of 
some major export or from unexpected capital flight occasioned by the build-up of 
external indebtedness, thus, running down foreign exchange reserves (see sections 5.5 
and 5.9 of chapter 5, of how phase 1 relates to the Nigerian economy).
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The problem with across - the - board tariffs are, it usually require cumbersome 
legislation or parliamentary approval. It is too slow or too uncertain to offset the 
macroeconomic impact of the initiating disturbance and achieve balance of payments 
equilibrium. The authorities having committed itself to generalised exchange controls, 
the country then succumbs in phase 2 to much stronger protectionist.
Phase 2: Is characterised by increased and more specific restrictiveness of the entire 
control system. Its significance is the proliferation of detailed regulations, administered 
by a large bureaucracy, to differentiate among alternative end uses of imports. Import 
licenses are distinguished according to origin and destination, for example, between 
wholesalers and final users and according to very detailed type such as capital goods, 
intermediate goods and consumer goods.
The problem with phase 2 is that, administration of licensing procedures can become 
more sophisticated in the sense that taxes or special customs duties are often levied 
to absorb some of the economic rents accruing to particular import licenses although 
others in the same commodity categories may be exempted. Specific exporters may 
get special subsidies to offset the overvalued domestic currency. Foreign exchange 
shortages may become too severe, as in the case of Nigeria, or too many obvious 
anomalies develop in the pricing and allocation of imports. Thus, pressure develops 
to devalue the currency and rationalise.
Phase 3 is a major discrete devaluation. The degree of rationalisation accompanying 
devaluation can vary enormously. The naira devaluation was to bring it down to its 
real value among other international currencies, as well as simplifying the 
administration of foreign trade . Exchange controls are relaxed and some subsidies for 
exporters and surcharges on imports, except on some luxury goods were eliminated. 
There was a real intent by the Nigerian authorities to push the real devaluation much 
further, as they did in March 5, 1992, by deregulating (floating) the naira in order to 
increase the export orientation of the economy and to reduce net incentives for import 
substitution by actually eliminating import quota restrictions.
Phase 4, quota restrictions are greatly reduced and or replaced by formal tariffs so that
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relative prices become more important in determining what is actually imported.
Phase 5 is full currency convertibility on current account with quantitative restrictions 
on foreign trade not employed as a significant means of regulating the balance of 
payments.
The pegged exchange rate is at its equilibrium level and monetary and fiscal policies 
are consciously employed to maintain external balance . According to Mckinnon 
(1992, p.96), in the process of economic development, free currency convertibility 
seems to be either very hard to attain or not a highly regarded objectives on the part 
of the authorities in poor countries.
6.4.2 APPRAISAL OF THE MACROECONOMICS OF DISTORTIONS FROM 
QUOTA RESTRICTIONS.
Starting with the originality of quota restrictions, the industrialised countries, Japan 
and USA for example, maintained more-or-less fully convertible currencies and honour 
the most- favoured - nation (MFN) principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). The problem is that these industrialised nations have not applied this 
principle consistently in negotiating export outlets in LDCs.
According to the postulation by Mckinnon (1992, p.96), aid tying including the 
extension of export credits at below market rates of interest, in effect require recipient 
LDCs to regulate their imports by source or by payments conditions. The United 
State’s attempts to improve its balance of payments position in the 1960s encouraged 
the proliferation of preferred lists of American goods from which aid recipients had 
to choose. Exports of American food grains to LDCs in the 1960s under public law 
480 encouraged the profileration of LDCs import restrictions on like products that 
were not similarly subsidised.
Dumping in LDCs of European commodity surpluses sometimes has similar side 
effects. Major donor countries like Japan often include their development assistance 
as a subsidy element in ordinary commercial credits. Such assistance can be obtained
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by the LDC in question only if it agrees to restrict its purchases from such credits to 
Japanese goods.
Article XVIII of the GATT is a general escape clause that allows poor countries at 
their behest to impose any tariff or quota restriction for "developmental" purposes. 
Unlike the industrial economies, therefore, LDCs are not effectively part of the GATT 
legal mechanism for securing freer trade. Therefore, to conclude this section, it is 
essential to note that the outcome in phase 2 is that, the import licensing authorities, 
whatever their initial intent, begin to influence the whole internal flow of trade and 
commerce. The distribution or redistribution of income through the assignment of 
license premiums becomes quantitatively very significant.
6.4.3 THE IMPACT OF GATT. TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES
"There has been a progressive dismantling of many trade barriers since 
the end of the Second World War, which can be attributed in large 
measure to the role and influence of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)21".
In the view of Paul Krugman, GATT lacks a theoretical underpinning. He argued that
GATT can be characterised instead as "enlightened Mercantilism" or as he labels it,
"GATT-think".
The guiding principles of GATT-think are: Exports are good and imports are bad; and 
an equal increase in imports and exports is good. Despite the seeming illogic of 
GATT-think. He noted that, it has led to a remarkable degree of achievement in trade 
liberalisation. However, trade policy as currently practised does not reflect clearly the 
model of free trade.
Bhagwati on the other hand grants there is reason to be concerned about unfair trade 
and to permit countervailing duties and anti-dumping actions to counteract it.
21 R.M. Stern, “Mini Symposium: Issues for the global Economy in the 
1990s", in The World Economy {the leading of International Economic 
Relations), 1992, July, Vol.15, No.4, pp.416 - 417.
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He pointed out that there is clearly some danger involved in-so-far as measures aimed 
against unfair trade can be misused for protectionist purpose22.
Bhagwati notes that allegations of unfair trade are a manifestation of the increased 
protectionist pressures dating from the early 1980s and may also reflect the suspicion 
that non-tariff interventions are inhibiting trade in ways that are not always obvious. 
Factors giving rise to sentiments of unfair trade include the increased magnitudes and 
complexities of foreign direct investments, problems arising in coping with exchange 
rate volatility.
He noted that there is still a further challenge to the GATT system, which is the 
increasing resort to the formation of regional trading blocs. The inclusion of article 
XXIV in the GATT agreement was a recognition of the possible benefit that might 
result from customs unions and free trade areas. The recent revival of interest in 
regional trading bloc, according to Bhagwati, reflects a shift in US policies. This may 
be due in part to the perceived need to form a North America bloc and may be a 
larger Western Hemisphere bloc to countervail the size and influence of an 
economically and politically integrated bloc in Western Europe.
According to Anne Krueger23, in the period 1945 to the late 1960s, there was a 
considerable homogeneity in the economic structures of LDCs and a commonality of 
inward looking and costly domestic policies. Krueger noted that:
[1] Countries that adopt the right policies can grow very rapidly and succeed in 
international competition.
[2] With more countr ies adopting outward looking policies, the supply of exports will 
increase.
[3] The LDCs are no longer a homogeneous group.
[4] The future of LDCs exports depends crucially on there being open markets in
22 Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Threats To The World Trading System", The 
World Economy, 1992, pp.443 - 456.
23 Anne 0. Krueger, Trade prospects for the developing countries, 
1992, pp.457 - 474. The World Economy.
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the industrialised countries.
There are two critical issues that will determine how favourable the trade prospects 
for LDCs will be. The first is whether it is possible to maintain and strengthen an 
open, multilateral trading system under GATT. The second is the success that 
individual LDCs may experience in the reorientation of their policies and adaptation 
of their domestic economies in ways that will be conducive to the realisation of 
greater economic efficiency and growth. Slow progress at the GATT negotiations has 
led the World Bank to conclude that a division of the world into trading blocs, 
Europe, the Americas and East Asia is the fast road to multilateral free trade24.
The problem with this postulation by the World Bank is that Africa has not been 
grouped into any bloc. May be perhaps the Bank’s neglect of the region could be 
because of the repressive policies most countries in Africa are still pursuing.
With liberalisation in Nigeria, the ECOWAS25 zone of which Nigeria is a member 
could become a viable trading area.
6.4.4 THE RATIONALE FOR QUOTA RESTRICTIONS IN FINANCIALLY 
REPRESSED ECONOMY.
In discussing the rationale for quota restrictions in financially repressed economy, 
Mckinnon (1992, p.99) questioned why phase 2 is observed in so many LDCs in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, whilst, observe less extreme quota restriction situations 
such as phase 1 and 4. Some of the answers presented for the above enquiry are:
[1] The macroeconomic instability tends to generate a "demand" for quota restrictions. 
Relating this to Nigeria, it has been argued in the previous chapters that some of the 
restrictions imposed by the Federal Government was to curb the excess consumption 
of foreign goods, which is taking a large portion of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
see table 5.7 of chapter 5.
24 World Bank Policy Research, Bulletin May - July 1992, Vol.3, No.3.
25 ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States.
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Domestic financial and price level instability which is usually associated with high and 
variable inflation, generates a second -best argument for quota restrictions because real 
and nominal exchange rates become highly variable and unpredictable (Edwards 
1989).
This increased exchange risk has potentially deleterious effects on the productivity of 
domestic investment. Thus, the authorities attempts to mitigate this investment risk by 
protecting some of their producers with absolute quota restrictions because the 
protective effects of such restrictions are relatively invulnerable to exchange rate 
changes. In contrast, the protective effect from given import tariffs can easily be upset 
by a real appreciation of the domestic currency, causing domestic producers of import 
substitutes to incur unexpectedly large losses.
[2] On the microeconomic arguments, the proliferation of quota restrictions may 
depend on the realm of politics as much as in economics. Mckinnon’s view was that, 
for countries with weak constitutional limits on the assertion of economic power by 
the government of the day, favourable allocations of quota restrictions can reward 
one’s political friends. The denial of licenses, including the permission to export freely 
at an equilibrium exchange rate, can be economically devastating to groups who are 
politically unfriendly.
Many governments in LDCs are self - styled socialists, who view their legitimate 
mandate to be one of extending state control over domestic economic activity. Even 
Military Governments such as in Nigeria, are often uninhibited interventionists, in 
their attempt to regulate the foreign exchange of the naira, import controls to the 
domestic banking system.
Governments in LDCs find that foreign trade is more easily controlled than domestic 
trade because of the need of traders to change from foreign to domestic money and 
vice versa, plus the usual practice of raising revenue by tariffs and licensing at a 
limited number of border - crossing stations and ports that conveniently encompass 
the economy. Therefore, quota restriction regimes are an indirect but Second-Best
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method of exercising a socialist or otherwise interventionist mandate.
For Mckinnon, the fiscal inefficiency of using restrictions on foreign trade are 
essentially to compensate for the domestic economic distortions. Both Bhagwati (1971) 
and Johnson (1965), advocated that taxes and subsidies should be used to offset 
distortions directly in the markets where they occur.
This means that, for those new industries where technological spill-over is very high 
and proportional to the level of production, direct production subsidies should be 
employed. But in Mckinnon’s view, quota restrictions on foreign trade must be a 
distant fourth - best or worst - possible solution to the problem of overcoming 
domestic distortions.
This leads to the question, why are quota restrictions so prevalent in practice? In 
answer to this question, Mckinnon emphasized that, the problem is that this theoretical 
critique of using trade restrictions to correct domestic distortions implicitly presumes 
that governments in LDCs have control over their public finances. Frequent fiscal 
crisis in LDCs often revolve around the problem of covering public sector deficits in 
a situation where capital markets are too rudimentary to permit government bonds to 
be sold directly to the non-bank public.
Therefore, the authorities are frequently induced into manipulating the flow of foreign 
trade and payments, as well as the flow of money and bank credits.
In a financially repressed economy, an open capital market barely exists and is 
incapable of channelling funds for investment into high priority uses. Entrepreneurs 
find that they cannot effectively bid for bank credit, despite the highly protected 
import - competing sector. In which case, the possession of an exclusive license to 
import some necessary intermediate goods such as industrial materials or capital 
equipments, performs an important dual role of:
(a) The holder of a license gets a capital grant in the form of a premium that can be 
applied toward investment.
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(b) The exclusivity of the license allows the holder to bid more easily for funds from 
the repressed financial system.
6 5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
The Mckinnon hypotheses was that, financial repression provided some 
microeconomic rationale for the persistent use of quota restrictions in Less Developing 
Countries to encourage particular kinds of investments.
This implies that, the successful elimination of quota restrictions regimes is more 
likely and may only be fully desirable economically, if packaged with a more general 
program to re-establish financial stability by reducing volatility in the real exchange 
rate and improving the workings of domestic capital.
The optimal order of economic liberalisation may vary for different liberalising 
economies depending on their initial conditions. Therefore, before price inflation can 
be feasibly phased out, and before the capital market is opened for free borrowing 
and lending, it is essential that the government attempt to balance the central 
government’s finances.
The policy prescription for overcoming the monetary system fragmentation should 
include a positive and uniformly high real rates of interest within comparable 
categories of bank deposits and loans, as well as removal of onerous reserve 
requirements, interest ceilings and compulsory allocations of cheap credit, hence 
encouraging domestic savers and investors.
Domestic financialisation operates mainly to increase the quality of the capital stock, 
both by raising the incremental output/capital ratio and by increasing the productivity 
with which the existing capital stock is distributed. Both the Mckinnon-Shaw and the 
Neo-Structuralist schools expect higher reserve requirements to reduce funds available 
for investment by reducing the demand for deposits or reducing the fraction of a given 
volume of deposits that are available for investment.
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Exchange rate problems have become a dominant theme in policy discussions in 
Nigeria as in many LDCs. The debt crisis, the disappointing outcome of the southern 
cone experiments with free market policies and the dismissal performance of Africa’s 
agricultures sector, are all attributed to the inappropriate exchange rate policies.
For a liberalising Economy, the best policy may be to stabilise the price level and 
eliminate reserve taxes on the commercial banks; which could involve substantial 
improvement in fiscal policies including the phasing out of all credit subsidises.
On quota restrictions, Nigeria’s reason for doing so was to curb the excess 
consumption of foreign goods, which is taking a large portion of the gross domestic 
product. Domestic financial and price level instability which is usually associated with 
high and variable inflation generates a second best argument for quota restrictions. 
This is because real and nominal exchange rates become highly variable and 
unpredictable.
Therefore, the microeconomic arguments, the proliferation of quota restrictions may 
depend on the realm of politics as much as in economics.
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7.0 CONCLUSION
The theses examined the role of interest rates and saving in determining economic 
growth. It looked at the various hypotheses advanced by Mckinnon, Shaw and the 
Neo-Structuralist schools.
Mckinnon postulation was that the existing economic assumptions are not adequate 
in the context of developing countries. He provided an alternative model in which real 
balances are complements to rather than substitutes for tangible investments.
Control over public finance according to the analysis is an essential prerequisite for 
successful financial liberalisation.
Shaw in his Financial Deepening hypotheses was very critical of low controlled 
interest rates and financial repression. His view was that, the real rate of interest as 
the return savers is the key to a higher level of investment and as a rationing device 
to greater investment efficiency. The postulation therefore is that, expanded financial 
intermediation between savers and investors resulting from financial liberalisation and 
financial development, increases the incentives to save and invest as well as raising 
the average efficiency of investment.
At the centre of the Neo-Structuralist model was then* incorporation of the Curb 
Market, in which money lenders and domestic banks intermediate between savers and 
investors. The Structuralist do not fully support the view that financial liberalisation 
can yield the desired result under the conditions of standard assumption that financial 
assets are gross substitutes. Their conclusion was that financial liberalisation is likely 
to reduce the rate of economic growth by reducing the total real supply of credit 
available.
A major distinction of the Neo-Structuralist from the Mckinnon - Shaw school is on 
whether increased demand for time deposits caused by an increase in the real deposit 
rate of interest reduces the demand for currency or the demand for curb market loans.
The Nigerian economy has significantly been transformed from one dependent on
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agriculture to one heavily dependent on oil since gaining independence in 1960.
The foreign exchange problems facilitated the slow down in industrial growth 
throughout the 1980s, The industrial policy of the immediate post independence was 
that of import substitution, which was supported by a number of limited fiscal 
policies.
The problem of gross inefficiency and corruption among the Nigerian institutions of 
the state as well as the private sector have militated against the development of a clear 
and sustainable ideological position, the promotion of industrialisation and rational 
accumulation. Thus the essential need for a structural and economic adjustment.
On the part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the 
Nigerian structural adjustment programme (SAP) was essentially to reduce the 
country’s balance of payments deficits. Hence, forcing a shift from state to a full 
market led policies. The emphasis was on pricing as the major instrument for 
organising the economy and reviving the agricultural production through a 
combination of policies involving devaluation, privatisation and reductions in state 
expenditures and subsidies.
The need for a coherent exchange rate mechanism is essential. Nigeria has learnt the 
mistakes over the years of keeping to a rigid fixed exchange rate system is viewed as 
macroeconomic mis-management. Hence, the adoption of SFEM, and later the 
floatation of the naira. The usual short term policy response of restricting imports 
through exchange controls, higher tariffs and pre-imports deposits has failed to achieve 
the desired results.
Developments on the Nigerian financial system concentrated on changes in structure, 
growth and the emerging challenges. The deregulation of the financial sector meant 
non - government intervention in the organised domestic financial market through 
interest rate regulations among other factors. Thus, banks can concentrate on their 
savings mobilisation role in the economy.
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